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Abstract 
This study adopts an historical approach to explore the impact of coalmining on the town of 
Doncaster. It finds that although Doncaster was not a typical mining town nevertheless coal's 
impact was widespread, and extended beyond direct employment to impact on socio-political 
factors including the town's external image. Whilst the study explores the impact over the 
entire one hundred years of mining around Doncaster, the rationale and focus of the study is 
an assessment of the legacy of the local mining industry, and the extent to which it has 
inhibited the town's economic competitiveness in what is today called an enterprise 
economy. In this regard the study contributes to a wider understanding of the nature of 
change in old industrial regions as well as considering the efficacy of current regional 
enterprise policy. In particular the study has explored the extent to which path contingency 
captures the transition from growth to decline in former industrial regions, more adequately 
than does that of path dependency (Hudson, 2005). The key distinction drawn between the 
two concepts is human agency which is identified as operating at a range of decision-making 
levels. Analysis comes through two related case studies which show that the coal industry 
provided the basis for diversification in to new products and markets offering the possibility 
to extend the industry's lifecycle and that of towns such as Doncaster which had come to 
depend on it. It is shown the fact that these opportunities were not taken was due to 
institutional failure associated with cognitive lock-in. This rather than any specifically industry 
or place-based factor explains the nature of Doncaster's decline. 
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1 Introduction 
Numerous studies exist which focus on the impact traditional industries have had on 
localities. Checkland (1976) for example used the analogy of the Upas tree to describe the 
destructive effect that the heavy engineering sector exerted on the growth of other industries 
in and around Glasgow. 1 Other studies have focused on the steel and chemicals industries 
in Cleveland (Hudson, 1989; Macdonald & Coffield, 1991; Beynon et ai, 1994), the steel 
industry in Sheffield (Tweedale, 1995), and the fishing industry in Grimsby (Thompson et ai, 
1983). However the mining industry and its communities have tended to be studied as an 
industry apart. The uniqueness of the coalfields derives in large part from the pace and 
intensity of industrial decline (Bennett et ai, 2000). Between 1984 and 1997, 170,000 miners 
lost their jobs representing one quarter of the total male workforce in the English coalfields 
(DCLG, 2007). The legacy of closure continues to have a profound social, psychological and 
economic impact on many of the former UK coalfield communities (see Hudson & Sadler, 
1990; Turner 1995; Beatty et ai, 2005). Given that coalmining is an extractive industry the 
decline and closure of particular collieries and the communities dependent upon them is an 
inevitable fact of life, nevertheless there remains some debate as to the reasons for closure 
with it is argued more pits closed in the last decades of the 20th century for economic and 
political reasons rather than for reasons of geology or exhaustion of reserves (Bennett et ai, 
2000, pp. 2-3). This thesis contributes to this debate by re-thinking the decline of the UK coal 
industry through the experiences of the town of Doncaster. 
It has long been recognised that the concentration of a single industry and/or employer 
within a town, city or region could lead to a degree of economic vulnerability once that 
industry declined. Writing at the time of the Depression in the 1930's, Alien (1933, p. 25) 
states that the development of such highly specialised industrial areas might reduce the 
1 The Upas tree was a tree native to Java, and according to legend was able to blight the growth of other tress in a radius of up 
to 15 miles. 
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range of its industrial interests in order to confine itself to what at that time were considered 
to be the more profitable trades. Such established industries were usually carried on in 
specialised rather than variegated areas, and in the event of their decay, would make the 
development of new economic trajectories more difficult. The narrow and highly localised 
character of the great British industries was, therefore, satisfactory only so long as the 
demand for their products continued to expand. The shift from first industrial revolution 
industries such as coal to second industrial revolution industries such as chemicals and 
engineering began to herald new considerations. Already in the immediate post World War 
One years, the tendency for industries to become concentrated in the proximity of coal 
mines was being modified by new influences. Economies in the use of coal and the 
introduction of alternative sources of power were already reducing the value of sites in the 
neighbourhood of the coalfields. At the same time improvements in urban transport were 
allowing employers to abandon the central and specialist labour centres, and seek sites for 
factories in smaller towns and districts where space was available and rates were lower. 
Thus a decentralising movement was in sharp contrast to the 19th century trend towards 
increased concentration at the coal supplies. Olsen (1982) warned of the potential impact 
associated with industrial decline. He suggests that the decline of a region leads to an 
organisational and cultural hardening of the arteries, what he called 'institutional sclerosis'. 
These places, he suggests, which grow and prosper in one era find it difficult, often 
impOSSible, to adapt to new organisations and cultural patterns regardless of how beneficial 
they might be. Amin & Thrift (1994) have discussed this in terms of regions possessing an 
inappropriate institutional thickness that underpinned and supported economic activities 
located within a region, and which helped reproduce regionally specific competencies, tacit 
knowledge and trust, regarded as critical determinants of continuing economic well-being, 
but which came to be seen as barriers to moving a regional economy onto a new and more 
promising developmental trajectory (Hudson, 1994). The coal industry, probably more than 
any other industry has been studied in relation to its 'unique characteristics' which have been 
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judged as bequeathing a particular set of legacies (e.g. Fothergill, 1992). Some, such as the 
strict gender division of labour which had been established as a necessary part of the 'old' 
industrial economy, have proven to be relatively permeable and transformable and have 
subsequently broken down (Hudson, 2005). In UK coalfields, as male employment declined 
in the mines, many of the new jobs attracted to replace them were in industries which 
targeted female wage labour. Whereas domestic service had previously provided the 
majority of female employment, new job opportunities were developed for example in 
factories but more latterly in the growing public sector, in hospitals, schools and local 
government. In other respects established habits and routines proved much more resistant 
to change (Hudson, 2005). 
These instituted legacies are said to remain in three main ways: in respect to peoples 
commuting behaviour; activity spaces; and aspirations and expectations about employment 
and work (Hudson, 2005). All three ways it is argued represent ways of cognitive lock-in in 
the way that people think of their labour market and their possibilities in it. Firstly, there is a 
marked reluctance to commute even modest distances for work. In many ways the region 
remains a series of small, discrete, and spatially bounded labour markets, rather than 
forming an integrated labour market in which people are linked to employment opportunities 
across the region. Secondly, there is a legacy of recruitment into 'traditional' industries with 
sons following dads resulting in limited aspiration and low skills levels (SBS, 1993; Bennett 
et ai, 2000; Troni & Kornblatt, 2006). Thirdly, there is an enduring culture of waged labour. 
People expect to be employed rather than self-employed. This is not to say that they lack an 
entrepreneurial attitude or spirit, but that these endeavours are not funnelled into the more 
conventional channels of small business formation (Rees & Thomas, 1991; Meegan, 1990; 
Henderson & Shutt, 2004). This concern has become particularly apparent and relevant to 
policy makers and academics alike with the shift from the managed economy to the 
entrepreneurial economy, typically associated with greater levels of self-employment, a small 
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business-dominated economy and by levels of organisational flexibility (Audretsch & Thurik, 
2004). 
This study focuses on the impact of coalmining on the town of Doncaster over the course of 
the 20th century, with a view to understanding the extent to which the legacy of the mining 
industry has inhibited the town's economic competitiveness in the entrepreneurial or 
enterprise economy. The_development of the coal industry in the surrounding villages from 
1900 can in many regards be interpreted as heralding in a new progressive phase in the 
town's economic history, breaking as it did the industrial dominance of the local railways 
whilst also adding a degree of permanence for local businesses, which had become reliant 
on agricultural trade. However, the decline of the coal industry and in particular the pit 
closure programme of the 1980's and 1990's had a devastating effect on the town's 
economy. By the end of the 20th century Doncaster was one of the most 'business deprived' 
districts in England, performing poorly in comparison to other areas across all traditional 
indicators of enterprise (IPPR, 2006). Whilst Doncaster would remain untypical of most coal 
towns, having a fairly diversified, if ultimately precarious industrial base, the town's problems 
were very much identified with its association with coal mining. 
In assessing the impact of mining on Doncaster the principal question in this study is how 
should decline be understood? Theoretically, path dependency has been used to explain the 
evolution of a particular industry in a given location. The explanatory power of path 
dependency has however been questioned, including recently in Hudson's (2005) rethinking 
of change in the North East of England. Drawing on evolutionary approaches in economics 
that eschew biological analogy and which emphasise that path dependency is socially 
constituted (Metcalfe, 1998), Hudson concludes that path contingency captures the 
character of the growth process, and in particular the transition from growth to decline, more 
adequately than does that of path dependency. Specifically he argues that the State had a 
central role in determining a particular economic trajectory by creating and reinforcing lock-in 
to ensure path dependency development, and subsequently seeking to erode such lock-in to 
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facilitate new developmental trajectories (Hudson, 2005, p. 590). This study extends the 
focus beyond the North East and therefore contributes to a fuller understanding of the extent 
to which continuity and change in economic development trajectory can be understood in 
terms of path contingency. 
In particular it will assess the varying engagement of the State, and its principal agent, the 
National Coal Board, with issues of socio-economic development and change. In doing so it 
highlights the contribution made by key decision makers and following Hudson (2005) shifts 
the focus from industry- specific determinants for lock-in to policy makers and policy choices. 
However, whereas Hudson limited his application of the concept of cognitive lock-in to 
inhabitants of former coal communities, this study extends the concept to focus on key 
decision makers within the context of the UK coalfield. It has been argued that cognitive, or 
political locks (Grabher, 1993) form when certain polices become entrenched as common 
practice and when reversal from them becomes unlikely (Forestiere & Alien, 2011). In 
exploring political lock-in, this study limits itself to highlighting examples of policy decisions 
which played a significant role in determining the trajectory of the UK coal industry and 
mining dominated areas, but is associated with entrepreneurial failure at an institutional 
level. In this regard the study contributes to those calling for a re-conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship beyond narrow definitions to enable a fuller understanding of enterprise 
and enterprise cultures (see e.g. Hjorth & Steyaert, 2003; Mazzucato, 2011) 
To explore and locate entrepreneurial failure, decisions are considered at three distinct but 
interrelated levels: macro, meso and micro. Macro level analysis focuses on the role of the 
State and its engagement with the coal industry. Meso level analysis focuses on decisions 
taken at an industry level, whilst micro level analysis focuses on decision making at a local 
level. Given the importance of the coal industry to the UK economy and the nature of its 
development over the course of the century, it is recognised that at times the scope of 
agency between these three levels may change, with one level reducing the agency of 
another. For example local agency might be reduced by national public policy or where an 
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employer is dominant in a particular locality. Of particular focus will be the role of State 
involvement in the nationalised industry and the related impact on the economic trajectories 
of coal dominated areas. 
Analysis is framed within two related historical case studies. The first focuses on the nature 
of decline in the UK coal industry and provides a reassessment of the history of the UK coal 
industry over the course of the 20th century. In particular it focuses on the industry's 
transition from growth to decline. The key contribution here is in its assessment of the 
contributory role played by key decision makers to determining a particular development 
trajectory. In this regard it focuses on the 'long decline' of the industry and argues that the 
nature, timing and impact of decline can be understood as contingent on institutional inertia 
which manifested itself through the development and maintenance of self- sustaining 
coalitions (Grabher, 1993; Hudson, 1994), rather than the inexorable outcome of the decline 
in coal usage. Evidence is drawn from across the 20th century and highlights critical 
junctures when alternative trajectories were possible but not taken. The second case study 
forms the empirical part of the study and considers the impact of mining and its subsequent 
decline on the town of Doncaster. Whilst never a classic mining town in the way for example 
Barnsley was, Doncaster nevertheless over time came to be dependent upon the fortunes of 
the surrounding collieries whether directly in terms of employment or indirectly through 
various inter-linkages and multipliers. The extent of dependence is evident in numerous local 
economic reports including post-coal studies, and which indicate a specific mining legacy 
detrimental to the town's subsequent economic development. Any legacy however was not 
inexorable but on the contrary the dangers associated with lock-in were known, and 
alternative trajectories were possible. The overall conclusion that lock-in occurred because 
of institutional inertia associated with political lock-in shows the key importance when 
studying regional lock-in in old industrial regions of engaging with an institutional context at 
all spatial levels. It thus throws light on how and why regions become associated with 
particular development trajectories. 
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There are those who have argued that it is futile to use case studies as the basis for studying 
the processes of contingency arguing instead that only simulation, experiments or 
counterfactuals are appropriate to study and test path dependency (Vergne & Durand, 
2010). This study rejects this conclusion, instead following Garud et al (2010, p. 767) who 
argue conversely that "the theoretical substance of path dependency would be more readily 
applicable to situations where the complexity of the observed system can be circumscribed 
to a small and finite set of properties". 
The structure of the study is therefore cumulative. Taken together the two case studies 
contribute to a reassessment of how we understand decline in former industrial regions. Both 
cases assess whether there were windows of opportunity available when industry and/or 
regional trajectories could have been altered and new paths created. These windows of 
opportunities are discussed in terms of critical junctures, which despite their theoretical and 
practical importance have received little attention in analyses of path dependence (Capoccia 
& Keleman, 2007; Pierson, 2004). In particular there has been little application of the 
concept of critical junctures to regional economic trajectories. This study seeks to address 
this gap by extending its range of application to focus on the decline of the UK coal industry, 
and in particular to the experiences of the town of Doncaster. Where critical junctures were 
apparent and alternative trajectories available within the coal industry, through for example 
diversification into new markets, might these have enabled new or alternative economic 
paths to have been created which could have enabled the town to break any dependence on 
coal mining and launch a new economic path? Whilst this question suggests the 
consideration of a series of 'what if scenarios, the study avoids the temptation to engage in 
counterfactuals. Its aim is both more focused and more limited, focusing on whether 
alternatives/opportunities were available, and on whether these alternatives were evident at 
the time. This we describe as forseeability - that publically available evidence existed of both 
threats and opportunities. Where both conditions, i.e. opportunities and forseeability can be 
demonstrated, the broad conclusion is that, rather than industries and regions sowing the 
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seeds of their own decline (Lamoreaux et al ,2007), the nature of decline is better 
understood as being contingent upon human agency (in this case at the level of policy 
decision makers). Whilst recent studies have suggested that many former coalfields have 
not entered a spiral of economic decline (Beatty et ai, 2005), there nevertheless remain 
intractable and embedded problems with many of these localities (Gore et ai, 2007). The 
study therefore has both practical as well as theoretical implications. 
Working within a broad tradition recently populated by economic geographers and 
evolutionary economists, the study remains essentially a local history study. As such it 
adopts an historical non-linear narrative style and draws on the case study approach initially 
developed by the Annales School during the 1920's with their focus on communities and 
regions, and with the non-positivist historical approaches more latterly developed by social 
historians such as E.P Thompson, Raphael Samuel and the History Workshop. Both schools 
eschew quantitative data in favour of integrating a wide variety of local and often novel 
sources of information. Whilst not fundamentalist in any particular regard, drawing for 
example on statistical information to identify broad trends, these data are treated as 
indicators. What is important is the historically-informed awareness of other factors, which 
may affect the figures (Tosh, 2002). Consistency is a particular problem when collecting data 
over such a lengthy period and measures have been taken to control for such change where 
possible. Specifically, measures have been taken to address issues of geographic 
coverage,2 industrial classification,3 4 and multiple indicators of regional competitiveness 
(e.g. Bowes, 2003; IFO, 1990). 
2 As with any historical study it is not always easy to ensure exact continuity as geographic areas have been subject to change 
(Halsey 2000). However, broadly the study focuses on Doncaster's six central wards as they are designated today. That is the 
central wards existing in 1900. plus other wards drawn into the town as result of boundary changes in 1914 (8alby with 
Hexthorpe and Wheatley urban district) and in 1951 (Cantley including 8essacarr). This sample is largely urban and includes 
Wheatley Hall Road but not other industrial areas 
3 Whilst comparability between successive censuses is clearly desirable. nevertheless such comparability is problematiC. One 
such problem is that the whole period of census taking has been subjecl to change in the form in which information has been 
obtained and from whom; changes in definition; changes in claSSification, particularly in the case of occupations (OPCS, 1977). 
Another major reason for lack of comparability is the continuous process of movement such as associated with changes in 
boundary areas and/or the growth of urbanised areas. While general trends can be established for the earlier period. more 
detailed analysis of changes in the industrial structures (which only became possible from 1921) only becomes possible from 
the latter dates. Even after that. changes in classification between census and the inherent difficulties of allocating employment 
to specific Industries. given the increasingly complex economic structure, mean that trend figures should be seen as 
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The latter have been aggregated but are not used in any standardised way. There are no 
hard and fast theories of regional competitiveness and therefore variables are not weighted 
equally nor are they organised into an 'ideal' type or model. Instead variables are discussed 
as part of themes which relate to other coalfield studies. These themes are: economic; 
infrastructural; social; educational; and political/institutional (Bowes, 2003).5 
The principal primary source will be local newspapers published at the time. Newspapers 
represent public documents easily accessible to local people and would form a key source of 
people's information and understanding. The use of this source will help guard against what 
Lucian Febvre's (a founder of Annales School), called psychological anachronism: the 
unthinking assumption that the mental framework with which people interpreted their 
experience in earlier periods was the same as our own. Newspapers provide a direct 
connection with the particular period studied, offering a rich source of information on the 
political, social, economic and cultural activities of the town over the century, as well as 
capturing the habits, everyday local events, and a vast array of personal news items. The 
advertisements sections alone can yield rich socio-economic data as to changing levels of 
business activity and employment profiles, whilst the editorials offer insight into key local 
debates. Given the focus on decision making and the related concept of cognitive lock-in, 
particular attention will be focused on how the local coal industry was reported in the local 
newspapers. Specifically were there any indications of the nature and extent of the impact of 
mining on the town? In short were there any warning signs of any negative impact caused by 
the local mining industry? If so when were these warnings reported, what was the nature of 
concern and how if at all did these concerns change over time? Specifically the study 
approximate (Gallie in Halsey 2000). For the inter war period there was variations in whether those out of work were included or 
excluded from census tables. Even in the post war period, obtaining a consistent series of figures for employment in different 
industries is far from straightforward. The Standard Industrial ClaSSification (SIC) was heavily recast In 1968. There was a further 
adjustment of the industry categories for the 1980 Classification which required reallocation of particular industrial categories to 
maintain consistency (so have decided to use 1980 claSSification) 
4 Although business classifications were taken down as they appeared in the appropriate Trade Directories, in order to 
standardise information the study has used the claSSification index to classify earlier periods in accordance with the 1980 SIC. 
5 IFO and Bowes regional competiveness indicators are provided in appendix 1 and 2 respectively 
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explores the extent to which there were any indications of the dangers associated with lock-
in, and its causes. For the purpose of this study the Doncaster Gazette (OG) and its 
successors the Doncaster Evening Post (OEP) and Doncaster Star (OS) have been selected 
to provide consistency over the course of the century, although other local press will also be 
consulted where appropriate. 
In addition to local newspapers the study also draws on local business directories.6 Whilst 
their limitations are well documented,1 they provide a complementary source to the more 
"homogenous, industry-as-SIC-code world of empirical analysis" (Klepper & Thompson, 
2006, p. 862), and therefore in conjunction with other primary data such as census returns, 
provide the basis for a fuller mapping of the changing industrial/occupational profile of a town 
(Rimmer, 1967). Business directories for example have the potential to identify the extent to 
which groups of inter-related or complementary industries and activities are linked by either 
direct supply chain relationships or by various indirect dependencies especially spending 
multipliers. In reality even in the most heavily industrialised and seemingly single industry 
regions, economies are typically ensembles of sectors in which growth is linked by income 
and expenditure flows (Metcalfe et ai, 2006). An understanding of the interrelationships 
between coalmining and the town's economy is therefore crucial to understanding long term 
impact, as the net result of the intersection and interaction of these linkages is often the 
creation and reproduction of the conditions underpinning a particular growth trajectory for a 
regional economy (Hudson, 2005). Given our interest in the extent to which mining's legacy 
has impacted Ooncaster's ability to compete in the enterprise economy, currently typified by 
self-employment and small businesses, of particular focus will be the extent to which local 
directories suggest that the local coal industry supported wider spin-out and/or self-
employment opportunities. 
e Businesses registered in the local directories largely relate to the boundaries of the town at the time of publication. That is the 
town geographic boundaries as designated in 1900; 1914; 1948 and 1983 (see 4.1 for fuller description). 
7 See for example http://www.historicaldirectories.org/hd/ud/usingdir8.asp accessed 3/4/2006 for discussion of advantages and 
disadvantages of trade directories. The principal criticisms of the use of trade directories are; coverage can vary significantly, 
double counting of individuals or firms can be a problem, the classification of trades can vary Significantly. 
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The study is presented in three main chapters. The first provides an assessment of the 
merits of path contingency as an alternative explanatory concept to path dependency. 
Drawing on a range of disciplinary traditions it will establish a broad conceptual framework 
and extends discussion of key related concepts such as critical junctures as well as 
considering political lock-in within the context of institutional inertia. Having established a 
conceptual framework the second chapter extends its range of application to focus on the 
experiences of the UK coal industry. This is divided into two related sections which together 
explore macro, meso and micro level issues related to the nature of industrial decline. Macro 
issues are particularly associated with the way in which national government viewed the role 
and purpose of the UK coal industry, and related policy choices. Meso issues are closely 
associated with corporate decisions within the National Coal Board but also consider the role 
of coal owners prior to nationalisation. Specifically it assesses the extent to which there were 
any potential opportunities to extend the lifecycle of the industry through for example product 
or sectoral diversification. This assessment is considered in relation to micro level impact. As 
coal declined so too did the fortunes of areas that came to depend on mining. Therefore 
where the coal industry could have adapted so too could have these localities. This micro 
level analysis is related in particular to the fortunes of the town of Doncaster. 
The final chapter focuses on the development of the town of Doncaster over the entire 
period of the 20th century. For practical reasons this chapter has been divided into three 
broad chronological periods in the development of the Doncaster area coal industry. These 
are: pre and early coal, which is associated with the period from 1900 when most of the 
collieries were first sunk around the town but also includes the inter-war years; the post 
Second World War years, which focuses on the 1950's and 1960's, and which we suggest 
represents a mature industry and a period of considerable expansion; and finally decline and 
post-coal from the 1970's through to the closure programmes of the 1980's and 1990's. 
These periods, whilst not directly comparable in any particular sense, do relate to similar 
sociological typologies associated with coal communities which define the three periods as: 
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youth; maturity; and old age (Taylor, 1979). This focus also allows data from newspapers 
and business directories to be supplemented with extant but unpublished local sources 
available in the Doncaster local history library and the town archives. In particular it allows 
the integration of local economic impact studies conducted during the 1920's, 1960's and 
1980's, enabling the incorporation and integration of the widest range of data on the town, 
and thus ensuring a more complete picture of the causal relationship between coal and the 
economic fortunes of the town of Doncaster. 
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2 Path dependency or path contingency? 
2.1 Introduction 
Former UK coalfields have experienced some of the most dramatic declines in prosperity 
levels of any equivalent Western European region. Although no longer an industry of any 
standing, this decline in mining and the manner in which it was brought about continues to 
have a profound social, psychological and economic impact on the former UK coalfield 
communities (e.g. Hudson & Sadler, 1990; Beatty et ai, 2005; Troni & Kornblatt, 2005; Gore 
et ai, 2007). Even where progress is reported, regional winners and losers are evident (Gore 
et ai, 2007), and stubborn problems associated with hidden unemployment often hides the 
extent of the problem (Beatty et ai, 2005). Whilst most former coal areas have shifted 
towards service sector-dominated economies, often seen as an indicator of progress, 
studies have shown that few have managed to do so whilst maintaining comparative levels 
of affluence, a factor which might explain their inability to re-orient themselves within the 
current dominant economic milieu - the enterprise economy. Understanding the lessons of 
decline is therefore of practical as well as academic interest. 
In order to understand regional trajectories in all of their manifestations, it is necessary to 
draw upon a variety of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives, notably history. The 
recognition of the importance of history in understanding regional trajectories is nothing new. 
Marxist analysis for example has been used to explain uneven development as an historical 
process (e.g. Massey, 1984). That 'history matters' has certainly become prominent in more 
recent analysis of regional development. Perhaps the most prominent theory that has sought 
to take history seriously in studies of regional development is that of path dependency, which 
has been defined in terms of "complex processes that are unable to shake free of their 
history" (David, 2001, p. 19). Simply put this means that current and future states, actions, or 
decisions depend upon the path of previous states, actions or decisions (Page, 2006). 
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Numerous theoretical, historical and empirical studies of path dependence are available, 
covering topics ranging from the selection of institutions (North, 1991), to the formation of 
government policies (Hacker, 2002), to the choice of technology (David, 1985; Arthur, 1994), 
to the location of cities (Arthur, 1994; Page, 1998). Whilst in many disciplines path 
dependency has come to dominate thinking (Boschma & Martin, 2010), many of its 
assumptions are not unproblematic. Particularly, its overly deterministic nature, which 
suggests a council of despair, and results in processes which have an irreversible and 
inexorable influence on the ultimate trajectory of industries and economies. This leaves 
limited scope for human agency. 
Alternative approaches question the value of path dependency for assessing the nature of 
growth and decline in former industrial regions. Economic geographers for example are keen 
to assess the extent to which path dependence can be seen as a process or effect that is 
locally contingent. Coal areas have tended to be described as places apart, dominated by 
strong cultures, which have both negative institutional and cognitive impacts on regional 
trajectories, and in particular their ability to forge new and sustainable development paths. 
The focus on path contingency therefore provides an alternative perspective highlighting the 
possibility of actors at a micro (local) level affecting the overall trajectory of any given region. 
Where economic geographers focus on locally contingent processes, it is also important to 
recognise the potential contribution of wider structural issues and the role played by actors at 
both a me so (industry) and macro (government) level. In reality agency at a micro level is 
often constrained by decisions taken at either or both meso and macro levels. In the case of 
the UK nationalised industries it is also important to recognise that industry level agency may 
also be contingent on decisions made at the level of the State. 
Whilst we know something of the cause and impact of industrial decline we know less about 
the contributory processes at play. The central question here is do regions sow the seeds of 
their own decline? Are processes placelindustry dependent, or can answers be found in 
more structural factors? The present chapter addresses this question by assessing the 
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explanatory merits of path dependency. Its value is considered in relation to path 
contingency. The chapter highlights the room for human agency as the key distinguishing 
factor between the two concepts, and places agency within a range of political and economic 
contexts. The chapter also explores the extent to which agency can work as both enabler 
and constrainer in determining regional economic trajectories, identifying that opportunities 
to intervene, to 'nudge' development trajectories and regional economies onto new and 
different paths are time limited but are available. That these opportunities are not taken 
suggests that development paths are not inexorable in their emergence and consequences, 
but contingent upon other factors such as institutional inertia or political lock-in. 
2.2 Path dependency or path contingency 
Concepts of path dependence are clearly useful in understanding the development of 
regional trajectories. Hudson (2005) for example shows that the North East's long period of 
growth from the early 19th century to the 1920's was based on close and mutually reinforcing 
links of intraregional traded dependences between the mining of coal, the production of iron 
and steel, and a wide range of engineering products manufactured from iron and steel. 
However he concludes this path dependent trajectory of growth was ultimately based on 
conditions which were contingent and conjunctional, and that therefore path contingency 
captures the character of the growth process, and in particular the transition from growth to 
decline, more adequately than does that of path dependency (2005, p. 583). Others have 
also criticised path dependency as being too deterministic. Within the domain of economic 
geography for example Martin and Sunley (2006; 2010) seek to reconceptualise path 
dependency as a dynamic open historical process by which technologies, industries and 
institutions, and therefore regions, evolve along unfolding trajectories. These trajectories, 
they argue, are shaped not only by the sequences of prior developments and influence, but 
also by the evolution of processes of path dependency themselves. This perspective has 
important implications for our understanding of both product and industry life cycles, with 
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recent explanations identifying generic forms of path dependency in a range of industries but 
which are not deterministic. 
For example, important departures from the life cycle model have been found in some 
industries, as new markets and niches are repeatedly constructed and exploited. A case 
illustrated by Klepper & Thompson (2006) who suggest that the continual rise in the number 
of new entrants in the laser industry may be because of the importance of specialised 
submarkets. These submarkets can be differentiated along numerous dimensions such as 
the technology they use, the geographical areas in which they operate or the services that 
they provide, and that the number will change over time. However, investment decisions 
through for example research and development provide new opportunities for firm 
diversification and growth, whereas firms which choose to remain specialised in a single 
market or submarket can be expected to vanish when that market dies. Further evidence of 
the 'enabling' forms of path dependency, often also referred to as 'path creation', is that 
product innovation does not always wane during the mature phase of some industries. 
Instead it may rise sharply. For example in the mature automobile industry, Japanese and 
some European producers gained an innovative lead over American producers through both 
process and product innovations (Hefferman, 2003; Klepper, 1997). Such cases of 
'resurgent innovation' have been described as evidence of a phase of 'dematurity' (Storper, 
1985). Processes of this sort would seem to fit a less deterministic development model in 
which an industry (and that part of a local or regional economy dependent upon it) 
undergoes radical adaption, in effect renewing (or extending) the industry's (regions) 
development path (Martin & Sunley, 2010). However, recent empirical evidence suggests 
that new development pathways are more evident in regions which do not have long 
industrial histories (Simmie et ai, 2008). 
In order to understand why some mature industries (and therefore regions) succumb to 
negative lock-in and complacency whilst others demonstrate increased innovativeness, it is 
important to understand the intersection of enabling and constraining processes. Martin 
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(2003) identified five possible factors of which three are relevant to this study. These are 
firstly: increasing returns whereby the more profits that can be made from the selling of a 
particular product or service, the more producers are inclined to produce it. This factor 
results in firms, consumers and regions being locked into repetitive patterns of production, 
consumption and employment and hence limiting the opportunity for the development of new 
products, services, regional economic trajectories and career opportunities. From this 
study's perspective the focus is the extent to which the National Coal Board maintained a 
commitment to the production of coal but which was to the longer-term detriment of the 
coalfields and their communities. Given the close relationships developed between large 
enterprises such as the Coal Board and its supply chain, any assessment should consider 
any negative impact, and in particular the ability of suppliers to develop what has been called 
boundary-spanning functions such as research and development and marketing (Hassink, 
2010), and diversify into new markets. The second and related factor is technological lock-in 
whereby regions are tied to existing technologies. This can be either a good or a bad thing. 
One recent comparative study conducted across UK regions found for example that whereas 
Cambridge had developed a trajectory of 'cumulative innovation' fuelled by the co-evolution 
of a highly entrepreneurial environment and based on a high-tech economy, the opposite is 
true of the old industrial city of Swansea which remains locked into a low skill economy 
(Simmie et ai, 2008, pp. 59-61). Within the context of this study the focus is the extent to 
which an entrepreneurial environment was evident within the coal industry whereby 
technological innovation was encouraged, supported and exploited. The third factor relevant 
to this study is institutional inertia which is associated with governmental, organisational or 
cultural systems which lag behind economic change. This institutional inertia or political lock-
in (Grabher, 1993) has been described as the development over time of thick institutional 
tissues aimed at preserving existing structures, and therefore unnecessarily slowing down 
industrial restructuring, as well as indirectly hampering the development of new development 
trajectories (Hassink, 2010). Institutional tissues consist both of networks of organisations, 
such as trade unions, business support agencies but particularly political administrations at 
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all spatial levels, and large enterprises, and who through the development of self-sustaining 
coalitions (Grabher, 1993; Hudson, 1994) influence disproportionately regional patterns of 
behaviour, such as norms, rules and written and unwritten laws, and subsequently a region's 
development path. In such a situation, large companies might not want to give up sites for 
the attraction of inward investment, as they might be concerned that they will lose qualified 
employees to competitors. Local authorities might not see the point of attracting inward 
investment or promoting restructuring in another way, as large tax incomes are paid by 
traditional industries (Hassink, 2010). In some regions, the spirit of entrepreneurship might 
dwindle because of increasing industrial concentration and the domination of large 
companies. These self-sustaining coalitions are also influential and are able to lobby for 
sectoral interventions often at a national level, which hamper the restructuring process more 
than they support it (Hamm & Wienert, 1989 in Hassink, 2010). Institutional milieus also 
change more slowly than industries, and therefore a sclerotic milieu can remain embedded 
within networks often constraining efforts to enable new trajectories (Callon, 1998). 
Institutional inertia or political lock-in is the central focus of this study as it suggests that the 
development trajectory of industries and regions is not just the result of economic factors, 
but better understood as much as a socio-cultural and political phenomena and one that can 
operate at all spatial levels. Although this factor is less well documented (Hassink, 2010; 
Simmie et ai, 2008) it could be argued that all factors are dependent upon it. 
Two examples can illustrate this point. Swansea has witnessed two phases of economic 
development. The first developed during the 19th century and was based on extractive 
industries such as coal and tin (Simmie et ai, 2010). The second triggered by decline in 
these industries was developed in the 1970's and focused on electronics. However both led 
to a negative trajectory. The decline of Swansea's traditional extractive sectors left it with 
pools of unemployed labour with limited re-training potential. Yet a combination of foreign 
investment in electronics, mass production branch plants and growing public sector 
employment provided new sources of employment. However the historical development of 
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this particular set of knowledge and skills limited both the range of possibilities that may 
have led to newer and more sustainable trajectories (Simmie et ai, 2008, p. 63). The case 
can be made that in failing to learn the lessons of history those actors responsible for key 
investment and policy decisions and embedded within self sustaining coalitions, were 
responsible for locking the city into a narrow and ultimately unsustainable development 
pathway. Arguably this is currently happening in the UK's defence industry. Championed by 
successive governments as a British success story, the defence industry has in fact been 
operating in a declining market and one increasingly constrained by ethical considerations. 
Yet arguments that have been promoted which challenge the industry to break with the 
current trajectory and utilise the current workforce's skills to diversify into civil manufacturing 
and Jor emerging technologies have so far met with little support at either industry or 
governmental level (see e.g. The Guardian letters page 30 Sept, 2011). Both examples are 
illustrative of how institutional inertia, through political lock-in, can determine narrow 
technological and developmental trajectories which eschew new opportunities for shorter 
term objectives. 
Whereas path dependency tends to suggest that industries (and regions) are buffeted by a 
series of unpredictable, non purposive and somewhat random events resigned to being 
locked in through self reinforcing mechanisms that we have no control over (Garud et ai, 
2010, p. 765), path contingency leaves a space for human agency. This is the key distinction 
this study draws between the two concepts, and is one that has to date received limited 
investigation (Simmie et ai, 2008). It is argued that agency can be used to lock regions into 
declining development pathways but equally that it can be used positively to create new 
paths and trajectories. Path contingency therefore envisages the possibility of agents or 
entrepreneurs searching for new opportunities, re-using resources, transferring 
competences as the basis of new growth previously referred to as path creation. These 
entrepreneurs (as key agents) it is argued are embedded in paths but not completely 
constrained by them: indeed they demonstrate 'mindful deviation' from prevailing ideas and 
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accepted ways of doing things (Garud & Karnoe, 2001). Whilst studies of entrepreneurship 
over the past forty years or so have tended to limit analysis to easily measureable units of 
assessment, principally new business start up (rates), this study adopts the Schumpeterian 
point of departure that entrepreneurship exists in all types of settings (1934/1994), 
irrespective of size or type (Burgelman, 1983; Miller, 1983; Gartner, 1985), and including the 
public as well as the private sector (Kearney et ai, 2007). 
The notion that there is a strong connection between entrepreneurship and the private sector 
has resulted in entrepreneurship in the public sector being underestimated resulting in 
theoretical, practical and political shortcomings. Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs, are 
important for the development of society in other ways than through starting businesses, for 
example, through effecting change (Sundin & Tillmar, 2008), or as a catalyst for innovation 
(Mazzucato, 2011). Entrepreneurial behaviour is here defined not only as the identification 
and discovery of opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), but also the shaping and 
crafting of the necessary institutional infrastructure in order to capitalise on and exploit these 
opportunities (Djelic & Quack, 2003). Where organisational and institutional contexts are 
engineered such that they create enabling conditions, they can also themselves create 
further opportunities for entrepreneurship (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). This might manifest 
itself in terms of new businesses started within a locality but equally could result in the 
development of what Burns (2005) calls an entrepreneurial architecture.8 Entrepreneurial 
behaviour in the public sector differs from that of private sector entrepreneurship in that the 
profit motive is not its primary goal (Forster et aI, 1996), although this is a distinction of type 
and not of the value of its economic and social contribution. In this study the profitable 
exploitation of coalmining and in particular the ability to exploit new or emerging 
opportunities is related not only to the strengthening of the industry's position and the 
fortunes of coal owners, but more specifically in relation to the fortunes of communities that 
8 Bums reference is to the entrepreneurial DNA of an organisation which he argues is built on the three pillars of leadership. 
culture and structure and underpinned by appropriate strategies, and follows Drucker's (1985) observation that 
entrepreneurship is based on the same principles, whether the entrepreneur is an existing large institution or an individual 
starting a new business. 
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became dependent on the industry, whether through employment (direct or indirect), or 
spending multipliers. To this end entrepreneurship, and an enterprise culture, is 
reconceptualised and related to an individual or institutional behaviour which is socially as 
well as economically useful (Hjorth & Steyaert, 2003), and one which may result in negative 
short term effects but with a view to longer term benefits. Conceptualised within this space, 
entrepreneurship and enterprise cultures are locally and historically situated and preclude 
the tendency towards one sized-fits-all policy approaches. 
This study explores the role of enterprise within two related contexts; corporate 
entrepreneurship and political entrepreneurship. The term corporate entrepreneurship has 
been used to describe entrepreneurship within large organisations (Burgelman, 1983). In this 
study the focus is on the coal industry , predominately but not exclusively under State 
ownership, and explores actions which might have been taken to diversify and change the 
industry's linear decline, and which might also have enabled regions dependent upon mining 
to change their economic trajectory. Political entrepreneurship is associated with state 
agents operating at both a national and local level. The notion of state agency is not novel: it 
has previously been addressed by economists and sociologists, particularly those studying 
developing economies. For example Evans (1995) noted that whilst the classical role of the 
State is seen in terms of regulation enforcer, in more recent times a more critical and 
proactive role has come to the forefront, highlighting the key enabling role of the State in the 
creation of new opportunities. The transformative role involves "eliciting entrepreneurship 
and facilitating the creation of productive capacities" (Evans, 1995, p. 6), often through its 
role as a funder of organisations (Mazzucato, 2011). Whilst largely discussed in relation to 
national government, the concept has also been applied to local levels (see Schneider & 
Teske, 1992). Both corporate and political entrepreneurship are explored more fully below. 
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2.3 Corporate entrepreneurship and business choices 
The creation of new paths of technology and industrial development is critical to the survival 
of both firms and regions. The alternative has been described as being associated with lock-
in. Decisions taken within existing organisations are therefore crucial. A range of options are 
open to the corporate entrepreneur. Patel & Pavitt (1997) argue that firms can launch new 
paths by modifying processes, or by branching out of existing industries into new but 
technologically related activities. Some firms such as 3M are renowned for this (Bartlett & 
Mohammed, 1999; Robinson, 2001). New paths can also be created by upgrading, renewing 
or revitalising existing industries through the introduction of new technologies, or the setting 
up of new products divisions. Whilst there is a strong argument to suggest that firms can 
only do a few things well at anyone time (Nelson, 1995, p. 79), there is an equally strong 
argument, as shown by the case of 3M, that long term and sustainable competitive 
advantage emerges from organisations institutionalising innovative and stimulating 
environments which recognise and incentivise staff and encourage new developments 
across a wide range of product areas. These firms have been described as having an 
'entrepreneurial orientation' (Miller, 1983), that is they have a heightened risk orientation, a 
commitment to innovation and a proactive approach to developing opportunities. Typically, 
firms which demonstrate an entrepreneurial orientation develop most of their new 
technologies in-house, a process leading to what Patel and Pavitt (1997) call technological 
accumulation. Others working in the domain of organisational learning suggest similarly that 
the key to sustainable innovative organisational cultures is the development of a strong in-
house knowledge base. This would be evident for example through a commitment to 
research and development. The underlying ability to create new knowledge through 
innovation is the ability to recognise, understand and use relevant knowledge. These 
attributes have come to be known as absorptive capacity which is identified as being 
essential to the development of new paths (Cohen & Leventhal, 1989). 
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Whilst Mazzucato (2011) has argued recently that State funded organisations can be nimble 
and innovative, which help to transform economies, these organisational characteristics 
have been less apparent in the public sector where larger, hierarchical and relatively rigid 
organisations are typical, and which have conflicting but well understood objectives and 
generally less control over resources (Sadler, 2000). Further the external environment of a 
public organisation is littered with political considerations (Nutt, 2005, p. 5), which often 
means they have less freedom to react as they see fit to the circumstances they face 
(Boyne, 2002). As a result of political constraints there are frequent changes in policy, and 
the imposition of short-term time horizons on key corporate decision makers. The views of 
opinion leaders, outright manipulation by legislators and interest groups, and opposition to 
organisational prerogatives are more important than economic issues (Levine et ai, 1975). 
In assessing the extent to which the nature of the mining industry's decline was contingent 
on decision making this study will explore the extent to which this was this true of the coal 
industry. Specifically was there evidence of such entrepreneurial leadership in the industry? 
Were decisions taken which enabled the industry to develop existing or new business 
opportunities be they through diversification into new markets or products and services, or 
was it constrained by wider political factors? And if so, why and what was the impact on both 
industry and dependent areas? 
2.4 Political entrepreneurship and policy choices 
The idea that innovative individuals contribute to institutional change has a long history in 
political science although it is less evident in other disciplines (where there is a tendency to 
view political activity as playing a largely unproductive role in entrepreneurship e.g. Baumol, 
1990). In his case study of political power in New Haven USA, Dahl (1961) introduced the 
term "political entrepreneurs," to describe these agents, which he defined as individuals who 
recombine resources in the policy arena to bring about change. Policy interventions can 
emerge at a local, national and increasingly today at a supranational level. This study 
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focuses on local (micro) and macro (national) but recognises the growing importance of the 
supranational level. Levels of regional autonomy may determine agency but local political 
entrepreneurs can be elected politicians, such as Mayors or members of town councils, 
leaders of established interest groups, or creators of new bodies (Schneider & Teske, 1992). 
Local level decisions might include the granting of planning permission for new commercial 
development, the provision of appropriate housing, or the provision of local tax incentives to 
attract factory location. A more recent example would be the decision to apply for or award 
Enterprise Zone status. These interventions can have intended and unintended 
consequences, which in turn can have both positive and negative impacts on a region both 
in the short and in the long term. Positive impacts might include the introduction of policies 
which lead to greater local and regional connectivity. A good example of this would be the 
UK government's motorway building programme during the 1950's which proved to be the 
catalyst for private sector developments in the depressed regions (Bale, 1974). Connectivity 
more broadly has consistently been identified has having a positive effect on regional 
competitiveness, including as part of efforts to regenerate former coalfield areas (Bowes, 
2003; Troni & Kornblatt, 2006; Gore et ai, 2007). Conversely, policy decisions can also have 
negative effects on regional trajectories. These can often be contradictory in nature. For 
example the very fact that regional connectivity is improved can often lead to the out 
migration of the younger, more skilled, members of the population, something which often 
"strips communities of their most dynamic and prosperous element" (DETR, 1998, p. 10-11). 
Similarly the granting of Enterprise Zone status to one region may have a negative impact on 
neighbouring regions in the short-term and for the recipients of Enterprise Zone status in the 
long-term once the tax relief disappears (Sissons & Brown, 2011). 
The negative implications of policy interventions are not new and in fact can be dated back 
to the origins of UK regional planning. Possibly the best example being that prior to the late 
1970's, regional policy interventions were predominately associated with the steering of 
industry into the development areas (Hudson, 2006). Whilst on the surface this seems to be 
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an enlightened policy, it has subsequently been shown to have had negative consequences 
for affected regions, commonly referred to as 'branch plant syndrome'. Research on the 
branch plant question from the 1970s has found that externally controlled branch plants 
typically lacked managerial authority and were functionally 'truncated', i.e. they concentrated 
on production activities whilst 'higher functions' such as research and development were 
conducted elsewhere within the parent firm (Watts, 1981). As a consequence of these 
features, regions with a high concentration of branch plants were likely to be deficient in 
white collar and high-skilled occupations (e.g. Townroe, 1975; Hayter, 1982) and 
technologically dependent, lacking innovative and entrepreneurial activity (e.g. Firn,1975; 
Hayter, 1982; Scott, 2009). Branch plants themselves were also criticised for their lack of 
linkages with local companies (e.g. McDermott, 1976; Stewart, 1976; Hoare, 1978; Stopford 
& Turner, 1985) and for their apparent vulnerability to closure during recessionary periods 
(e.g. Harris, 1988; Fothergill & Guy, 1990; ScoU, 2009). Whilst there has been some shift in 
understanding in recent years it is still generally concluded that a high concentration of 
branch plants in a region is a risky strategy without some degree of local autonomy and local 
embedding in local supply chains and networks (Simmie et ai, 2008). The experience of 
Swansea again illustrates this point. As does Northern Ireland whose role as a low cost 
production location seems to have owed much to a government assisted wave of branch 
factory inward investment that characterised the region in the 1960's and 1970's (Crone, 
2000). Branch plant syndrome is therefore illustrative of a negative impact that policy-makers 
decisions can have on the longer term development of a region. 
2.5 Policy choices and political consensus 
In seeking to highlight that economic and regional trajectories are contingent on decisions 
and decision-makers often operating as part of self-sustaining coalitions, it should be 
recognised that the line between economic adjustment and renewal can be thin (Boschma & 
Lambooy, 1999; Martin & Sunley, 2006), and that in most instances regional economic 
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trajectories including path creation will inevitably involve a complex admixture of deliberate 
agency and accidental and unintended consequences (Martin & Sunley, 2010, p.79). Meyer 
& Schubert (2007) for example, argue that the formations of all paths lie somewhere on a 
continuum between completely accidental and random emergence, and a deliberate 
intended creation. This could range from acts of God such as the recent economic impact of 
hurricanes and tsunamis to the impact of globalisation and the increasing levels of 
supranational decision-making. Within an institutional context this means decisions are often 
taken which have consequences but which are not always as initially intended. However 
from a political choice perspective the outcomes of policy can be identified with institutional 
inertia and political lock-in. 
Understanding what factors drive policy decision-making has been considered in political 
science (e.g. Dunleavy, 1995). It was recently explored by Johnson (2005) from a small 
business policy perspective. He argues that politicians (as the key decision-makers) are 
primarily interested in their own welfare, defined as enhancing their chances of re-election. 
This leads them to seek ways to ensure that they are seen as 'popular'. This means 
politicians typically follow a short election cycle so they are more likely to favour short-term 
benefits, such as the application for, and the granting of Enterprise Zone status. Secondly, 
that they will be tempted to favour interventions that they judge will benefit particular 
electorally influential groups, rather than those that maximise overall and longer term 
economic welfare. In short they might take conscious decisions out of short-term political 
expediency but which may not be in the longer term interest of the local areas they may 
represent. 
An alternative perspective, more closely associated with a Marxist approach suggests that 
all policy interventions are ultimately motivated by a desire to benefit the ruling class rather 
than the ordinary worker/community. Viewed from this perspective interventions would be 
driven by a desire to maintain an ideological or political orthodoxy over and above the 
concerns and needs of individual regions. The result is often one-size-fits-all regional 
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policies determined by a national or industrial strategic agenda but which are pursued at the 
expense of specific regional needs. Whilst these agendas and priorities can shift over time 
as parties of differing political persuasions reach office, nevertheless regional policy making 
in the UK has tended to be typified by a broad consensus (Parsons, 1988). This pOlitical 
consensus could be seen to emerge in the 1930's and was associated with maintaining a 
particular view of a capitalist economy. In the 1930's talk was of the maintenance of an 
economic orthodoxy, and from the later 1970's onwards about the hegemony of the free 
market. This consensus revolved around an arrangement for handling and defining the 
economic problems of the time in certain specific ways. In the 1930's it was 'derelict' or 
'depressed areas', in the 1950's and 1960's it was 'growth zones', and 'regional planning.' 
From the late 1970's regional policy focus shifted to the creation of an 'enterprise economy'. 
In the period before the 1970's regional policy was associated with the maintenance of the 
staple industries and the steering of industry into depressed regions or growth zones. From 
the late 1970's increasing pressure was placed on local authorities to expand or develop 
their own autonomist economic development and employment programmes, principally 
based on encouraging the growth of local small firms (Hudson, 2000). 
Each intervention "was designed to effect a change in what we might term the 'meta' policy, 
and each adopted what was then the prevailing discourse of the day" (Parsons, 1988, p. 13). 
Each was designed to divert attention from the fundamental cause of the problem towards 
the particular local problems and associated with the alleged peculiarities of places and 
people (Davies and Green, 1979 in Parsons. 1988). Any scope for local agency would be 
within the parameters established by the meta policy with local authorities enmeshed and 
effectively incorporated into accepting the State's definition of the problem and its proposed 
solution (Davies & Green, 1979 in Parsons, 1988). A degree of local consensus was 
therefore often evident although the commitment was often underpinned by a range of 
financial incentives. Hudson's (2000) description of Labour councillors in the north east for 
example, as 'the last entrepreneurs', is a pejorative comment based on his observation that 
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local authorities had (often reluctantly) accepted that competition in the market place was the 
only way to solve their problems, to a point of vigorously and often successfully competing 
for enterprise zone status, or Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) funding. 9 
2.6 Critical junctures and decision making windows 
Path contingency recognises that during any given time period there will be opportunities to 
break economic (industry) and regional trajectories and to create new developmental 
pathways. These opportunities can be said to reflect critical junctures (Collier & Collier, 
1991) which are defined as branching points, resulting in the adoption of one course of 
action from among alternatives (Mahoney, 2000, p.512). Thereafter, developments continue 
along that particular path (Mahoney, 2003; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). What constitutes a 
critical juncture has been variously explained but with little consideration of regional 
economic trajectories. For example Garrett & Lange (1995) showed that electoral landslides 
create critical junctures as they provide clear mandates for policy change. Karl (1997) 
employed the concept in analysing the "petro-states" development paths, whilst Haggard 
(1988) used it to assess the changing influence of trade unions. From a regional perspective 
critical junctures present policy and decision makers with what economic geographers have 
termed windows of locational opportunity (Storper, 1995; Boschma & van der Knaap, 1999; 
Boschma & Frenken, 2003). However, these windows are often narrow and are likely to be 
both locality specific and with long term implications. Policymakers should therefore 
endeavour to keep such 'windows' open to avoid lock-in to a restricted technological path 
(Simmie et ai, 2008). 
I See for example Convery's (2006) review of the six winning bids for Local Enterprise Growth Initiative funding. LEGI 
represents the most significant source of economic development funding currently on offer, with a budget of £300 million over 
the period 2006-2009 (date of initial publication of thesis). The areas eligible to apply are those that had been listed at least 
once within the 50 most deprived local authorities under the various domains of the Indices of Deprivation 2000-2004, with 
Government stating that it was particularly interested in bids from local authorities that have the 'lowest rates of enterprise 
formation' and are furthest from meeting their enterprise targets'. The South Tyneside bid recognised that its area was 
characterised by an 'enterprise deficit and persistent underperformance arising from a dependence on large employers in 
declining industries .. .'St Helens declared itself to be at the bottom of the league and states Its ambition to become a 'self-
sustaining economy which no longer requires special measures:. Primarily the bid intends to change a culture in which 'for 
generations, almost everyone worked for a few large companies' and to demonstrate that now 'there is life beyond benefits and 
that self-employment and enterprise is a real option. 'Hastings describes itself as 'the most deprived town In the country's most 
prosperous region, and County Durham's b.id has. one of the most ambitious visions; to develop 'the most enterprising 
communities in the North east and the fastest Improving area for enterprise and productivity in England'. 
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The contribution of the critical junctures concept is its focus on historical causes (Collier & 
Collier (1991). However, if focusing on the formative moments of new paths during narrow 
windows of opportunity is critical, then only being able to do so long after the critical juncture 
could be considered to be a significant weakness as an analytical framework and policy-
making tool. From a policy-making perspective this would suggest that in order to instigate 
change, policy-makers and organisational leaders would need foresight as well as the ability 
to act. Given the focus on contingent causes of decline, this study assesses the evidence as 
to whether alternatives were available, and whether alternatives were apparent at the time -
forseeability. Were there, for example, alternative technological paths available to the coal 
industry which offered opportunities (for both the industry and dependent region) or was the 
industry a single product industry which offered little by way of spin out potential? Secondly, 
was decline foreseeable? Where decline was foreseeable and alternatives not developed 
then a conclusion would be that decline was contingent and the result of political lock-in or 
institutional inertia. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The chapter has outlined the conceptual underpinning for the study drawing on and 
integrating a range of disciplines including economic geography, evolutionary economics, 
political science and history. It establishes that whilst industrial and regional growth and 
decline is often associated with path dependent processes which lock in particular economic 
and cultural trajectories, path contingency provides a more convincing concept for 
understanding the nature of decline of old industrial regions. The chapter has related path 
contingency to both industry and regional decline but focused on the related concept of 
institutional inertia or political lock-in as a key contributory factor in determining economic 
and cultural trajectories. Political lock-in has been related to regional industrial legacies, 
grounded within the concept of entrepreneurship, which has been further extended to 
consider its relationship with decision making at both an industry (meso) and policy-making 
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level- at both a local (micro) and national (macro) level, and broadened to recognise social 
as well as economic value. This decision-making nexus has been located within the concept 
of self-sustaining coalitions, which are networks of interests which act to constrain regional 
opportunities in line with a particular cognitive or ideological perspective. It has been argued 
that regional lock-in is a multi-scaled process, and one which also has a high degree of 
place-dependence, but is in fact influenced and affected by both intra-regional and extra-
regional factors. Human agency within and between these levels is identified as the key 
determining factor in understanding the nature of regional decline. Signalling the potential 
constraints on regional agency provides a caveat to place-based conclusions but is 
significant given the 'political' history of the coal industry in the UK. However, this does not 
detract from the broader conclusion that regional trajectories are contingent on human 
agency (at some institutional level). Windows of opportunity for enabling interventions, which 
can steer industry and regions on new, different and sustainable development paths are 
here associated with critical junctures, and although these interventions may have short term 
drawbacks, for regions and policy makers, they would have longer term benefits for regions. 
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3 Coal and coal mining 
3.1 Introduction 
The coal industry occupies a central place in Britain's industrial history (Scott, 2006) having 
occupied a strategic importance to the UK economy few other industries could. The industry 
became a catalyst behind Britain's industrial revolution and provided most of the energy 
needs of the country's population for much of the 20th century. Throughout the 19th century 
(and to a lesser degree in the 20th century), coal was also viewed as the main force in 
determining the localisation of wider trades and industries (Alien, 1933), acting for example 
as a catalyst for the expansion of manufacturing in the north east's economic development 
during the second half of the 19th century (Hudson, 2000). Geology and natural resources 
certainly influenced the location of the industry, unlike the spatial pattern of many sectors 
such as the textile industry in and around Manchester, or shoes and leather in towns in 
southern England which seemed at best only tenuously related to a set of underlying 
physical conditions (Scott, 2000). Strongly embedded within often geographically isolated 
coal communities, the coal industry has typically been studied as an industry apart. The 
extent of industrial 'uniqueness' has subsequently been qualified, but nevertheless remains 
a central factor in understanding both the industry's growth trajectory (Hudson, 2005) and 
the nature and impact of its decline (Fothergill, 1992). This chapter explores the nature of the 
coal industry. Specifically it assesses the industry's transition from growth to decline over the 
course of the 20th century. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to explore the nature of change in old industrial regions. 
It does so by exploring the relationship between mining and the town of Doncaster over the 
course of the 20th century, and the extent to which coal mining locked the town into a narrow 
trajectory which offered little opportunity for movement on to different, new and sustainable 
development paths. This chapter therefore provides the wider industry context. Specifically 
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this chapter will assess the extent to which the coal industry's development path was locked 
in to a narrow economic trajectory limited to the production of its principal product - coal. 
Industries which remain specialised in a single market or submarket can be expected to 
vanish when that market dies: regions which become dependent upon them likewise. The 
processes by which lock-in occurs provides the key focus and will enable an assessment of 
the extent to which decline is better understood as path contingent rather than path 
dependent. Agency had earlier been identified as the key distinguishing factor between the 
two concepts and therefore analysis will be based on evidence that alternative product and 
market trajectories were available which could extend the lifecycle of the industry and/or 
enable coal communities to re-orient themselves onto to newer and more sustainable 
development paths, and that these were recognised but rejected. Within this chapter agency 
is considered in relation to two decision making levels: macro to explore the role of the State 
and, meso to explore the role of the industry. 
Evidence is organised within two related sections. The first section 3.2 explores the long 
decline of the coal industry. The purpose is not to give a comprehensive historical account of 
the changes in the industry, but to examine the decline of the coal industry by focusing on 
key decisions taken by industrial and political actors and their impact on the overall trajectory 
of the UK coal industry. The narrative highlights examples of key decisions taken where 
alternative development paths were possible. As such, there is a deliberate selectivity in the 
choice of evidence. To aid analysis, comparison is provided with the West German coal 
industry. Whilst any generalisable comparison of coal areas is difficult (whether national or 
international), the German experience in terms of the sheer scale of regionally concentrated 
industrial decline is close to the experience of that of the UK's. At the time when decline 
intensified from 1980, both governments believed that the free market should be the basis of 
energy decision making. In 1980 UK government policy objectives were stated as ensuring 
the 'adequacy, security, and efficient use of energy supplies', whilst in 1983 West Germany's 
objective was to ensure a 'safe and economical supply of energy' (BMW1, 1986, p. 9.48). In 
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both countries coal would remain important but its decline would continue as nuclear power 
took a larger share of electricity generation. There were, however, significant differences in 
coal policy between the two countries. What were they, and how did they affect the coal 
regions? 
To simplify matters the 20th century is broken down into four main periods relating to major 
phases in coal output, employment, investment and ownership etc. Each period, it is argued, 
offered a policy window of opportunity to shift the subsequent trajectory of the industry onto 
a more sustainable path whether through improved levels of investment, productivity or 
diversification. Briefly, 1913-1946 was a period of fragmented private ownership and limited 
investment. Whilst the poor state and performance of the industry meant that it was subject 
to numerous government enquiries, the period is nevertheless typified by government inertia 
and most notably associated with the pressing question of public ownership of the industry. 
Th is is su rfaced here but developed more fully in section 3.3. 1947-1956 marked the 
beginnings of state ownership. Whilst coal was the dominant fuel source at this time, 
institutional inertia again determined that the industry's development path remained 
constrained. This is highlighted through the lack of coordination between the State's fuel 
policies and the long term plans of the Coal Board, which is also symptomatic of the wider 
constraints on Coal Board agency, and highlights the fundamental ambiguity of purpose 
which threatened to undermine the competitiveness of the industry. Whereas 1947-1956 had 
been a period of expansion, conversely 1957-1973 represented an era of rapid contraction 
in deep mining capacity, as new energy sources were available and promoted at the 
expense of mining. Whilst unwilling to intervene to support the industry the self-sustaining 
coalition comprising the State and Coal Board nevertheless determined to a great extent that 
coal areas would remain locked-in to a declining industry and unable to diversify into new 
emergent sectors. Finally 1974 saw the publication of the Plan for Coal and an upturn in coal 
investment and output, although this was short-lived and was followed by another sharp 
period of contraction during the 1980's and 1990's and the subsequent ending of deep 
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mining in the UK. This period is therefore associated with large scale pit closure 
programmes, mass job losses and highly localised unemployment (Beatty et ai, 2005). 
Whereas pit closure was a fact of life for many coal areas in preceding decades, during the 
1980's and 1990's there were few alternative jobs available, as pit closure often coincided 
with retrenchment in other local heavy industry. Timing and the response to pit closures is 
identified as the final critical juncture, with political lock-in determining not only the speed of 
decline but also the inadequate response to regional economic dislocation. The four periods 
cover the 20th century and therefore provide the basis for a reassessment of the nature of 
decline of the coal industry. Windows of opportunity are identified as providing critical 
junctures which offered the opportunity to enable a different and more sustainable 
development path. That these opportunities were not taken represent failure at an 
institutional level previously described as institutional inertia or political lock-in. 
Section 3.3 develops the argument but extends its analysis to consider the case for 
corporate entrepreneurial failure which prevented the industry from diversifying into related 
and new markets, whether through a lack of investment or wider institutional inertia. The 
failure of the British coal industry has been the subject of extensive study over many years 
with a number of causes identified. Here the debate is re-categorised and simplified into two 
schools of thought which on the one hand view decline as being path dependent and 
determined by the nature of coalmining, and on the other as contingent on wider structural 
and institutionally factors. In the former category, mining is viewed as a Single product 
industry which offered few spin out opportunities, ensuring a trajectory based on a narrow 
and ultimately unsustainable economic base (e.g. Church, 1986; Outram, 1997; Garside & 
Greaves, 1997). Decline was therefore linked to the specific product lifecycle of coal as an 
energy source and inexorable. Regional economic trajectories therefore can be understood 
this way. Conversely decline has been interpreted as the result of corporate entrepreneurial 
failure. Coal was not an undifferentiated product, and submarkets and uses for its various 
types provided opportunities for diversification. Many colliery companies combined 
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coalmining with ownership of coke ovens, with metallurgical production, and in the case of 
the Doncaster Collieries Association with an integrated sales agency (Supple, 1987). 
However that these, and other, submarkets were not developed to any degree has been 
blamed on the entrepreneurial failure of British coal owners (Chandler, 1990). Institutional 
and structural factors related to export and capital markets for example have been explored 
in mitigation of the actions of coal owners. For most of the inter war period the prospects for 
good profit-making in the coal industry were poor: the demand was inelastic yet the supply 
was competitive and the investment costs of innovation high (Supple, 1987, p. 408). Within 
this dynamic context a degree of caution is understandable. However, there was also scope 
for agency at a company level. For example, whilst recognising that capital markets might be 
tight, the structural insularity associated with family ownership played a part in both a desire 
to invest, and in limiting access to capital to invest. Similarly, almost more than any other 
industry, coalmining exemplified a potentially sharp disjuncture between its business and its 
technical functions ensuring that resource allocation decisions were not also coordinated. 
Notably, it has been argued that a cultural flaw lay at the root of the problem, compounded 
by what has been described as a brotherly ethos which enjoined Britain's leading mining 
men to the discipline of civic activism which took them away from their businesses This 
resulted in a preference for managerial strategies that were most immediately to hand and 
least demanding in terms of time and attention (Dintenfass, 1988; 1993; 1996). Whilst the 
robustness of these culture-based conclusions have been questioned on methodological 
grounds,10 and examples of entrepreneurial activity at a firm level are evident, the central 
argument that a poor entrepreneurial spirit was endemic in the UK industry at large, 
including the coal industry has received considerable support.11 The entrepreneurial failure 
thesis focused on the coal industry under private ownership but is here extended to consider 
'0 As with their countryman Martin Weiner. both Chandler and Dintenfass. have had their condusions questioned on 
methodological grounds. Chandler due to his US centric analysis. Wiener for basing his thesis on selective quotations from 
literary sources (Thompson. 2001. p.155) In the case of Dintenfass. the robustness of his generalisations have been 
questioned as being based upon the study of just four mining companies and more recently the personal biographies of 155 
Men of Note (Walton. 2000) 
11 See for example Sampson (1962). Johnson (1977). Bellini (1981). (Wiener (1981). Barnett (1986). Elbaum & Lazonick 
(1986). 
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the period under public ownership. It therefore assesses the validity of the claim that 
managerial inadequacy was an inherited weakness of the industry not easily susceptible to 
reform by public ownership (Supple, 1987, p. 677). Was therefore the coal industry 
institutionally a bad entrepreneur? In assessing the contingent nature of decline it asks 
specifically, were alternative trajectories available? Did for example targeted investment in 
new products and sectors offer potential access to new and sustainable markets? Evidence 
is organised under pre and post-nationalisation headings. When considering the private 
industry it limits its analysis to the single issue of investment demonstrating how the interests 
of a self sustaining coalition comprising both industry and landowners, was supported by 
government to the detriment of the industry, its workforce and dependent communities. For 
the period after nationalisation it considers why state ownership was mainly confined to the 
working and getting of coal, and why there was so little diversification from the outset into 
related activities. Why for example was nationalisation not used to coordinate vertically 
integrated production processes? Whilst the section examines the National Coal Board's 
(NCB) attempts at diversification and greater integration, it focuses on the production of 
mining capital goods and the Coal Board's in-house engineering facilities. In the former it 
asks why were the ancillaries not developed further, and in the latter it asks why did the NCB 
adopt a tacit policy of non-competition with the private sector and leave the supply of a vital 
capital good almost entirely to the private manufacturers? Conclusions are considered in 
relation to the implications for both the nature and impact of decline on coalmining regions. 
As with the earlier section an international comparison is provided to aid assessment. Whilst 
in Britain the division between public and private sectors was rigidly drawn this was less the 
case in industries in other countries. Austria, Sweden and Italy for example used holding 
companies to enable state-owned companies to diversify and expand into new fields (Saville 
& Kerevan, 1987). In the Dutch state owned coal industry, diversification and expansion was 
encouraged from the outset. Comparison with Dutch State Mining (DSM) therefore provides 
an appropriate comparison with the UK coal industry, under both private and state 
ownership. In both cases it highlights the potential for diversification, both as a reaction to 
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adverse market conditions and as a way of developing new business opportunities in key 
emerging markets. 
3.2 The long decline of the coal industry 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section explores the long decline of the British coal industry. The purpose of the 
following is not to give a comprehensive historical account of the changes in the industry, but 
to examine the decline of the coal industry by focusing on key decisions taken and their 
impact on the overall trajectory of the UK coal industry. 
3.2.21913-1946 
The rise and decline of the coal industry occupies a central place in Britain's industrial 
history. At its peak year of 1913, the industry's coal production stood at 287.43m tons per 
annum: there were 3,024 pits and 1,127,900 miners (Alien, 1981). The industry constituted 
the largest industrial employer of male labour, around one in twelve of the population being 
directly dependent on it, while providing a key input to other industries and an important 
contribution to exports. Yet during the inter-war years the industry witnessed a dramatic 
decline. By 1937 employment and tonnage exported had fallen to only 63.1 % and 66.3% of 
their 1924 levels (Supple, 1987). This was the product of a number of developments, 
including external factors which affected industrial agency such as adverse movements in 
the demand for coal and the growth of international protectionism. However, a major cause 
of the industry's declining international competitiveness was its poor labour productivity, a 
factor often associated with poor management decisions and which resulted in the slow 
diffusion of mechanisation and associated production techniques (Scott, 2006). 
Table 1 provides a useful breakdown of statistical information related to the level of 
mechanisation in the inter-war years. It shows that there were increases in the number of 
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coal cutters and mechanical conveyors, and that the percentage of coal cut by machinery 
increased from 19% to 59% between 1924 and 1938. It also shows that there was a 
corresponding rise in the use of electrically- driven machines and lamps underground. All 
this might indicate rapid technical change within the industry, but in comparison with other 
European and US coal producers, Britain's advance towards mechanised mining was slow 
and uneven, with great variations in levels of capital investment in machinery between and 
within regions. In mitigation, uneven distribution of machinery can be attributed to a range of 
different physical conditions specific to individual mines such as the unevenness of roads, 
the stability of roofs, faults and thickness of seams (Supple, 1987). Boyns (1994) for 
example shows how the speed and nature of diffusion of mechanical cutters in south 
Wales's collieries can be explained and justified by geological factors as well as by the social 
nature of work which ensured the continuation of hand filling alongside mechanical 
conveyors. Others have added similar warnings against any sweepingly generalised 
conclusions in relation to the speed and nature of diffusion of technology in the UK coal 
industry. Greasley (1979) for example warns against viewing mechanisation as a panacea 
for the British coal industry. The introduction of machinery at the coal face could for example 
lead to bottlenecks further outbye (Supple, 1987). That said, the fact that incremental 
introduction of machinery may have an adverse affect on production also serves to highlight 
managerial failure within the industry, within which a planned and coordinated approach was 
needed to investment in other operations particularly haulage, as well as in more and better 
trained workers (Reid Report, 1945). 
Table 3:1 also shows there were over 2,000 working mines in Britain on the eve of the 
Second World War. The small scale of most of these mines has been identified as restricting 
the possibility for mechanisation and the achievement of economies of scale although not 
necessarily profitability (see for example Fine, 1993). In contrast many mines in Europe were 
deliberately laid out on a large-scale from the start. Whilst many British mines were typically 
producing 100,000 tonnes of coal per year, large-scale German mines were raising almost 
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one million tonnes per year and some Dutch mines almost two million tonnes. Before the 
General Strike of 1926, Britain's national average mine productivity was as high as Poland's 
coal industry, the highest in Europe, and about level with the Ruhr coalfield and Europe. A 
decade later, output per man-shift was half that in Poland and had slipped well behind 
German and Dutch levels of productivity. Between 1913 and 1938 output per man-shift OMS 
increased by 13% in Britain, whereas over the same period, the Ruhr had increased 64%, in 
Poland by 63%, and in the Netherlands by 101 % (Grundy-Warr, 1989). This discrepancy can 
be explained by a range of factors but central amongst these was the fact that British mine 
owners were slower to adopt mechanised methods than many other European producers. 
Collieries in the Ruhr won some 97% of their coal from mechanised means in 1934, 
compared with only 2% in 1913, whereas less than half the coal cut in Britain was by 
machine (Table 3:1). 
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Table 3:1 - Mechanical and electrical machinery in use in coal mines, 1924-38, (including number of horses and ponies) 
Coal cutting machines Mechanical conveyors and Safety lamps in Electrical equipment loaders use 
Number and kind of machines in use Coal cut by machinery Number in use Aggregate horse Number 
No of powered installed of horses 
mines and Year 
at Conveyors ponies No of No of No of employed work on flame electrical motors 
Percussive Quantity Percentage coalface Tonnage below 
Disc Bar Chain and other Totals 1,000 of total and Loaders coal lamps lamps in use Below Above ground 
machines tons output elsewhere conveyed ground ground 
below (1,000) 
ground 
1924 2855 1213 921 2281 2812 6830 49911 19 1373* - - 576318 356817 - 810896 671036 65210 
1925 2840 978 767 2645 2122 6512 27778+ 22 1667* - - 493325 370123 34257 852045 768100 56762 
1928 2539 793 635 3391 2312 7131 61388 26 2856 - 27976 416018 375186 36695 897660 824672 50405 
1930 2328 572 566 4131 2367 7637 75756 31 3747 453 42495 379551 389238 39979 954789 861680 49243 
1932 2158 300 412 4442 1983 7137 80286 38 4120 526 52666 295521 391142 41358 970131 885131 41764 
1934 2123 257 325 5006 1818 7406 103701 47 5369 637 81493 242901 394820 45342 1022104 927082 37751 
1936 2080 206 251 5516 1627 7600 125670 55 6727 716 109318 209539 407318 50081 1104318 974284 33136 
1938 2125 140 186 6005 1398 7729 134958 59 7826 766 122915 175462 474913 55809 1198261 1045726 32524 
-- -- - - -
Source: Based on the Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mines accessed in Grundy-Warr, 1989 
Notes: + 1926 Miners' Strike led to low production figures 
* Mechanical conveyors used at the coalface only (Figures for elsewhere below ground are not recorded prior to 1928) 
- Not recorded 
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Coal owners were constantly attacked for neglecting investment and for seeing no need for 
change in their methods. They were accused of a persistent conservatism in the face of 
technical, organisational and market pressures. Even within the Mining Association of Great 
Britain (MAGB) senior voices were raised to acknowledge the failing of the coal owners 
(Supple, 1987, p. 396). The numbers of Government enquiries into the industry during the 
inter-war years also testify to the widespread nature of concern. However, and despite a 
degree of public sympathy for greater state intervention no significant action was undertaken 
to address the fundamental problems. Thus by the late 1930's, the British coal industry was 
generally in a bad shape and technically backward compared to several other coal producing 
nations. It was as Pagnamenta and Overy (1984. p.182) put it: 
"weighed down by hundreds of worn out businesses, paying low wages to a workforce that 
was getting older as younger men left for the better-paid jobs elsewhere. The old, bad, coal 
industry was the one the public heard about, and the one that provided the case for state 
ownership." 
3.2.31947 ·56 
For the Attlee government, the coal industry's performance was at the centre of its whole 
economic programme, and it was, as the first industry to be nationalised after the war, a test 
case for the government's nationalisation programme. Thus, in stark comparison with the 
period under private ownerShip, there was no shortage of funds for the industry in the first 
three years of state ownership. In terms of wider strategic management of the industry 
however continuity rather than change would be the dominant theme. 
In 1950, the NCB introduced its first Plan for Coal, which was supposed to act as a 
production guide and capital expenditure outline for the industry until 1965. As coal was the 
dominant fuel source, accounting for approximately 90% of the nation's fuel needs, the Plan 
was of considerable importance to the energy future of Britain. In fact by the late 1950's the 
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Plan was becoming an irrelevance (Grundy-Warr, 1989) and a Revised Plan for Coal (1959) 
envisaged a reduction in output from the 244 million tonnes estimated in the 1950 Plan, to 
an output of 200-215 million tonnes by 1965 (Taylor, 1992). Why and what were implications 
for this sudden change for the NCB? 
The 1950 Plan for Coal estimated that some £635 million would need to be spent on the 
industry. The emphasis for investment was placed on capital expenditure at the collieries. 
During the first six years of the Plan money was readily available. According to one 
observer, money was "too readily available ... the industry has tended to look on the signing 
of blank cheques as the one and only solution to its problems" (see Con nor, 1962). In just 
five years, the NCB invested £353 million, an average of £60 million a year. By 1955, annual 
capital expenditure was approaching £100 million (see Fig 1 below). This level of investment 
was predicated on the belief that coal output would continue to increase. In 1956, the NCB's 
strategy document Investing in Coal envisaged that some 230 million tonnes of coal would 
be produced annually between the years 1961-65. 
Even though large amounts of capital were necessary simply to maintain output levels, the 
NCB was investing capital to expand capacity. To do this the NCB had to invest on the basis 
of long lead-in times between the date of investment and the date of production. The fact 
that the NCB was having to plan, invest and operate to such long lead times meant that any 
sudden and unplanned change in energy demand leading to a drop in coal sales could 
literally wipe out millions of pounds of capital investment projects. This is exactly what 
happened in the late 1950's. 
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Figure 3:1 - Productivity 1947-75 Investment (£ million) 
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What is of interest here is the lack of coordination between the State's fuel policies and the 
long term plans presented by the NCB, and highlights the ambiguous nature of both the 
purpose of the industry and the overall location of strategic agency which would bedevil the 
industry throughout its period under public ownership. In 1955, the Conservative 
Government announced its intention to supplement coal supplies with other kinds of energy, 
including atomic energy and oil (Reid, Alien & Harris, 1973. p.16). However, the NeB was 
allowed to continue its expansionist policy, and borrow capital at high rates of interest from 
the government when it was already saddled with paying back compensation to the old 
private owners. Furthermore the NeB was unable to charge the prices it wanted for its coal. 
From the time the NeB was established the government interfered in its pricing 
arrangements, making it impossible for the Board to operate independently at arm's length 
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from government or to react to changing market conditions. As Lord Ezra, the former NCB 
Chairman (1971-82) noted: 
'Right from the start, the underlying Morrisonian principle was breached. In spite of the 
explicit intention of leaving it to the management themselves to fix the prices for their 
products, having regard to the public interest, the Government persuaded the NCB to 
continue the "gentlemen's agreement" reached with the former coal owners during the war to 
peg prices at their former 1939 level. Thus coal prices in Britain were kept well below the 
world market level throughout the Attlee Government, and indeed until 1957 when the 
market situation fundamentally changed through the influx of large quantities of oil from the 
Middle East' (Ezra, 1987, p. 39). 
Coal price pegging meant that the world market price was well over the price of domestic 
coal, up to £2 per tonne higher. This meant that the NCB was not able to maximise the 
benefits from coal sales when there was a shortage of coal in Britain and on world markets. 
Between 1946 and 1956, the NCB produced some two billion tonnes of coal which, as Ezra 
(1987) pOinted out, would have built up a substantial financial reserve for the coal industry at 
a time when it was beginning to face severe price competition from cheap oil and gas 
imports. Ezra estimated that the industry lost at least £2,000 million of justifiable revenue in 
the first decade of nationalisation, and £500 million in the period to 1975 (Investors 
Chronicle, 12'h December, 1976). In common with other nationalised industries, the NCB did 
not receive any compensation from price restraint, and its capital investment programme 
was undoubtedly limited by lack of internal resources in the late 1950's and throughout the 
1960's. 
Another factor highlighting the NCB's limited agency was that the organisation was also 
restrained from borrowing from the private capital market, which meant that it had to borrow 
from the government and often at higher rates of interest than could have been obtained in 
44 
private sector financial markets. This made the achievement of its commercial objectives 
more difficult, particularly during times of increasing competition from alternative fuels. 
3.2.5 1957·73 
Inland coal consumption reached a post-war peak of 218 million tonnes in 1956 (Ashworth, 
1986). In the three years to 1959, total consumption (including exports) declined by 33 
million tonnes. More ominously, seven power stations had converted to oil. Nevertheless, 
1956-59 was another peak capital investment period for the NCB (see Figure 3.1). By 1960 
the NCB's view of the prospects for the coal industry had changed from over-optimism into 
despondency. E.F. Schumacher (1960), who was then the NCB's Chief Economist, began to 
warn against the closure of collieries with substantial reserves left in them, and against fuel 
policies over-reliant on what he termed the "fleeting convenience" of cheap imported oil and 
natural gas. Suddenly the NCB began abandoning projects in which it had sunk millions. As 
Conner (1962, p. 83) put it: 
'It may be that the artificial market conditions which prevailed throughout the world in the 
immediate post- war years lulled those responsible for formulating and directing broad coal 
policy into a false sense of "demand security" and, in consequence, influenced 
developments in the obvious and orthodox direction almost to the exclusion of the new.' 
The ambiguity underpinning policy decisions at this time is evident in fact that the State, 
having allowed the Coal Board to continue its massive investment projects, was 
nevertheless unwilling to intervene to restrict fuel imports. Wider political motives were 
suspected. At the 1960 Miner's Conference Will Paynter, the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) Secretary, warned delegates that the Conservative Government was attempting to 
break up the nationalised industry. Firstly, he argued, through enforced competition with 
foreign oil, secondly by making the House of Commons annually responsible for how much 
money should be made available to the NCB, and finally by making individual pits compete 
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against each other for their survival. In response the NUM called for restrictions on oil, and 
for a merger of coal distribution into the nationalised industry framework (see Hall, 1981, pp. 
78-82). This did not happen, and whether politically motivated or not government decisions 
began to impact on employment in the coal fields. 
In spite of some limited government measures to slow down the rate of rationalisation, the 
early 1960's witnessed a substantial increase in pit closures. Between 1957 and 1969, 505 
collieries were closed with a loss of 378,000 jobs. In 1967 alone, 34,000 miners were 
affected in some way by the pit closures. There were 12,000 redundancies in that year, six 
times higher than any previous year. Whilst there had been 174 pit closures in the first 
decade of state ownership, there was a qualitative difference with the subsequent closures. 
With earlier pit closures concentrated on pits nearing the end of their working lives or on low 
productivity pits where miners could be transferred easily to higher output pits in the same 
localities, from 1956 onwards this pattern changed with more and more pits closed 
deliberately to lower NCB operating costs and cut capacity. This included many pits which 
had received substantial investment in the first decade and had plenty of estimated working 
life left in them. Young men who had been encouraged to join the industry in the mid 1950's 
by NCB slogans such as "coal mining gives you a job for good" suddenly discovered how 
transient such promises were (Grundy-Warr, 1989, p.140). 
Unfortunately the NCB had no freedom to reduce coal prices as it was limited in its ability to 
borrow from the government. In contrast, the multinational oil companies were able to 
transport oil in huge tankers and had the flexibility to offer discounted prices in order to get a 
share of the European energy markets (Grundy-Warr, 1989). Coal also lost traditional 
markets due to technical changes in the rail and steel industries. In the 1960's, British Rail's 
demand for coal fell from almost 10 million tonnes in 1960 to only 140,000 tonnes per annum 
by 1970 as a result of the switch from steam to diesel. Natural gas began to displace coal, 
and the State's commitment to a civil nuclear power programme meant that by 1970, nuclear 
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stations produced 22.8 million kilowatt hours of electricity. This was enough to support 9.4 
million tonnes of coal per year or nearly 18,000 mining jobs (Robens, 1972, p. 179). 
Most accounts of the post-war coal industry concentrate on an analysis of the changes in 
demand and supply, particularly as a result of oil's price advantage over coal (see Robinson, 
1988). It is important to point out however, that market conditions were also contingent on 
the UK government which could have intervened in numerous ways. For example, the 
government could have adjusted tax policy, or attempted some measure of long-term fuel 
planning by making adjustments in the relations between nationalised fuel suppliers and fuel 
buyers (Grundy-Warr, 1989). Neither the Conservative nor the Labour Governments of the 
1960's were interested in doing this. Official thinking in government, relevant government 
departments, in the Treasury, and amongst non-coal industry 'energy experts' was that oil 
was plentiful, prices would remain lower than coal well into the future, and oil supplies were 
secure (Schumacher, 1974). Government inaction can also be understood in terms of its 
growing commitment to nuclear energy. 
The Fuel Policy White Paper of November 1967 reduced coal output further to 152 million 
tonnes, (Taylor, 1992) and projected that by 1975 there would be only 159,000 employees in 
the industry, which would be 221,000 fewer than in 1967. It also projected that employment 
would be down to 65,000 by 1980 if production was reduced to 80 million tonnes. The White 
Paper also envisaged an expansion in nuclear power, oil and a slight growth in gas 
consumption. In the case of nuclear energy, the policy was "pushed by politicians, who 
seemed to regard nuclear power as a bright new toy, and by the Atomic Energy Authority, 
whose interests and experiences were technological rather than commercial" (Hannah, 1982 
in Ashworth, 1986, p. 51). Support for nuclear energy at this time is indicative of 
governments shifting energy priorities, but also demonstrates its neglect of the wider 
economic, social and environmental concerns (Fothergill, 1988). By the mid-seventies all the 
White Paper's assumptions and estimates had been proved wrong. Nevertheless, it 
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continued to be influential amongst decision-makers in Government and Whitehall , 
effectively locking-in policy thinking until oil prices rose during the early 1970's. There would 
therefore be no attempt by government to intervene in the fuel markets to prevent or even 
slow down widespread pit closures. 
Successive governments during this period continued to be lured by the prospect of cheap 
and abundant oil supplies at the expense of a long term national energy policy. The 
dominant argument underpinning decision-making was that security of energy supply should 
be sought through flexibility via diversification rather than dependence on a high cost 
indigenous fuel. The result was that coal was treated as the 'residual legatee' after other 
fuels, which put pressure on the NCB to cut capacity in order to reduce supply to the level of 
demand. The way in which the NCB went about this task was heavily influenced by the tight 
financial parameters within which it had to operate. 
The price of coal was pegged artificially low as a matter of government policy up to 1957. 
Applications made by the NCB for price rises were either delayed, ignored or only partially 
fulfilled. Lord Ezra (1987, p. 40) also noted that the NCB was required to import dearer, 
American coal and pay the price differential itself. This according to Ezra was a clear 
example of how the government imposed "social obligations on the coal industry much to the 
detriment of its commercial well-being". Another problem for the NCB was its dependence on 
the government for finance, and the Treasury's method of allocating resources to 
nationalised industries in the context of overall macro-economic policies and not on an 
appraisal of each industry's needs. Through the application of these wider economic and 
financial constraints the State was therefore central to the creation of production targets, 
financial plans and to the overall profitability of the nationalised industries (O'Donnell, 1985). 
It is in this light that the NCB's (1959) closure plan should be viewed. 
The worst affected areas were the 'peripheral' coalfields of Scotland, Durham, 
Northumberland and South Wales (Waddington & Parry, 1995). Pit closures meant that 
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miners had little choice but to transfer to neighbouring pits or move to the 'central coalfields' 
under the NCB pit transfer schemes, or leave the industry altogether. This led to the break-
up of numerous mining communities, social dislocation and pockets of unemployment in 
areas where closures were concentrated and few employment alternatives were available 
(House & Knight, 1967). 
The scale of the closures also reveals an important aspect of state ownership in practice, 
and further illustrates the contingent nature of regional economic trajectories. Not only were 
UK governments unwilling to intervene in fuel markets to slow down the contraction of the 
deep mining industry, but there was also no effort to use the nationalised employers as 
instruments of regional policy to enable alternative economic trajectories to be developed. 
Two examples illustrate this point. Firstly, whilst government had shown itself keen to limit 
the NCS's agency in terms of wider macro-economic policy, there was little attempt by 
successive governments to influence the NCSts rationalization plans in a way that would 
reduce the intensity of cut-backs in particular localities. Rather there seemed to be a tacit 
acceptance in Parliament, except amongst a few MPs from mining constituencies, that pit 
closures were a price worth paying for cheaper fuel. The degree of tacit acceptance can be 
extended to include the leadership of the NUM at this time, with closures during the 1960's 
going largely uncontested. This 'logic of moderation' (Taylor, 1984) whilst partly based on an 
understanding that closures would be spread over time and space, and on the promise of 
alternative jobs in mining (Hudson & Sadler, 1995), was also a fatalistic acceptance that 
closure was inevitable, and an immutable fact of life: oil was cheaper than coal, therefore the 
demand for coal must fall (Alien, 1981). 
Secondly, whilst Government policy remained very much wedded to the maintenance of the 
staple industries well into the post war era, this was at the expense of the longer term 
economic and social viability of the affected regions. As the White Paper on Employment 
Policy 1944 stated, the 'first line of attack on the problem of unemployment in these areas 
49 
must be to promote the prosperity of the basic industries on which they primarily depend e.g. 
coal, steel, engineering and shipbuilding' (p.11). This focus on basic industries however was 
clearly inconsistent with the account it offered as to why these areas had become depressed 
during the inter-war years - namely through their excessive 'dependence' on a few basic 
industries.12 However, it followed that so long as these basic industries were profitable it 
would be difficult to imagine any change in the balance if other industries required workers 
(Hudson, 2000). The role that both government and industry played in determining the 
nature of regional economies can be clearly illustrated by the Hailsham Plan for the North 
East in the 1960's which called for the modernisation of the Teesside economy to be based 
around key national industries, especially chemicals. In order to meet this plan, severe 
labour shortages in the Teesside chemical industry led to deliberate planning embargoes on 
the development of alternative sources of employment for skilled manual workers in the 
locality (MacDonald & Coffield, 1991). Treasury officials at this time expressed concern that 
locating new industries in the Development areas might have negative economic effects, in 
that they competed with the staple industries for manpower. As one Treasury note stated, .. 
one of the main troubles is that these basic and essential industries are to some extent being 
drained of manpower by lighter industries which offer more attractive conditions of 
employment" (in Scott, 1996, p. 51). Such a policy is also evident in the National Coal Board 
North East Development Area (NEDA) Plan in 1948. The NEDA Plan argued that: 
' .. .from the national point of view, with coal the most precious and urgently needed of 
industrial raw materials, to introduce into mining areas, without surplus male labour, male 
employing industries housed in up-to-date factories and able to offer pleasant work at good 
wages, would inevitably attract men away from the mines with disastrous consequences for 
coal production.' 
12 Conversely, regions with a wide range of industrial skills, like Binningham, had been able to see many of their old Industries 
die away during the past half century without losing their general prosperity, because they had the resilience to develop new 
activities to replace those which became obsolete (Ministry of Reconstruction, 1944, p. 11) 
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Accordingly the Plan was based: 
... on the assumption that no appreciable volume of alternative male employment should be 
deliberately introduced into stable long life mining districts which are unlikely to possess 
much surplus male labour. (in Hudson 2006, p. 112). 
It is virtually certain that this assumption was adopted at the insistence of both the NCS and 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power (Hudson, 2006) and as early as 1946 prioritisation of coal 
production had been accepted by Durham County Council Planning Committee which 
reported that: 
Government policy indicates that industries which are mainly male employing will be brought 
only into those areas with a definite need for immediate male employment as distinct from 
diversification only. (DCCPC, 29.10.46, item 7 in Hudson 2006, p.112) 
The focus of regional policy during the 1950's and 60's demonstrates the extent of 
institutional or political lock-in, as policy was underpinned by a national economic consensus 
between the Labour and Conservative Parties, and one which led to modernisation, 
investment and expansion in a narrow industrial base (Foord et ai, 1986), which produced 
very little in the way of spin-off employment in manufacturing industry (McDonald & Coffield, 
1991). The State was therefore centrally involved both in the creation and in the reinforcing 
of lock-in to ensure path dependent development between the late 1920's and mid 1970's 
(Hudson, 2006). In this regard the NCB was also complicit. 
As the mine owners prior to nationalisation had sought to restrict the mobility of labour 
(Senson, 2002), so too the NCB regarded the labour supply as its own (Salt, 1995, p. 70). 
Supported by successive governments the NCB had a clear policy of actively discouraging 
inward investors into mining areas. This power was frequently used and in the case of 
Durham was extended to the refusal to release vital information on the future of individual 
collieries necessary to allow the local Council to devise appropriate planning policies of its 
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own (Hudson, 2006). The dominance of the NCB only began to weaken as coal production 
began to decline during the 1950's, but it remained an influential institution, embedded in 
various regional and local networks in the region until the 1980's, often for example helping 
to determine local and regional skills policies. 
From the late 1950's onwards therefore the NCB as an influential regional employer and as 
a proxy for the State came to be a major contributor to de-industrialisation of the coal regions 
and the resultant structure of employment. Within regional self-sustaining coalitions, these 
institutions constrained local autonomy and agency, and hampered the restructuring 
process, ensuring that coal regions remained locked into repetitive patterns of production, 
consumption and employment, ensuring that opportunities for the development of new 
products, skills and careers opportunities were limited. Where new investment was attracted, 
much of this would serve to perpetuate a low skills economy and determine ultimately an 
unsustainable development path. Many of the new jobs created by the branch plants 
attracted to the North East, whilst diversifying industries and sectors to a degree, also 
ensured homogenisation in terms of stage of production and location in value chains, with 
proliferation of low skill, low value-added activities (Hudson, 2005, p.585). Most of these new 
jobs were not for displaced males, but were mainly low paid, non-unionised jobs for women. 
The very scale of losses of predominately male jobs created a local economic imbalance 
within the coalfields that proved to be a problem. 
3.2.6 Post 1974 - shift from social democratic to neo liberal 
The 1973-74 oil crises ensured the Plan for Coal published in 1974 set a target of 135 million 
tonnes for 1985, of which 120 million tonnes was to come from deep-mined output. 
Increased capacity would require the extension of the life of existing pits, as well as opening 
up of new developments including the Selby 'super pit' complex near Doncaster (NeB, 
1974). 
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For the Plan to work however there needed to be a degree of intervention in energy markets 
and coordination with other fuel industries. Again, this did not happen. The Labour 
Government in particular sought to expand North Sea oil production. The demand for coal 
would also be hit by the increasing trend towards energy conservation (Robinson, 1988) and 
by the rapid decline in Britain's heavy industries and manufacturing during the late 1970's 
and 1980's. However the second major period of pit closures was only partially due to 
changes in energy demand. Of more importance was the shifting political and financial 
constraints imposed on the coal industry and the energy sector by the Thatcher 
governments during the 1980's. 
Never before has a government's broader political and economic priorities impinged so 
much on the running of a nationalised industry or on intra-public sector relations. As Grundy-
Warr (1989, p. 150) states: 
'Although successive Thatcher Governments have been dogmatic in their adherence to a 
'free market' laissez-faire philosophy, they interfered more in the organisation, control and 
performance of the coal industry than any other governments'. 
Whilst the Thatcher government had no stated national energy policy, its whole economic 
programme was based on indigenous North Sea oil revenues and nuclear power. The 
liberalisation of the oil tax regime in 1983 for example was a deliberate attempt to encourage 
oil companies to exploit oil fields in the North Sea. Government continued obsession with 
nuclear power meant that misleading documentation (Jeffrey, 1986) was used to hide true 
energy generation costs in comparison with coal (see The Times, 11/3/83; Ashworth, 1986) 
and to underpin the government's business case. There were also wider strategic 
considerations which overrode the economic case for nuclear power within government but 
which illustrate the contingent nature of the coal industry's development during this period. 
One of which was the development of weapons grade plutonium. A second strategic driver, 
especially on the part of the Conservative government, was to weaken the bargaining power 
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of the National Union of Mineworkers by providing a major alternative source of electricity 
generation to coal (Fothergill, 1988, p. 234). This 'anti-coal' policy was therefore bound to 
lead to a clash with a resurgent NUM. 
Whereas a 'logic of moderation' had typified the NUM's leadership during the 1950's and 
1960's, by 1967 the miners and their union, bolstered by the industrial leverage afforded 
them by the centralisation of the wage bargaining structures, adopted a more 'militant' 
demeanour which was reflected in two successful national strikes in 1972 and 1974. The 
unsuccessful national strike of 1984-5 however resulted in a return to pit closures, but this 
time on an unprecedented scale. At the time of the strike, British Coal employed 171,000 
miners at 170 collieries, and had a total workforce (including white collar staff, workshops, 
opencast mines etc) of 221,000. Nearly 90% of this workforce was shed during the first ten 
years after the strike, and job losses continued thereafter on a smaller scale. Whilst 
economic arguments were put forward to justify the closure programme, subsequent studies 
have shown that wider political considerations were the key determining factor in the 
decision to close pits. They show that the closures were by no means exclusively 
concentrated on the worst performers, and many of the pits closed in the decade after the 
end of the national miner's strike had in fact achieved very large increases in productivity in 
the years preceding closure (Glyn & Machin, 1997).13 Studies also show that the wider social 
costs of closure were not considered as part of closure decisions (Glyn, 1988). 
The swiftness with which the UK industry disappeared, coupled with the highly localised 
concentration of mining employment, resulted in severe deprivation and mass 
unemployment (OETR, 1998). This was especially the case in the Yorkshire coalfield which 
experienced the largest reduction in coal industry employment over this period, losing 
'3 Glyn & Machin (1997) find reasons other. th~n econom.ic factors played role in identifying pits for closure. These included 
pressure on BC to keep open a number of Pits In the outlYing area. However they also note that the 5 pits that were on Boyd's 
'worst 31' were all in Yorkshire. 
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67,000 male jobs between 1981 and 2000. These jobs made up 95% of all male jobs in 
1981 (Beatty et ai, 2005). 
Faced by the prospect of searching for work within an increasingly shrinking labour market, 
those fortunate enough to find work in the 1980's did so in relatively low paid jobs. For 
example 80% of redundant miners who had found work in other industries were earning less 
than they had in the coal industry (see e.g. Guy, 1994; Turner & Gregory, 1995). Faced by 
declining levels of affluence and few real job opportunities, many ex-miners were 'realistic' 
enough to recognise that their chances of securing employment were slim, and subsequently 
became 'discouraged' workers combining redundancy payments with social security 
payments to "ensure an adequate though not extravagant standard of living" (Beatty & 
Fothergill, 1996, p. 637). The phenomenon of 'hidden unemployment', although not unique 
to former mining communities,14 can be seen as a direct result of government policy towards 
the coal industry at this time and remains a serious problem in former coal areas (Beatty et 
al,2005). 
The extent to which government policy affected the nature of decline, and scale of the 
subsequent challenge to regenerate coal areas can be further illustrated in that the knock on 
'multiplier-effect' of pit closure also ensured that jobs were lost elsewhere in the economy 
(Fothergill & Witt, 1990). In Wakefield for example, O'Donnell's (1988) analysis found that 
7% of local mechanical engineering jobs were lost as a direct result of loss of sales to British 
Coal, a figure which he recognised greatly underestimated the actual numbers affected, with 
many small and medium sized secondary suppliers and sub-contractors not covered by his 
surveys. Table 3:2 shows the importance of the mining machinery industry to the wider 
region in terms of employment. It shows that whilst the numbers of managerial staff (column 
1) grew over the decade, the greatest decline in employment was amongst craftsmen 
(column 7) and low skilled operators (column 8). The latter job categories are similar to the 
I. See Beatty & Fothergill2002. 2005b. 2007 
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skills profile of those made redundant from the local collieries, increasing the level of 
competition in the local labour market. 
Table 3:2 - Employment by occupation in the UK mining machinery industry in 
Yorkshire and Humberside 1978-87 
Year Occupational No. of 
category* establishments 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
1978 237 36 419 185 664 208 1631 1310 4690 30 
1979 237 31 430 190 685 222 1662 1274 4731 29 
1980 226 19 510 193 657 242 1636 1301 4784 30 
1981 231 26 552 262 632 234 1730 1230 4897 31 
1982 244 15 549 312 509 243 1623 1228 4723 31 
1983 256 15 530 264 486 203 1610 1056 4420 30 
1984 283 38 457 233 485 212 1406 932 4046 27 
1985 258 40 402 221 423 189 1349 822 3704 24 
1986 262 35 397 263 387 195 1445 848 3832 25 
1987 281 58 412 196 381 168 1294 760 3550 23 
Source: Engineering Industry Training Board (E/TB). 1988 
*see appendix 3 for occupational category list 
In addition to concentrations of mining manufacturing activity, especially in south and west 
Yorkshire, there was also close relationship between mining and manufacturing in the region 
as a whole. The links are many and varied. Mining machinery firms purchase of special 
metals and components from Sheffield steel based concerns. British Rail engineering 
workshops (pre-privatisation) in Doncaster carried out sub-contract work for the Coal Board. 
British Rail transported coal produced in the region. Many employees in private firms started 
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out as apprentices in the mining industry. There are also complex supply networks between 
monopoly buyer and supplier. One example became evident when British Coal announced 
its intention to look for overseas suppliers of cloth for donkey jackets having previously used 
100% British-made cloth (Yorkshire Post, 30103/1988). 
The challenges for those made redundant, and for the local economy in general was also 
compounded by the wider multiplier effect, with many local businesses in the service 
industries also reliant on the purchasing power of miners and their families. Both Winterton 
(1993) commenting on Barnsley, and O'Donnell (1988) on Wakefield, found that this 
expenditure multiplier was even more damaging to the local economy than the employment 
multiplier. One local businessman who decided to move his business away from South 
Elmsall following the closure of nearby Frickley Colliery states: 
'Times have been very difficult recently because of the recession and the fact that Frickley 
has been under a cloud for the past year. As far as business is concerned it closed a year 
ago - when people have a noose round their necks they're unlikely to spend any money' 
(Kitsen, 1993, p. 1). 
This quote is representative of the experiences of countless businesses in the coalfield 
areas during the period of pit closures and highlights one of the paradoxical features of the 
Conservative government's policy objective to shift regional trajectories from a perceived 
dependency culture, in which an expectation of employment was endemic amongst the local 
population, to an enterprise culture based on increased levels of self employment and an 
indigenous small business economy. Namely that the very same Government policy which 
deliberately encouraged capacity cuts in British Coal to improve competitiveness, partly in 
preparation for its privatisation, would also contribute to the decline of private sector 
business through a lack of consideration for the various resultant income and linkage 
multiplier effects. This did not stop government from introducing a wide range of enterprise 
policy measures in promote self employment. Table 3:3 covering the entire post-war period 
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shows that the dramatic increase of policy measures introduced in support of this objective 
coincided with the pit closure programme. It shows that there was little government support 
for small businesses before the 1980's but that the number of policy measures increased 
dramatically from the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 as small businesses 
became part of a wider government policy objective to shift the country from a perceived 
dependency (reliance on the State) to an enterprise (self reliant) culture (Green et ai, 2008). 
This policy trajectory continued with the election of New Labour in 1997, which broadly 
followed the Conservatives small business-led regional policy strategy. 
Table 3:3 - UK policy measures to support small businesses 1946-2004 
Years Number of 
measures 
1946-60 2 
1961-70 13 
1971-81 33 
1982-89 103 
1995-96 200 
2003-04 267 
Source: Greene (2002), Gavron et al. (2000), PACEC (2005) in Greene et aI, 2008. 
Subsequent impact analysis shows enterprise policies to have had little effect with levels of 
self employment in former coalfield areas remaining stubbornly low compared to other 
regions (Keeble & Walker, 1994; Van Stel & Storey, 2004; Johnson & Reed, 2008). In fact in 
many of these regions enterprise policies have proved to be counterproductive resulting in a 
reduction in overall employment (Van Stel & Storey, 2004). Broadly, two arguments have 
been put forward to explain the spatial differences in new business formation rates across 
the UK regions, but which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first argument tends 
implicitly if not explicitly to support the argument that low levels of new business start-up in 
mining areas can be explained in terms of a cultural flaw. That is ex- miners and their 
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communities were unable to escape a cognitive lock determined by generations of 
employment in the coal industry. The second explanation focuses on structural problems 
within the coalfields associated principally with transferable skills and levels of regional 
affluence. This explanation is supported by historical data on new firm formation rates from 
the inter-wars years. It shows that the least fertile regions during this period were the mining-
dominated depressed areas in the North of England and South Wales, which had also been 
amongst the poorest of the regions (Foreman-Peck, 1985). Moreover, these regions were 
also typified by poor business survival rates as unemployment crowded workers into self-
employment (Foreman-Peck, 1985), and into sectors closely related to their work experience 
(Hudson, 1987). The evidence from the more affluent regions during this time was markedly 
different, with more businesses starting up, in more diverse sectors and with a much higher 
chance of both survival and growth. 
As with the inter-war period the most pressing motivation underpinning the enterprise policy 
was the chronic unemployment caused by de-industrialisation of which the pit closure 
programme was central. With coalfield areas witnessing high levels of unemployment, those 
who risked starting up in these localities, as had been the case during the 1930's, tended to 
be crowded into low value-added service sectors such as motor maintenance and 
hairdressing, which offered little scope for growth and employment, let alone local economic 
regeneration, and in sectors which were typified by high failure rates as one government 
subsidised start up was displaced by another (Greene et ai, 2004). For these individuals 
(and regions) the reality of enterprise was a twilight world of hard work, low pay, casual 
labour and insecurity (Macdonald & Coffield, 1991). Spatial difference in UK start-up rates 
during the 1980's and 1990's is therefore best understood as it was during the 1930's as a 
factor of regional income disparities rather than any individual or regional cultural flaw. 
Rather than indicative of the cognitive lock-in associated with any reluctance to start a 
business, the inability of coal areas to develop an 'enterprise economy' is further evidence of 
more structural causes. The example of British Coal Enterprise illustrates this further. 
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Support for the government's 'enterprise crusade' came via a wide range of business 
support services but which had been established with minimum budgets to try and make job 
losses in the nationalised industries more palatable (Hudson, 2000). These agencies, 
embedded within local policy making networks offered what Macdonald and Coffield (1991, 
p. 80) describe as "implied regional policy written small." The principal support service in the 
wake of pit closures, and through which much of the governments regional funds were 
channelled was British Coal (Enterprise) Ltd (BCE). BCE was established in October 1984 
and modelled on BSC (Industry) Ltd which had been set up by British Steel in 1979 to deal 
with a similar dislocation in the steel industry. The two main purposes of the schemes were 
to encourage the inward movement of firms, and to encourage redundant workers to set up 
in business on their own. BCE made some impressive claims with regard to job creation 
although subsequent analYSis has tended to be more conservative (Fothergill & Guy, 
1994}.15 However in terms of supporting business start up the BCE scheme had several 
disadvantages over the much larger BSC scheme which in itself was indicative of a policy 
choice and the resultant evidence from the scheme is less unequivocal or impressive. The 
focus on supporting self employment as a key regional economic enabler itself also 
highlights the extent to which government thinking remained locked in to a narrow 
ideological space, and one which failed to take into account local and regional specific 
issues. Three points illustrate this and highlight how political lock-in best describes the 
experiences of coal areas during this period. 
Firstly, the majority of small businesses created or supported by BCE were not actually 'new' 
and tended not to be run by former miners (Turner, 1992). The latter point should not be too 
surprising given that ex miners were not really the target audience for the scheme (BCE, 
1986; Rees & Thomas, 1991; Pickering 1995), but it questions the scheme's rationale in the 
first place, and highlights the extent to which ex miners were effectively abandoned by the 
15 Fothergill and Guy (1994) suggest that BCE created 16,000 new jobs at a cost of £4,300 for workspace and £16,600 for 
outplacemenVretraining; costs which they suggest compare favourably with other job creation agencies. 
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State. Secondly whilst the qualifying criteria for loans was that the new business should not 
displace jobs in other local businesses, it is not apparent how such small businesses actually 
made a net contribution to local employment, or merely replaced or displaced existing firms 
(Waddington & Parry, 1995). The net effect on employment or other economic value added 
therefore was negligible. Finally, although, BCE stated a strong preference for encouraging 
and supporting manufacturing industries, it was estimated that 40% of businesses supported 
by BCE were in fact in the service sector where displacement is especially problematic with 
new firms subsidised by cheap loans, accommodation or government grants, able to 
undercut and put their competitors out of business (Edwards, 1991). 
In sum, having determined the nature and scale of the challenge for mining areas, a self-
sustaining coalition (which also at this time began to include, if often reluctantly, local 
authorities), continued to determine the measures by which affected communities should 
respond to the challenges of pit closure and unemployment. Just as branch plant syndrome 
is illustrative of a fundamental flaw in policy thinking associated with political lock-in, so too 
was the shift to the enterprise economy. In the case of enterprise policies, the flaw was 
based on its failure to understand the link between regional affluence and sustainable small 
business economies. Equally policy was largely imposed on localities with little account 
taken of local circumstances or wishes. The comparison below shows that alternative 
approaches to decline and regeneration were possible. 
3.2.7 Comparing the British and West German Coal Industries 
The contraction of the coal industry was not unique to the UK. Similar problems faced the 
coal industry in Germany. From the mid 1950's it too faced increasing competition from 
alternative energy sources such as oil and natural gas. Between 1958 and the early 1970's 
two thirds of employment in mining was lost, and as with Britain the ability to absorb 
displaced miners in new pits reached its natural limits. The German coal industry was also 
regionally concentrated, mainly in the Ruhr area, where it employed 15% of the total 
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workforce. Again, as with Britain, coal had come to occupy a special place in German 
economic and industrial history, rousing deep emotions in the affected regions. Faced by the 
same dilemma as their British counterparts, and confronting a dissolving energy consensus, 
West German policy makers adopted a policy in stark contrast to their British counterparts. 
Whereas in the UK, the NCB concluded from 1980 that an accelerated closure programme 
was necessary to meet the financial objectives set by government, and which resulted in the 
ending of government deficit grants from 1987/8, in West Germany policy makers resolved 
to "maintain its coal policy to secure supplies and in the interests of the people who work in 
coal mining areas" (BMW1 1986, p. 48 in Taylor, 1992). This entailed both social aid and a 
high (and increasing) level of production aid to bridge the gap between domestic and 
international coal prices. It also provided coal communities with time to develop more 
appropriate and socially acceptable alternatives to mining. 
What follows further illustrates the contingent nature of the experiences of the UK coal 
industry and coalfield regions. It does so by demonstrating that there were a number of 
policy choices available to both the UK and German governments which were both faced by 
the same challenge. The comparison focuses on two alternative policy choices. These are 
government aid for the purpose of industry restructuring, and government aid for the 
purposes of production. The comparison shows that these choices shaped both the manner 
and ability of the respective coalfield regions to respond to the decline in their mining 
industries. 
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Table 3:4 - The British and West German coal industries: the cost of public policy 
(Nominal US $ million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Production Aid 
West Germany 
Current output 794 598 787 639 1163 2157 
Price support 962 1461 1617 1222 2401 3600 
Total PSE 1703 2000 2346 1975 3463 5815 
United Kingdom 
Current output 663 1326 2803 98 454 170 
Price support 362 671 390 485 1180 Nd 
Total PSE 1025 1997 3193 583 1643 Nd 
Restructuring Aid 
West Germany 186 162 128 127 179 Nd 
United Kingdom 343 673 479 1465 1770 Nd 
PSE = Producer Subsidy EqUivalent 
Nd = no data available 
Source: lEA 1988, table 0-5 and 0-13 in Taylor, 1992 
The consequences of the policy choices can be seen in Table 3:4. In West Germany, 
restructuring aid at this time remained very low compared to production aid and price 
support, whereas in the UK although total aid increased, production aid (noticeably deficit 
grants) declined (except for 1985/6) and then disappeared, whilst restructuring aid rose 
dramatically. This analysis points to a fundamental difference between West German and 
British coal policymakers. In the former, policy was directed at preserving the industry's 
existing shape, in the latter it was directed at restructuring in the direction of the free market. 
Germany's decision to support its coal industry was based not only on ensuring a secure 
energy supply, but also because coal and its supply chain were viewed as essential factors 
in the development of new industries not only in the coal industry but also in other branches 
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of industry, such as electrical and mechanical engineering, and in the construction industry 
(Schubert & Brautigan, 1995). 
Mining inter-linkages have been discussed above with a particular focus on the negative 
local and regional economic multiplier of pit closure. The German government's decision to 
invest in the preservation of the coal industry can therefore clearly be understood within this 
context. This can be illustrated by the decision that all German fossil-fuel electricity 
generating stations should be fitted with flue gas de-sulphurisation plants (FGD). Whilst 
reducing acid emissions from existing stations this policy would also have generated work 
for numerous local and regional companies, and provided work for the steel, construction 
and engineering sectors (Grundy-Warr, 1989). This action can be compared with the UK 
government which rejected calls to introduce tight regulations and inducements to 
encourage private sector electricity utilities to introduce similar energy conservation methods 
(Financial Times, 18-01-1989). 
The fundamental rationale for Germany's approach to the challenges of their coal industry, 
and affected communities was that structural change could not be achieved through 
structural collapse, and policy measures ensured that although the future for coal was 
limited, nevertheless the industry would be gradually phased out over time,18 with policies 
promoting structural change introduced during this phase out to ensure mineworkers and 
mining communities could prepare for alternative careers, thus making structural change 
'socially compatible' (Schafer, 1995). 17 
The German approach had a number of tangible and logical advantages over that adopted 
by the British government. Reviews of European coalfield regions identify that where the 
industry is still active, foreign investment helps to diversify the local economic fabric so as to 
16 Subsidies finally come to an end in 2018 (Leunig & Swaffield. 2008). 
17 See also German coal talks outcome: Socially tolerable restructuring. The International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine 
and General Workers' Unio~, ICEM Update, No. 15. 13 March 1997 accessed at http://www.hartford-
bwp.com/archivesf61/216.html.1 March 2013 
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'anticipate' the impact of pit closure, whereas investment after closure is used to deal with 
the psychological and economic impact and effects of closure. A government commitment to 
managed decline also gives miners (as well as young people in the area) the opportunity to 
retrain or develop new skills whilst still in work. The German approach also has the 
significant advantage of maintaining a level of local affluence which gives SMEs the 
opportunity to establish themselves in the locality (Council for Europe, 2006). 
The Ruhr coalfield continues to experience economic problems with unemployment rates 
marginally higher than national rates,18 however studies also highlight that regeneration is 
being developed in a more sensitive and sustainable way. For ,example, whilst the 
development of the service sector was important, the regeneration process in the Ruhr also 
targeted a specific settlement of industries in emerging sectors 19, supporting the further 
qualification of workers and founding of universities (there was not a single university in the 
huge Ruhr area until 1965 whilst today there are five). These measures led to a significant 
improvement of the area during the 1980's, and today the region has become the centre for 
high tech industries in the chemicals, energy and health care sectors.20 
Much of this success can be related to the managed nature of decline. It can also be 
attributable to the local autonomy of the Lander in comparison to local authorities in the UK 
which had absolutely no influence over local and national economic policy making (Taylor, 
1992). This local agency enabled the region to develop (often small scale) regenerative 
initiatives based on local solutions many of which emerged from the building upon and 
reinforcing of the cultural identity of the coalfield, and the re-use of old colliery sites. 
Evaluation studies all point to this as being a defining feature of the regeneration process in 
18 In 2004 unemployment rates for the Ruhr area was 12.8% compared to 11.9%(Council for Europe, 2006). 
19 The regeneration process was strongly influenced by the sustainable development agenda with the region focusing on 
developing the infrastructure to attract industry in this emerging sector. By the end of the century 22% of all enterprises In the 
region being located in the environmental sector (NRW State Government, 1998) 
20 Recent statistics also show that whilst the region has developed its service sector nevertheless in 2009 58% of employment 
was in the manufacturing sector. Source: Official Employment Statistics of the Federal Government and State Government. 
http://business.metropoleruhr.de/en/location/data-facts-and-figures/the-jOb-market.htmIAccessed on 30.4.2013 
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the Ruhr area. This is not to say that policy makers did not seek to change the image of the 
region, but that they sought to do so in ways which retained a link with the past and which 
promoted a strong regional identity (Shaw, 2002). Indeed the link between industrial heritage 
and regional regeneration was central to the 'entrepreneurial shift' of regional policy in the 
1980's (Hotchkiss, 2000). One positive spill-over benefit of this being the adaption of the old 
Zollveriein site for needs of SMEs which has been central to encouraging people to stay 
(Leunig & Swaffield. 2008). 
This limited comparison shows that whilst the result ultimately was to be the same, the less 
ideological approach adopted by the West German government recognised the wider and 
longer term dangers of destroying the complex web of local economic inter-linkages and 
interdependencies, whilst also providing the basis from which to reach a consensual solution 
(Taylor, 1992). The comparison with the UK experiences in this regard could not be starker. 
Regeneration studies undertaken in the UK during the pit closure programmes of the 1990's 
highlight a level of resentment and subsequent alienation amongst local people at 
(enterprise) policy measures which were often interpreted as 'alien imports' designed to slur 
the good name of the town (in this case 8arnsley) and which failed to recognise and build on 
the positive aspect of local traditions (North et ai, 2001). 
3.2.8 Summary 
The purpose of this section has been to provide a reassessment of the decline of the UK 
coal industry which illustrates why and how path contingency captures the character of the 
industry's development trajectory more adequately than does that of path dependency. The 
analysis was divided into four time periods covering the 20th century and the industry under 
private and public ownership. In each of these time periods it highlighted that opportunities 
existed to alter the trajectory of the coal industry to provide a more sustainable development 
path. That these opportunities were not taken has been identified with institutional inertia or 
political lock-in operating at both an industry (meso) and government (macro) level. This was 
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considered in terms of the implications for coal areas. Institutional inertia was shown to have 
had a negative impact on the competitiveness of the industry under private ownership, and 
continued to play a role in defining the development of the industry during public ownership. 
It was shown that the nationalised coal industry failed to protect jobs and the longer term 
viability of coal areas, but that this was largely contingent on the considerable political, 
financial and economic pressures acting upon it. Coal Board agency was restricted by tight 
pricing, and financial and external market conditions, all of which were controllable by the 
State. Similarly the lack of coordination between investment and production priorities of the 
NCB and its main customers had a significant impact on both the industry and coal regions. 
The NCB's failure can therefore be interpreted as largely the failure of consecutive 
governments to clearly define the industry's social obligations in particular in relation to 
supporting longer term employment within the coal communities, or at least supporting 
measures which would have provided breathing space until alternative employment 
opportunities could be developed. The issue of timing was considered in comparison to the 
German experience which highlighted a number of important qualitative if not quantitative 
differences when managing a declining industry, and which provide salient lessons for those 
looking to understand the nature of industrial and regional decline. In the UK, having failed to 
protect jobs in the industry, a self sustaining coalition dominated by the Coal Board but 
underpinned by the State constrained efforts to create new economic paths, as 
nationalisation was used as a strategy to underpin a regional development trajectory around 
the declining mining industry. In doing so it ensured that regional trajectories remained 
locked in to what was recognised to be a declining industry, and actively prevented 
diversification into newer or emergent sectors. 
67 
3.3 Mining and entrepreneurship 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The previous section explored macro-economic issues arguing that government policy could 
at the very least have altered the speed and timing of decline and therefore the context for 
local and regional regeneration. The fact that successive governments failed or chose not to 
do so illustrates their role in determining the nature and scale of regional economic 
dislocation. This section extends the assessment by exploring the extent to which (at the 
meso level) the coal industry failed to grasp opportunities to adapt to the changing nature of 
the external environment. Specifically it will address the questions: did coal provide the basis 
for product or market diversification? If so why were these opportunities not taken? 
Conclusions are considered in relation to any implications for the nature and impact of 
decline on coalmining regions. As with the earlier section an international comparison is 
provided to aid assessment. In this case a comparison is made with the experiences of the 
Dutch state-owned mining industry. 
3.3.2 Pre-nationalisation 
The case against the coal owners is well established. That on the whole they failed to invest 
in new machinery and the implications for the industry has been discussed above. Here the 
question of entrepreneurial failure is extended and related to wider institutional factors. It has 
been argued that the nature of decline can best be understood as contingent on structural 
and institutional factors associated most clearly with a self-sustaining coalition. What follows 
develops this point by highlighting the fact that wider institutional barriers to greater 
investment in machinery existed. Supple (1987) characterised these barriers as: pattern of 
control of collieries; pattern of mineral ownership; pattern of industrial relations and wage 
system; and government policy (Supple, 1987). These he argues had varying degrees of 
impact on the industry between the wars. Of these, the fragmented pattern of mineral 
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ownership, it has been argued, was the key impediment to reorganisation of the industry, 
with landlords holding the upper hand in relation to the operators (Fine, 1990). Fine's 
evidence therefore works to remove blame for lack of reorganisation from the coal owners 
(Wale, 2001). What follows maintains a focus on the coal owners but broadens it to highlight 
the role of landowners, whose rent-seeking activities ensured the structure of the industry 
remained fragmented, hampering its competitiveness, as well as that of the State, whose 
unwillingness to act throughout the inter-war period in support of a more efficient industry 
provides another example how political lock-in manifests itself. 
Entrepreneurial failure is evident in the rent-seeking activities of land owners, whose role 
was based on a unique system of fragmented royalties which explained in part the slow 
diffusion of mechanisation during the inter-war years. In this regard British coalmining can be 
compared unfavourably with other European coal-producing countries whose royalty 
practices generally developed from a tradition of crown mineral ownership (Scott, 2006). 
Under the European system the crown owned the mineral royalties and granted concessions 
to mining concerns. This enabled mining firms to build straight underground roadways and 
utilise locomotives for faster means of transporting coal from the coal face to the pit bottom 
and which improved overall productivity. In Britain on the other hand, ownership rested with 
the landowners which meant roadways were often determined by owners and not always 
straight (Scott 2006). In fact the mineral rights laws meant that engineers developing mines 
had to observe underground boundaries that followed streams and hedges dividing property 
on the surface. One coal mine might have three or four land owners with the mineral rights to 
coal beneath their land, each entitled to a royalty. Coal extracted from under such a property 
could cost over a penny a tonne extra, so roadways were bent to avoid expensive 
properties. This resulted in complex, narrow, twisting passages unsuitable for locomotive 
haulage or long-distance conveyor belt systems. 
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Much of this has been discussed earlier with table 1 providing evidence of the speed of 
diffusion and levels of productivity during the inter-war years. In this section analysis is 
extended to re-focus on the question of entrepreneurship. Table 3:5 covers the period 1903-
1938 and highlights the potential bottlenecks in production caused by the "bizarre illogicality 
of the mineral rights law" (Pagnamenta & Overy, 1984, p.179). It shows that whilst by 1938, 
59% of coal was cut mechanically, by the same date only 38% of coal was transported to the 
pit bottom by mechanically-driven conveyor belts. Table 3:5 also shows that by this date 
virtually no locomotives were in use in British mines by 1938. 
Table 3:5 - Percentage of coal mechanically cut and conveyed in British mines 1903-
38 
Year Mechanically Face Gate Locomotive conveyed 
cut conveyed conveyed on 
main/secondary 
haulage * 
1903 2.3 N/A N/A 0 
1909 5.2 N/A N/A 0 
1913 8.5 N/A N/A 0 
1920 13.2 N/A N/A 0 
1924 18.7 N/A N/A 0 
1928 25.9 11.8 N/A 0 
1930 27.9 14.4 5.8 0 
1931 31.1 17.4 8.4 0 
1932 35.0 21.6 10.5 0 
1933 38.5 25.2 13.4 0 
1934 42.4 30.0 19.1 0 
1935 47.0 36.9 24.4 0 
1936 51.0 43.0 29.5 0 
1937 55.0 47.9 33.2 0 
1938 59.5 54.1 36.2 0 
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Source: Annual Report of H.M Chief Inspector of Mines (1904-39); 
N/A, COAL 22/174 paper T.A.C. 9, 3 act 1944 
* Derived from data on the number of locomotives in use in British mines, which stood at 16 
in 1939, implying a percentage contribution to aggregate tonnage hauled that was not 
significantly different to zero (in Scott, 2006) 
The system of private ownership, which produced fragmented land and colliery holdings, and 
the preference of owners and shareholders for short term profits and dividends, provides an 
explanation for the relatively slow pace of mechanisation prior to World War 11, and therefore 
the poor performance of the British coal industry during the inter-wars years. It highlights an 
example of entrepreneurial failure of both the landowners who maintained the tradition of 
rent-seeking activity, but also failure at a political level, as the system was contingent on 
institutional inertia. 
Mine owners had complained that political interference (along with trade union power and 
unfair competition) had impeded investment and innovation, but with the single exception of 
the uncertainty caused by the heated nationalisation debates during 1919-20 there is little 
evidence to support such a claim. There was plenty of government sponsored interest in the 
coal industry during the inter-war years which identified the shortcomings of the industry 
under private ownership.21 Of these the Sankey Report which recommended nationalisation 
of the industry can best be described as representing a critical juncture for the industry. 
Nationalisation at this time could have addressed the growing industrial disharmony and 
social unrest whilst providing greater rationalisation of production, and much needed 
investment in modernisation. That Sankey was rejected by Lloyd George's Coalition 
government is representative of the broader political consensus at this time. It shows that 
21 Interest in the industry began with the Coal Mining Organisation Committee (1915). Sankey Commission (1919), the 
Buckmaster, Macmillan and Samuel Inquiries of 1925-26. lots of official discussion during the late 1920's and 1930's, the 
investigations of wartime, and culminating with the Reid Committee of 1944-45. 
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even where it was clearly evident that the colliery owners were not prepared to invest in the 
industry in order to improve productivity and boost competitiveness, so too UK governments 
were not prepared to intervene to ensure modernisation.22 To a degree government inaction 
can be explained as being based on a fear of the social consequences of enforced 
amalgamation and rationalisation, from the lobbying power of the coal owners, represented 
by the secretive and hugely influential Mining Association of Great Britain (Bailey, 2007, p. 
183), but a more convincing explanation is that inaction was a matter of political philosophy. 
In Germany during the 1920's a more proactive state and industrial class had acted 
decisively to concentrate mining production and increase industrial efficiency (Reid Report, 
1945, p. 16). The Samuel Commission 1925-26 had provided evidence to support similar 
actions in the UK. However no UK government during the inter-war period was prepared to 
take action and enforce the powers necessary to coerce a reluctant industrial community 
(Supple, 1987). 
In sum, owners and the State effectively collaborated in locking the industry into a particular 
trajectory which meant that by the late 1930's the British coal industry was generally in a 
poor shape and technically backward compared to other coal producing nations. Whilst there 
were widely differing levels of performance between mines and regions, Supple's overall 
assessment of the performance of the inter-war British coal industry was that as a whole it 
had been lamentably poor, and suggests significant failings on the part of coal owners. 
However rather than place the blame exclusively with the coal owners it is best understood 
as a shared endeavour between on the one hand private owners who failed to invest and on 
the other hand by political inertia, with government failing to act in the best interest of the 
industry and national economy. Rather than too much political interference as some coal 
owners claimed, it was the lack of intervention that was the problem. Arguably it was only 
through such intervention that the coal industry could receive the coordinated action and 
22 It is also indicative of a failure of industrial leadership on the part of the Miners Federation of Great Britain whose campaign 
dissipated once wages had been increased and hours reduced. 
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levels of investment it needed. It was these years of neglect by private owners that was 
reflected in the Reid Report (1945), and which would help provide the rationale for the 
subsequent state ownership of the industry. It was anticipated that state ownership would 
learn from previous mistakes, take on a more pro-active role in helping to create a modern, 
competitive, dynamic and entrepreneurial industry which furthered the public interest and 
advanced the welfare of its workforce (Coal Nationalisation Bill in Supple 1987, p. 634). 
3.3.3 Post nationalisation 
As mentioned above, long before nationalization, colliery companies did things with coal 
beside mine it. They processed it in various ways, and sometimes used the by-products of 
those processes for further refinement or manufacture.23 They transported and sold coal and 
its products, not just to wholesalers but sometimes as retailers to customers. Some coal 
owners tried to make a profit out of other products and assets of the collieries whether clay, 
shale or land. All these activities were pursued in order to make the mining business easier 
and more profitable to run, and to derive some extra revenue from assets. Many of these 
activities (and opportunities) transferred to the State under the 1946 Coal Act. Diversification 
was therefore not entirely ruled out by the Act, but the Act concentrated on the handing over 
of private collieries to the State and gave few operational guidelines outside the primary 
work of producing coal (Ezra, 1987). The industry was nationalised as a horizontally 
integrated monolith with set primary functions to perform, and a management structure 
designed to administer coal mining. Once the nationalised industry's boundaries were 
settled, and the bureaucratic structure in place, they were unable to diversify without 
Parliamentary approval (Grundy-Warr, 1989). Whilst the Act itself then allowed for some 
diversification, the development of profitable ancillaries was low on the NC8's priority list and 
23 By products recovered included: tar; .sulphate; concentrated ammonia; benzol; tar products; ammonium chloride and town 
gas. These could be extensive undertakmgs. In 1913 for example. 332,600 !onnes of sulphate of ammonia were produced most 
of which (324,700) was exported. Sheffield Archives, Sulphate of ammonia production, exports etc, as ascertained from the 
British Sulphate Ammonia Federation report year ended 31" May 1921, SY187/B1112. There were also 15,135 coke ovens In 
the UK in 1919. Sheffield Archives. Memoranda of certain statistics as to the production of coal, coke and by products In the 
coalfield of Yorkshire in relation to the coalfields of the UK, SY/186/B11/2. 
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was not given prominence in the Act. This strongly suggests that the State did not want to 
encourage the coal industry to venture into new markets or sub-markets. Indeed it was not 
until the 1960's that the NCB had its own Coal Products Division, separately managed, and 
concentrating on the development of the industry's products. This section examines why the 
State owned coal industry was confined mainly to the mining of coal, and why there was so 
little diversification. Inactivity in this regard needs to be understood not only in terms of the 
implications for the industry, but also in terms of any impact on communities that came to 
depend on mining and mining related employment. 
Assets transferred to the NCB fell into four categories: coal products; merchanting; 
manufacture of goods from materials produced along with coal or used in the coal industry; 
and land and property (Ashworth, 1986, p. 474). The focus here is limited to the activities 
which were pursued in the business environment set by the outside world, which were 
genuinely supplementary or complementary rather than subordinate services, and which 
offered genuine opportunities to extend the lifecycle of the mining industry and for diversify 
into new and emerging sectors. The rationale being that where an industry lifecycle can be 
extended it provides greater opportunities for regions that come to depend on it. likewise 
where an industry provides the basis for diversification into newer sectors this too provides 
the basis for the development of newer regional economic trajectories. The following two 
sections therefore focus on ancillary activities and manufactures. 
3.3.4Ancillaryactivities 
Whilst the act made provision for wider activities it was not until 1963 that the NCB set up its 
own Coal Products Division to concentrate on coal by-products. This was something which 
was in itself indicative of the priority given to such activities. During the 1960's however, the 
NCB was losing market share to oil and therefore it received government approval to engage 
in various activities related to mining. The logic behind this move was explained by Lord 
Robens, NCB chairman during the 1960's: 
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What we did was to utilise our resources, physical and human, our own particular expertise, 
which a shrinking mining industry had made available. The aim was to produce profits which 
we could use to stabilise the price of coal and thereby improve the financial position of our 
primary business (Robens, 1972, p. 320). 
The Coal Products Division introduced new products, handled North Sea Gas activities and 
also took over smokeless plants. The NCB's coke ovens produced benzole as a by-product, 
which for many years was used as motor spirit. Eventually the NCB built a modern benzole 
distillation plant with a big steel company. Another by-products joint venture was with Dutch 
State Mines, which established a plant to make caprolactam, the raw material for Nylon 6. In 
the 1960's the NCB also extended its expertise to continental shelf exploration. The NCB 
also owned solid fuel appliance showrooms, although it could not sell the appliances. It 
therefore became the majority shareholder of a builder's merchant business, J.H. Sankey & 
Sons Ltd in order to distribute appliances. The NCB held 77% of Sankey which went on to 
become the third largest builder's merchants in the UK. These activities were profitable. 
From 1965/66 to 1969/70 profits increased from £9.3 to £20.6 million (after tax). This was 
followed by a Labour government White Paper The Finances of the Coal Industry (Nov, 
1965) which gave the NCB permission to diversify into non-coal mining activities by investing 
up to £75 million. However the overall approach to diversification was piecemeal and 
ancillaries remained a peripheral concern. 
In fact the NCB failed to capitalise on some crucial market opportunities. For example, whilst 
the NCB had expertise and facilities available to develop oil and gas from coal, it made no 
serious attempts during its first two decades to enter these markets. As early as the 1930's 
the Maclaurin Scheme had envisaged the development of (principally Scottish) oil as a 
pragmatic response to the economic problems of that decade (Maclaurin, 1945). At the time, 
oil imports into the UK were seven million tonnes per annum. By 1961, oil imports had 
reached fifty million tonnes and were increasing. The Maclaurin Report had stated that all 
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filling stations of the future would be at collieries and gas works, which would supply petrol, 
diesel oil, bottled gas and compressed gas for all purposes (Conner, 1962, p. 86). To 
implement such an ambitious scheme on a nationwide scale would have meant very large 
additional tonnages of coal for carbonisation. Although it was beyond the coal industry's 
capability to displace oil imports entirely, a share of the oil market could have rejuvenated 
mining. Perhaps more significantly it would also have helped create a more diversified 
national energy market based on indigenous, non-renewable resources, reducing the 
nation's oil import bill, and strengthening the long term security of energy supply (Grundy-
Warr, 1989) whilst at same time going someway to supporting local economic resilience, 
encouraging for example the development of new skills. 
During the early 1960s, the Gas Boards were importing natural gas from North Africa and 
establishing a Grid. Instead of cooperating with each other, the gas and coal industries were 
effectively at each other's throats. Greater coordination over energy policy at this time would 
have helped create a more diversified energy base without the massive run-down of the 
nation's coal industry due to fuel imports (see Schumacher, 1960). That the UK nationalised 
energy sector was allowed to continue along divergent paths was due to conflicting 
objectives and the lack of strong central direction from the State. Similar conclusions, with 
similar consequences can also be identified in the lack of coordination between the 
nationalised coal and steel industries which resulted in a run-down of Britain's coking coal 
capacity at a time of increasing coking coal imports (Hudson & Sadler, 1986). 
The NCB's control over prices was limited by its lack of control over retail and distribution 
networks. Whilst it had a substantial share of the wholesale market, it only had 5% of the 
retail trade. The National Board for Prices and Incomes had in 1966 recommended 
amalgamations into larger coal distribution organisations, rationalisation of ordering, 
collection and delivery services, and an expansion of NCB retailing activity. Although the 
NCB acquired Amalgamated Anthracite Holdings Ltd covering south Wales and the west of 
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England, and the Lancashire Fuel Company, it was highly dependent on the activities of 
private middlemen. In 1976 the NCB was dealing with 280 wholesalers and 7,800 retailers 
involved in distribution which resulted in wide disparities between different types and 
quantities of coal, between and within regions, and between different retailers. This situation 
contrasted sharply with that of the oil industry, which was mainly controlled by multinationals, 
which tig htly controlled their own retail outlets (Alien, 1981, pp.1 09-11 0). 
Whereas the 1960's had seen some diversification into non-mining activities, the election of 
the Heath government of 1970-74 brought about a change of attitude. A strong body of 
political opinion emerged which believed that the NCB should be focusing on mining and 
ending any strategy of even limited diversification. This was made clear to the NCB 
Chairman Lord Robens during a meeting with Sir John Eden, Minister of State with 
responsibility for nationalised industries, in which the sale of some of the NCS's ancillaries 
was discussed. In preparation for privatisation of NCB's ancillaries the 1971 Coal Industry 
Act required the NCS to report to government on its ancillary activities and on those 
companies in which it had a share or interest. Clearly aggrieved Lord Robens subsequently 
resigned his chairmanship stating as his primary reason his reluctance to become "the 
instrument for "hiving off'" profitable activities outside the main business of mining" (Robens, 
1972, p. 323). The period 1974-79 was one of expansion of capital investment in new 
productive capacity and mining technology in coal mining, but there was to be no great 
change in attitude towards NCB ancillaries. 
The election of the Conservatives in 1979 marked a fundamental shift in policy towards the 
mining industry and again could be said to mark a critical juncture with the priorities shifted 
towards preparing the industry for privatisation. The Government subsequently placed tight 
financial limits on the industry whilst encouraging the NCB to introduce measures to reduce 
its operating costs and overheads (see Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1983). As 
part of this policy objective, subsidiaries and holdings began to be sold off. J.H. Sankey for 
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example, was sold off in 1984.24 The Board also sold its 30% stake in Associated Heat 
Services (AHS), a company which designed, installed, and operated boiler and air-
conditioning plant. AHS had been partly owned by the NCB since 1966. In 1983, AHS had 
pre-tax profits of some £3.3 million on a turnover of £35 million, but was sold for £7.5 million 
(Whitfield, 1985) and continues today as a private energy management contractor. The NCB 
also rationalised capacity in the Coal Products Group, which employed nearly 3,000 people 
in 1985-6 and some 1,732 people in 1986-7 (Grundy-Warr, 1989). In addition the Coal 
industry also divested itself of much of its land, property and housing stock during this 
period. 
Overall the picture presented above is one of a failure to develop potential new areas of 
business which could have shifted the NCB from its narrow trajectory and potentially 
avoiding the worst excesses associated with regional lock-in. There was certainly a strong 
financial case to continue. Between 1947 and 1982 ancillary activity made a total profit of 
£247 million, which equated to roughly a third of operating profits for non-mining activity 
(Ashworth, 1986). The potential existed to extend this activity had the political will been 
there. However opposition to further development came not just from Heath's government 
and Tory backbenchers but also from the NUM which also opposed the initiatives out of the 
fear of a detrimental impact on union membership levels. This is illustrative not just of the 
contingent nature of economic trajectories but also a level of consensus amongst key mining 
stake holders and decision-makers whose action or inaction on this and related issues would 
be a determining factor in future trajectories related to the coal industry. It could also be said 
to reflect a critical juncture as by 1979 developing coal board ancillaries was no longer an 
option and this and other potential opportunities to diversify were gone. 
24 Between 1970 and 1980, Sankey's sales had grown from £20 million to £163 million, the assets employed from £8.4 million 
£58.9 million, the profits from £335,000 in 1971 to £4.7 million in 1979/80 (Hansard, 23 Noy 1981 accessed at 
bttp:llhansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1981/noY/23/national-coal-board on 291712011). 
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3.3.5 In-house engineering 
The NCB did not take over any mining machinery facilities from the old private companies 
(although some coal combines did own engineering subsidiaries). After nationalisation new 
central workshops were built, however with the single exception of a small factory in south 
Wales (Tredomen Engineering at Hengeld, acquired in the 1960's), the NCB did not 
manufacture mining plant and equipment (Grundy-Warr, 1989, p.91). This was despite the 
fact that the NCB during the 1970's and 1980's was at the forefront of the technological 
development of the mechanised Longwall System. In practice, the Coal Board passed on 
many of its innovations at no cost to private manufacturers who then profited by them (see 
Townsend, 1980). As mentioned earlier, in theory nothing prevented the NCB from 
developing this area of business. The 1946 Nationalisation Act 1946, Chapter 59, Section 
One, Part Two left this possibility open: 
The function of the NCB shall include the carrying on of all such activities as it may appear to 
the Board to be requisite, advantageous or convenient for them to carry out in connection 
with the discharge of their duties ... and in particular: 
d) producing or manufacturing any goods or utilities which are of a kind required by the 
Board for or in connection with the working and getting of coal or any other of their activities 
or which can be advantageously produced or manufactured by the Board by reason of their 
having interests or manufacture thereof in connection with the working and getting of coal or 
any other utilities so produced or manufactured. 
e) any activities which can be advantageously carried on by the Board with a view to making 
the best use of the assets vested in them by the Act. 
Yet the NCB chose not to. Why was this? One reason was that Attlee's Labour government 
1945-50 believed competition was vital for industries such as manufacturing, where the 
product changed rapidly, and that the related risks were therefore better taken by private 
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enterprise (Sowden, 1995). However, this was more a comment on the specifics of the car 
industry than industry more generally. In the case of mining machinery the risk was less 
evident and demand for intervention immediately apparent. 
After nationalisation the NCS's demands for all kinds of plant and machinery increased. The 
mining machinery industry was unable to meet deadlines and there were serious bottlenecks 
in the supply of underground equipment. Whilst problems of supply were aggravated by 
shortages of both materials and labour there were also inadequacies in the size and 
structure of the machinery industry itself (Grundy-Warr,1989). Attlee's government however 
made no moves to encourage equipment manufacture within the Coal Board. Wider studies 
have suggested that the Labour governments were ill-prepared ideologically to sustain a 
policy on efficiency and modernisation in the private industry and were divided on the 
benefits of the market as against planning. Consolidation set the seal on cooperation as the 
dominant mode of government's relation with private industry25 (Mercer et al. 1992). 
The resultant accommodation meant that despite the obvious demand for machinery after 
nationalisation, government made no attempt to encourage equipment manufacture within 
the Coal Board.26 Rather, the recommendations of the Technical AdVisory Committee (1945) 
were followed and instead the NCB sought close technical cooperation with its suppliers. 
Private manufacturers therefore benefited from what Townsend (1976) described as a 
"complimentary interactive process" of technical collaboration with the NCB. They benefited 
from the NCB's superior technical resources, and R&D facilities, as well as various technical 
innovations made by NCB personnel. Most of the initial innovations for the Anderson 
Shearer Loader originated in the NCB and were passed on to three major cutter loader 
suppliers. The same applied to microprocessor-based mining technology and the Coal 
Board's preferred automation system, MINOS, which was developed by staff in the Mining 
25 It was an outlook which completely accorded with the views of the civil service and the policy of 'Industrial Diplomacy' 
developed in the 1930's. 
26 This despite a commitment to remove restrictions preventing the NeB from diversifying into manufacturing contained in the 
Labour Party's 1964 election manifesto 'The New Britain' 
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Research and Development Establishment (M ROE) at Bretby (see Burns et ai, 1983). 
Suppliers also benefited from the NCB's laboratory and underground mine equipment testing 
facilities, which proved to be an invaluable "shop window" to them by promoting their 
products to potential overseas customers (ABMEC, 1986). These products were then 
promoted by the Coal Board's consultancy services British Mining Consultants Ltd and Coal 
Processing Consultants Ltd. 
The opportunity was always there to extend manufacturing capacity if it had been given the 
go-ahead by senior NCB management. But as Alien (1981, p. 115) observed, "the NCB had, 
it seems, an innate preference for encouraging the private exploitation of its activities. n 
During the 1950's and 1960's there was plenty of scope for more internal contracts to be 
given to the NCB workshops at a time when the NCB was spending millions awarding 
private contracts, and also at a time when the NCB was threatening its own Cowdenbeath 
workshop with closure (Grundy-Warr 1989, p. 94). Whilst the NCB expressed concerns 
regarding the ability of private contractors to meet the needs of the industry (MMC, 1983), 
the contracting out of repair and maintenance to private firms would increase dramatically 
during the 1980's even where evidence was produced which showed this to be a more 
expensive process (MMC, 1983). In 1983 the NCB had 126 central workshops situated close 
to local pits, employing around 10,000 engineering and managers (Grundy-Warr, 1989). This 
number fell to 11 by 1985 and would fall further following the pit closure programme. 
Historically, the NCB had not allowed its engineering workshops to tender for outside 
business. This was clearly a political decision. However, the failure to develop greater in-
house manufacturing can also be viewed in terms of corporate failure which led to 
organisational and cultural rigidities. It is also indicative that managerial inadequacies were 
an inherited weakness of the industry not easily susceptible to reform by public ownership 
(Supple, 1987). Kerevan & Saville (1987) argue that the almost military lines of command 
within the top-down bureaucratic administrative structure of the NCB and its rigid rules and 
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regulations stifled imaginative initiatives in the workshops and prevented the utilisation of 
local engineering skills and resources. The increasing centralisation of purchasing and 
stores and management control, from the 1960's onwards, provided little freedom for 
workshop staff to run their operations as they saw fit. Tight budgetary constraints and a 
flawed accounting system meant that workshops were considered to be areas for 
economising, rather than increased capital investment, by NCB accountants and senior 
management. 
In fact, the productionist mentality of senior NCB mining engineers meant that the 
workshops, rather than being seen as potential innovation or 'skunk works', became viewed 
as a troublesome subordinate element in the real business of digging coal. Therefore, they 
conclude that the NCB workshops commercial and technological potential was missed. 
Numerous examples of workshop innovation are available: Kerevan & Saville cite the 
examples of the Alloa Heading Machine, flameproof equipment, electrical panels, hydraulic 
props, and a range of other equipment. "Instead of developing these within the NCB, 
Headquarters merely amalgamated improvements and handed over details to private 
industry, representing a colossal public subsidy to the private sector" (Kerevan & Saville 
1987, p. 57). 
3.3.6 Summary 
The case of the coal industry's engineering workshops highlights a lack of flexibility and 
entrepreneurial skills, which many right-wing critics have ascribed as an inherent weakness 
of nationalised industries, and which would provide political ammunition during the 1970s 
and 1980's. However in order to develop effective in-house manufacturing the NCB would 
have had to invest in their specialist workshops and allow them to compete to a degree with 
private sector firms. Whilst there was some limited outside tendering permitted, on the whole 
successive governments were reluctant to allow this. Consequently, over the years the 
central workshops suffered from a lack of investment and under-utilised resources. 
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Opportunities existed to develop new lines of business including into overseas markets but 
government preferred to support private sector expansion. Yet this strategy was also short-
sighted and ultimately counterproductive as the close technical cooperation promoted by 
government failed to incentivise private manufacturers to invest in boundary-spanning 
functions (Hassink, 2010) most notably associated with internal investment in research and 
development. Therefore once NCB contracts began to dry up most of the mining 
manufacturing companies were unable to diversify into new markets. Given the clustering of 
private mining manufacturers (discussed earlier) around the coalfields this merely 
compounded the regional impact of pit closure. A similar conclusion can be drawn in the 
case of the NCB ancillaries. Whilst profitable they were not developed, but instead 
subsequently sold off cheaply. What this section shows therefore is that opportunities 
existed for the State to act in an entrepreneurial manner enabling the development of new 
economic and regional trajectories. However, what it also shows is that the NCB from its 
inception was constrained by the Nationalisation Act, ambiguous commercial functions and 
by the financial and product pricing constraints of successive governments. This was 
discussed in 3.2 but extended in 3.3. Alien (1981, p. 117) argues that state owned industries 
have suffered from their ambivalent 'hybrid' status, which has led to bad entrepreneurship. 
He argues that, "through ambivalence towards its purpose, through the advice given by 
governments and the controls they imposed, through its incompetence, the NCB was a bad 
entrepreneur." What follows suggests that this was not necessarily a feature of state owned 
industries per se but the reality of the British state owned industries and the coal industry in 
particular. Rather than a feature of nationalisation as critics of state ownership would 
suggest, the development trajectory of the UK coal industry was determined by key 
decisions within both government and industry. 
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3.3.7 Comparison with the Dutch mining industry 
The earlier comparison with the German coal industry showed that the nature and speed of 
decline of the UK coal industry is best understood as being contingent on the policy choices 
of UK governments. It highlighted that alternative choices were available to government 
which at the least could have provided time for coal regions to adapt to decline. The 
comparison with Germany also shows another important contrast with the UK industry and 
again highlights the role of agency in the nature and timing of decline of the UK coal 
industry. German government support for its mining industry was also predicated on the 
understanding that it provided the basis for future innovation and enterprise, and therefore 
potential alternative paths. The following comparison develops this further. Whereas the UK 
coal industry was actively prevented from diversifying into activities such as the manufacture 
of mining machinery and equipment - activities that remained a source of profit for other 
private sector companies (Hudson, 2005), other coal producing nations adopted a different 
approach which had significantly more positive longer term implications for the industry and 
for those regions dependent upon it. The following comparison with the Dutch State Mines 
(DSM) therefore extends the assessment of corporate entrepreneurial failure, highlighting 
alternative paths in new technological sectors which were available to the NCB. 
Dutch State Mines (DSM) was established in 1901, as a government owned but 
competitively operated company. The company was run by a politically independent 
managing board of directors and given full authority to create a company based on economic 
and competitive principles. Although the company was responsible to the Minister of Finance 
for its overall expenditures, its profits could be retained to invest in its own operations. This 
approach to state ownership enabled DSM to maintain an entrepreneurial approach to its 
business developing new products and overtime diversifying into new sectors. This ensured 
that as energy demands changed so too did DSM. For example when coke oven gas was no 
longer used exclusively for public gas supply DSM moved into other areas. In 1929 for 
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example the company's nitrogen works, utilising the coke oven gas was established to 
produce fertilizers. Gradually DSM began to produce other chemicals. This part of the 
company's portfolio was extended during the 1960's in response to the decline in coal 
demand. This shift in trajectory was supported by a major investment between 1965 and 
1979 which had two objectives- continuation of the company and profitability. 
In 1967 DSM became an unquoted public company no longer dependent upon the Minister 
of Finance and required to fund its operations through capital markets (Grant, 2004). By 
1970 all coal mining operations had been phased out and DSM moved into the production of 
industrial chemicals, plastics and resins, and spun off its fertilizer business. During the 
1980's DSM handled the States 40% interest in the distribution operations of the Dutch 
natural gas reserves through one of its subsidiaries nevertheless the national government 
still retained direct control over sale and pricing policy as well as final approval of export 
contracts. DSM was privatised in 1989, and since the 1990's has transformed itself again, 
selling almost all of its commodity chemicals activities and becoming a Life Sciences & 
Materials Sciences company (de Geus, 1997). 
From its inception DSM developed internal business practices which ensured that it was able 
to overcome the challenges of cheap foreign coal and increased competition from oil by 
implementing proactive and innovative strategies (Davids & Tjon Tjin Tai, 2009). Wider 
strategies were developed based on long-term planning focusing on de-bottlenecking, 
research and development, and diversification. Central to the success of DSM was the 
establishment of an Experiment Station, which included a patents department and licensing 
company (Van Rooij, 2007). One particular early innovation to emerge from this innovation 
centre was the development of new coal cleaning installations needed to provide a higher 
quality of coal against lower coal processing cost. As mentioned above the NCB had its own 
innovation centres such as the Central Engineering Establishment at Bretby although its 
purpose was much more limited compared to that of DCM. At Bretby for example the 
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intention was not to manufacture specialised machines in quantities but merely to develop 
prototypes in order to help private manufacturers speed up their own development. 
What the above comparison shows therefore is that mining as an industry is not intrinsically 
un-entrepreneurial, nor that the nature of its decline was in any way determined by the 
nature of its principal product - coal. But that the ability of the mining industry and coal 
regions in Britain to adjust to declining levels of coal consumption was constrained by a self-
sustaining coalition most clearly evident in terms of political decisions and poor 
entrepreneurial leadership at the Coal Board. Not only could coal provide the basis for 
diversification into other new product markets, but the coal industry itself could also have 
developed internal capabilities which were not technologically dependent, but were 
transferable at a micro level. In the case of the NCB, internal capabilities were not developed 
nor any real attempts made at diversification. The State could have intervened to enable the 
development of these capabilities and encourage diversification in numerous ways. For 
example by allocating research and development funds towards the exploration of new 
markets and sub markets such as energy conservation, and renewable energy sources, or 
by building on the experience and expertise of Coal Board scientists and technicians in 
developing mechanised and automated mining systems to branch into new but 
technologically related industries. As mentioned above the NCB was at the forefront of 
numerous new technological developments but also extended to new coal use technologies. 
A major conclusion is therefore that external constraints imposed by government narrowly 
defined the objectives of NCB senior decision makers and ensured that the industry 
trajectory remained locked into existing markets at the expense of the longer term viability of 
regions and skills. Opportunities to develop new sustainable trajectories did exist through 
diversification and a measure of competition against private firms. Whilst this was a 
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possibility prior to 1979, this was no longer an option afterwards as activity shifted to 
preparing the industry for privatisation.27 
3.3.8 Conclusion 
Without reverting to counterfactuals, this chapter has demonstrated that the UK coal industry 
although in decline, offered a number of alternative economic trajectories through 
diversification into new sub-markets. It also demonstrated that although in decline, 
alternative ways of managing the industry were available which could have mitigated some 
of the problems experienced in the coal areas during the 1980's and 1990's. One scenario 
was based on the experiences of the Ruhr coalfield during the 1980's and focuses on 
government agency. It highlights a policy choice to reduce the speed of decline so as to 
minimise potential multiplier impacts which have been shown to impact on wider 
opportunities for sustainable local economic development. Regional structural change 
cannot be achieved through structural collapse, a conclusion which has been shown to have 
contemporary as well as historical relevance. Another, perhaps more bold scenario would 
have been to break the coal mining trajectory before the collapse in mining employment, by 
for example using the technical expertise, skills and knowledge within the NCB to diversify 
the industry. This could have been achieved through integrating horizontally into submarkets 
by developing the NCB's manufacturing base, or more radically still by altering its core 
product as happened in the case of the DSM. Both would have required a different approach 
to organising and managing organisational resources. Both in short would have required a 
more entrepreneurial mindset. This broad conclusion supports the Chandler argument that 
industrial decline was associated with a corporate entrepreneurial failure but extends its 
central thesis to cover the period after nationalisation and includes the State as the key 
stakeholder largely determining the direction of the NCB. However the Chandler thesis is 
updated to cover the period under public ownership, and whilst broadly agreeing that the 
27 As part of the privatisation process for example BC rationalised workshop capacity and increased 'contracting out' of repair 
and maintenance work to private firms (Grundy-Warr, 1989) 
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Coal Board's trajectory was contingent on corporate failure, adds the caveat that under state 
ownership the industry often lacked the agency to determine its own priorities. Rather it was 
actively prevented from diversifying into activities such as the manufacture of mining 
machinery and equipment - activities that remained a source of profit for other private sector 
companies (Hudson, 2005). Spatially concentrated and largely dependent upon the Coal 
Board as both technical incubator and main customer, as it declined so did they, with 
obvious regional implications, both in the short term Gobs and spending) and longer term 
(skills). 
By focusing on agency, either at a corporate or political level, the chapter has sought to 
highlight the extent to which contingency better describes the process of decline in the UK 
coal industry. The underpinning rationale for contingency theory is that alternative 
trajectories were available. Studies have shown that windows of opportunity for path 
creation, the purposeful breaking of a particular trajectory in favour of other more sustainable 
paths, are short and therefore require decisive, even unpopular action, at both a corporate 
and political level. Action taken within these windows may have short term regional 
drawbacks, but they may also have longer term benefits for the region. The case of 
Germany during the 1920's is a case in point, where strong leadership was combined with a 
clear national industrial strategy. It is for this reason that these windows of opportunity have 
been associated with critical junctures, branching points at which alternatives trajectories are 
available. Three potential critical junctures were highlighted. These were during the Sankey 
debates in 1919-20, at the point of nationalisation in 1947 following the landslide election of 
Attlee's Labour government, and again following the election of the Thatcher government in 
1979. The first offered the opportunity for clear state leadership to address the systematic 
and institutional problems that existed within the industry. Whilst nationalisation was not a 
panacea in 1920 with wider structural and institutional factors affecting the performance of 
the coal industry, it did nevertheless provide the best opportunity for coordinated investment 
in technology and organisation of the industry. The evidence to support this assertion is in 
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the lamentable performance of the industry during the course of the following decade. That 
State intervention was rejected at this time was due to ideological rather than business or 
economic reasons, and serves to illustrate that the subsequent negative trajectory 
associated with under investment was determined by institutional inertia. The second critical 
juncture followed the landslide election of Attlee's Labour government. At this time coal held 
a monopoly position in the UK energy market and therefore the government and industry 
were able to take a long term view of capital investment which heralded much needed 
modernisation. However, the purpose and role of coal in the UK economy remained 
ambiguous and there was never a coherent national energy policy. The industry was 
nationalised as a horizontally integrated monolith with set primary functions to perform, and 
a management structure designed to administer coal mining, with a clear division between 
private and public sector, and an ambiguous attitude towards diversification. This set the 
tone for future government approach to the industry and meant that institutional inertia 
continued to affect the development path of the industry (and regions) especially once its 
monopoly ended. The State could have intervened to enable a different development path in 
numerous ways including limiting the amount of imported fuel, or adjusting taxation or 
regulatory policy, or by allocating research and development funds towards energy 
conservation, and renewable energy sources. Even within a declining industry what is wrong 
with a more imaginative approach to capital investment that actually maintains jobs (the 
approach adopted by Germany), or which generates new manufacturing jobs and opens up 
the possibility of new market opportunities (as had been the case in the Netherlands)? Both 
would have had a Significantly different impact on the future development trajectories of coal 
areas. 
As mentioned above entrepreneurial behaviour is socially as well as economically useful. 
The Coal Act placed clear social drivers on the NCB which extended to the interests of coal 
communities in the longer as well as shorter term. This required the NeB to exploit the 
resources of the industry to proactively enable change, in the interests of the coal 
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communities as well as to maximise coal production. This would have involved it in shaping 
and crafting the necessary infrastructure in order to capitalise on and exploit new 
opportunities, whether at corporate or at a regional level. Both the Ruhr and DSM case 
studies show that this could be done. Neither provides a blueprint nor a panacea, but both 
do provide clear illustration of how decisions can have a more beneficial effect on industrial 
and regional trajectories. In the UK, public ownership via nationalisation came to be used as 
a strategy to underpin a coal area's development trajectory around mining as the State 
sought to replace the private sector as proximate guarantor of regional paths. It did so 
however in ways that created a trajectory locked-in to existing industries. Largely the newly 
formed National Coal Board was confined to mining coal and was constrained from 
diversifying in any meaningful way. The subsequent path contingent development of the UK 
coal industry can therefore be understood in terms of notions of increasing returns with coal 
production often pursued to the longer term disadvantage of the coal areas. 
The final critical juncture followed the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. It 
heralded the transition from a social democratic to a neo-liberal mode of state engagement 
with the economy and society. In terms of coal policy the shift was most evident in the 
privatisation and associated rationalisation of the formerly nationalised industry. This was 
particularly significant in revealing the contingent character of the trajectory of coal regions. 
In order to render the industry attractive to private interests, the formally close and politically 
mediated ties between the nationalised industries were broken as they were allowed to 
source and sell globally. For example the electricity supply and steel industries had formed 
markets for coal, which disappeared as these industries were allowed to buy coal on the 
international market. This led to an enforced pit closure programme which determined the 
nature, scale, and equally importantly the timing of decline, the speed of which did not help 
local communities in their efforts to diversify and in creating new sources of employment. 
The central government top-down approach to the subsequent problem of unemployment 
tended to by-pass local authorities, although many of these were subsequently co-opted via 
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regional policy funding parameters. Various enterprise agencies were also established but 
often with limited budgets. Their efforts, including those of British Coal Enterprise highlighted 
above, had a limited impact on job creation. Together the action of the various agencies 
represented an inadequate response to the scale of the problem created by the speed and 
timing of closure which in many regions coincided with wider de-industrialisation. Local 
authorities lacked resources to tackle the numbers of unemployed, and often had to compete 
against each other for national and European funds. This was especially true of government 
enterprise policy which focused largely on increasing the rate of self-employment in the 
same regions now experiencing dramatically declining levels of affluence. Even where 
regions did attract capital investment this was often in the shape of branch plants, which 
typically perpetuated the low skill trajectory of the area, and which were often the first to 
close at times of economic hardship or due to corporate strategies of parent companies. 
The weakness of the critical juncture framework is said to be the tendency to understand 
their significance only with the benefit of hindsight. In the case of the long decline of the UK 
coal industry this chapter has provided sufficient evidence to draw the conclusion that the 
decline was foreseeable, even planned. The decline of the industry had certainly been 
anticipated long before the absolute decline of the 1980's and 1990's. Yet even at this late 
stage the government and Coal Board continued to promote mining careers and dominate 
regional policy making, imposing solutions, such as the enterprise policy, which had been 
shown to be flawed. Opportunities to break the narrow coalmining trajectory existed but were 
overlooked. When finally this trajectory was broken, it resulted in structural collapse. The 
result was that UK coalfields have experienced some of the most dramatic declines in 
prosperity levels of any equivalent Western European region. Many continue to struggle to 
reintegrate into the modern economy. What follows explores the impact on the town of 
Doncaster. 
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4 Doncaster 
4.1 Introduction 
Whilst Doncaster was never a mining town in the way for example Barnsley was, it was 
nevertheless the arrival of coal at the turn of the century and its subsequent development 
which has been associated with transforming the outlook and economic trajectory of the 
town. The town's first economic report published in 1922 suggested that the town had by this 
date been "subtly but surely changed from a large old-fashioned and prosperous market 
town, to the avowed metropolis of a new industrial district" (Abercrombie and Johnson, 1922, 
p. 8). That said, despite the town's market town status Doncaster was not new to industrial 
development, having developed tanning and woollen industries in ancient times and 
significant manufacturing occupations in leather and allied trades, food and drink processes, 
clothing and textile, and distribution and transport during the 17th and 18th centuries (Nash, 
1983). It was however the arrival of the Great Northern Railway (GNR) in 1853 that shifted 
the town onto a more industrial trajectory. The arrival of the railway had an immediate effect 
ending the town's relative geographical isolation (Coates, 1976) whilst effectively destroying 
the town's local coaching and posting trade. However in destroying one of the town's 
traditional industries, the arrival of the railway works and its related engineering and 
draughtsman skills, created a new economic trajectory. The GNR engineering works 
expanded rapidly to become a major employer in the town, employing 3.500 men by 1913. 
Significantly, the engineering works (which came to be known locally as 'The Plant') also 
trained some of the leading engineers of the day.28 The development of the Plant works was 
significant as it also attracted investment and provided the hub for subsequent engineering 
28 These included Oliver Bulleid (a premium apprentice, 1901-5), who went on to become prominent in railway engine design In 
England and Ireland, and W.O. Bentley (a premium apprentice, 1905-9), the creator of the Bentley motor car (Barber, 2007). 
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clustering, of which Peglars and British Ropes are perhaps the two most significant 
representatives.29 
This process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) has been identified as the 
entrepreneurial and necessary contribution innovation plays to the dynamic growth of 
economies. The arrival of the railways and related engineering skills arguably provides an 
example of this process, destroying the local coaching industry but developing new skills and 
knowledge which offered the prospects of regional cumulative innovation. The prospect of 
continued cumulative innovation is determined by institutional support at a range of policy 
making levels. In this regard the limited support provided by Doncaster's local corporation to 
attract the railways could be considered to be an early indication of institutional inertia, 
reflecting a complacent attitude to industrial development. This had been evident in previous 
corporation responses to possible developments of new industry, of which Edmund 
Cartwright's textile development and Benjamin Huntsman's experimentation in steel 
production are the most notable examples.30 It has been argued that these missed 
opportunities were more by design than bad luck, and that Doncaster, unlike its West Riding 
neighbours, had no desire to become a manufacturing town and positively shunned attempts 
to develop new business (Wormald, 1973). The railways challenged this institutional inertia, 
but the development of the concealed coalfield around Doncaster had a more profound 
impact on the town. 
29 Peglars Brothers and Co. was established in 1899 and manufactured brass and gun metal for the plumbing trades. British 
Ropes Lld was established in 1902. Originally established as Doncaster Wire Company It merged In 1925 to become British 
Ropes. Both companies were developed on the Carr site on the southern side of the London North East Railway and would 
become major employers in the area throughout the 20th century. Other notable examples of business established alongside 
the railways included the Doncaster Wagon WorKs, Stevens Wagon Company, and Burnett Wagon Company. The railways 
also led to the arrival of the Cooperative Society in 1867 as 2,500 people migrated to the town looking for jobs in the new 
industries and leading to the development of the surrounding villages of Balby and Hexthorpe (Holbrook, nd). 
30 Reverend Edmund Cartwright, the inventor of the power loom, opened a spinning and weaving factory in Hallgate In 1787. 
However, the smell from the buildings rendered the industry unpopular with the Corporation and townspeople (Worrnald, 1973), 
and Cartwright. an ingenious inventor, but poor bUSinessman went bankrupt in 1793. Cartwright subsequently left Doncaster 
and pursued a career in innOva!ion ~n London and the Home ,Counties. Benjamin Huntsman, the Inventor of the crucible 
process for manufacturing steel, hved In the town dUring the 1740 s. A man of all round mechanical skills, Huntsman conducted 
much of his early experimental worK in steel improvement whilst living In Doncaster. However he later moved to Hansworth, 
near Sheffield to continue his worK. 
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Appendix 4 shows the town of Doncaster in relation to this coalfield. It shows the town and 
the surrounding (former) pit villages as located within the boundaries of what is today (2010) 
the Doncaster Coal Mining Referral Area. In focusing on the impact of the coal mining 
industry on the town of Doncaster over the course of the 20th century, this study draws a 
distinction between the central town of Doncaster and the wider Doncaster area which 
includes the (former) pit villages (Appendix 4). As with any historical study it is not always 
easy to ensure exact continuity as geographic areas including that of the boundary of a 
town, have been subject to change (Halsey & Webb, 2000). However, broadly the study 
focuses on the town's central wards which existed in 1900 (see map appendix 5), plus other 
wards drawn into the town as a result of the boundary changes in 1914, 1948 and 1983 and 
which today make up the Parliamentary seat of Central Doncaster: In 1914 the town map 
(see appendix 6) shows that with the addition of Wheatley, Balby and Hexthrope the town 
became nine wards (Central, Balby, East, Hexthorpe, Hyde Park, St James, St Johns, St 
Georges and Wheatley). These wards continued until 1939 when a redistribution of wards 
took place. However the November 1939 elections were postponed because of the outbreak 
of the Second World War and elections did not take place until the 1st November 1945. In the 
subsequent reorganisation the East and St James wards disappeared and were replaced by 
new wards named Bessacarr, Intake, Town Field, Westfield and Woodfield. The mining 
village of Armthorpe was added in 1983 (Armthorpe, Balby, Bessacarr and Cantley, Central, 
Edenthorpe, Kirk Sandall and 8arnby Dunn, Town Moor and Wheatley, see appendix 7). 
This study area is largely urban and includes Wheatley Hall, Marshgate and Kirk Sandall 
estates (see appendix 8) but not other industrial areas. 
As stated above Doncaster was not a coal town in the way that Barnsley was. No mines 
were developed within the towns central wards (until Markham Main was drawn into the area 
in 1983) but coalfield definitions suggest that if not a coal town itself then Doncaster was 
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certainly the centre of a coalfield. 31 Appendix 4 shows the area of the Doncaster coalfield 
and the location of (former) collieries. The development of the concealed coalfield in the 
early years of the 20th century meant that by the end of the First World War there were eight 
collieries developed within this area: Rossington; Markham Main; Askern; Hatfield; Yorkshire 
Main; Bentley; Bullcroft; Brodsworth. Two further collieries were in operation in the area: 
Denaby colliery which opened in 1867, and Cadeby colliery which opened in 1893. Along 
with Thorne colliery which began production in 1928, these 11 collieries are described as the 
Doncaster area collieries. 32 • Following nationalisation the newly formed NCB grouped the 
industry into eight divisions, each corresponding to a major coalfield (see appendix 9). 
Doncaster's collieries were organised into Division three or the North East Division. Each 
division had areas sub-divided into A and B sub areas (with the exception of number eight 
Castleford which was sub-divided into A, B and C). Doncaster was area number two. 
Doncaster had 11 pits on vesting day in 1947. These were: Sub Area A; Askern; Brodsworth; 
Bullcroft; Hickleton; Rossington; Yorkshire Main; and Sub Area B; Bentley; Goldthorpe; 
Hatfield; Highgate; Markham Main, and Thorne.33 Following reorganisation in 1967, the 
Yorkshire Division ended and four new self contained areas were created: Barnsley; 
Doncaster; South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire (see appendix 10). Whilst the Doncaster 
area had the least number of producing collieries at this time (thirteen) they were 
acknowledged as having some of the richest coal-seams in the country and making a 
31 There is no single definition of 'the coalfields'. Maps based on geology, historical connections or labour markets at different 
points in time would all generate subtly different definitions. The Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research (CRESR) 
define British coalfields based on resident employment in coalmining and associated Industries at ward level. This definition 
was originally devised by Beally and Fothergill (1996) and was based on ward level resident employment data taken from the 
1981 Census of Population. The intention was to capture those areas still dominated by coal mining prior to the large scale pit 
closures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The criterion used to qualify a ward as being within a coalfield area was that 10% of 
employed residents be engaged in mining. The statistical threshold was interpreted flexibly, for example to Include some wards 
that did not meet the 10% hurdle but which were largely or wholly surrounded by other coalfield wards. When applied to South 
Yorkshire this definition results in the majority of the county, with the exception of the city of Sheffield, being defined as a 
traditional coalfield. A subsidiary category, pit villages, was also defined for those wards where this figure exceeded 25 per 
cent. This definition has been used successfully in previous research studies (Beally and Fothergill, 1996; Gore et al 2000; 
Gore et ai, 2001), and was displayed in map form in an appendix to the CTF report (Coalfields Task Force, 1998). 
32 Whilst the re-organisation of the coal industry under state ownership resulted in changes to coal area boundaries, these 11 
collieries are consistently described as the Doncaster collieries as they are located in the Doncaster Coal Mining Referral Area 
as designated in 2010. 
33 Hickleton, Highgate and Goldthorpe were organised under the Doncaster area whilst Cadeby and Denaby collieries were 
organised under Number three Rotherham Area Sub- Area B 
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disproportionate contribution to coal production in the Yorkshire area (see e.g. appendix 11). 
In October 1985 following the national miners' strike, Doncaster's collieries were reorganised 
again with the creation of a new South Yorkshire area which comprised the amalgamation of 
the old South Yorkshire and the Doncaster area. 
In its assessment of the impact of the coal industry on the town of Doncaster over the course 
of the 20th century, this chapter assesses in particular the extent to which coal came to 
dominate the town, and the extent to which this development can be understood in terms of 
path dependent processes which are inexorable, or conversely whether the nature of coal's 
impact on the town can be understood as contingent on human agency. Chapter 3 
highlighted that the coal industry had potential for diversification and therefore regional 
development trajectories could have been changed. Even where no diversification took place 
chapter three also highlighted that policy choices at a meso but particularly at a macro level 
could have enabled coal dominated areas to develop alternative paths. However the coal 
industry's decline as a single product industry and the resultant dependence of coal 
dominated areas has been identified as a key inhibiter in economic regeneration. Coal 
legacy characteristics are considered in relation to wider indicators and determinants of 
regional competitiveness (see IFO, 1990). This list currently extends to 41 variables covering 
five categories: economic; infrastructural; social; educational; and political/institutional 
(Bowes, 2003). These variables are however not exhaustive nor equally weighted, nor can 
they be organised into an 'ideal' type or model. They do however provide a broad framework 
for analysis and demonstrate the importance of engaging with indicators wider than 
economics. For example a central focus of this study and this chapter is an assessment of 
the extent to which coal mining's legacy has inhibited the town's economic competitiveness 
in what is today called an enterprise economy. Specifically former coal dominated areas are 
said to lack an entrepreneurial spirit with lower than average levels of indigenous SMEs. 
Two indicators can be used to assess the value of this proposition, firstly local politics and 
secondly industrial structure. Where UK enterprise cultures have been empirically tested, 
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local political affiliation has formed the basis of a 'local enterprise' variable, based on the 
assumption that communities which traditionally elected a high proportion of Labour 
councillors exhibit relatively negative socio-cultural attitudes to self employment and 
entrepreneurship (Keeble & Walker, 1994). Given that coal dominated areas have typically 
been associated with Labour politics might this explain Doncaster's current business 
deprived status? Similarly, spatial differences in the rates of new firm formation have been 
identified as determined by the structural composition of an area. Empirical research shows 
that regions dominated by small and/or young firms have relatively high new firm formation 
rates (Audretsch & Fritsch, 1994; Mason, 1991; Mueller, 2006), whereas areas dominated by 
large plants would be expected to perform badly as incubators of new bUsiness founders 
(Johnson & Cathcart, 1979). This is based on the stylised fact that entrepreneurs are often 
organisational products, that is to say that they spin-off a firm from their previous employer 
or they at least start a business in an industry with which they are already familiar (Audia & 
Rider, 2006; Storey, 1982). Industries it has been shown differ in their degree of entry 
barriers and the extent to which entrepreneurial opportunities emerge (Stam, 2010). To what 
extent therefore did coalmining come to determine the low firm formation rates in the town by 
the end of the century? 
Chapter three showed that the nature of the UK mining industry's trajectory rather than being 
inexorable was contingent on agency at ~ number of policy-making levels but particularly at 
a meso (NCB) and macro (State) level. Local (micro) agency was highlighted above as a 
possible determinant of Doncaster's early industrial development path. Doncaster's Local 
Corporation has been identified, with a particular policy focus which aimed to avoid 
industrialisation, preferring an economic trajectory which maintained the town's lethargic and 
comfortable way of life (Wormold, 1973). To what extent is the nature of Doncaster's 
economic development path over the course of the 20th century better understood as 
contingent on one or all of these policy-making levels? 
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The chapter is organised chronologically and its structure is based on sociological typologies 
associated with coal communities which identify three significant time periods: youth, 
maturity and old age (Taylor, 1979). The periods which follow are re-described to relate to 
major phases in the development of the Doncaster area coal industry. Briefly they are; early 
period dating from 1900 to 1945 which covers the period from the sinking of the first mine 
shafts around Doncaster to the end of the Second World War. The early years of the 20th 
century saw the first large scale development of the concealed coalfield of South Yorkshire 
with the sinking of collieries at Brodsworth and Bentley followed by an even greater 
expansion between 1911 and 1920.34 Although the geology of the concealed coalfield meant 
that these collieries required significant investment, there was no shortage of interest for the 
development of large scale pits which could produce millions of tons of high quality 
(,Barnsley best') coal per year, a factor which provided greater certainty of market demand 
than in other coal areas of poorer quality.35 This was also reflected in relative wages levels 
(Barber, 2007). During this period mining began to influence occupational patterns as well as 
range of socio-cultural factors, although its impact was neither universal nor linear. During 
the Edwardian period at least, the local coal industry also provided key locational 
advantages for new business development. That these advantages were not developed 
sufficiently could be seen to represent a critical juncture as local agency began to diminish 
with national policy makers growing in influence. To what extent was this the case? 
The mature period covers the years 1946-1970 and reflects a period of increased investment 
and expansion in the local mining industry which now came under public ownership. 
Although the Doncaster area had the lowest number of productive collieries in the Yorkshire 
region these pits had some of the richest seams. This is reflected in the period being one of 
:J.4 Most of the Collieries in the Doncaster coalfield were sunk between 1905-1916, with the exception of Cadeby and Denaby 
Mains, which were sunk earlier as they exploited a natural cutting through the magnesium limestone made by the Don Gorge 
(Gill, 2007). 
35 Doncaster area coal found markets in locomotives and domestic use. Doncaster also had good links to export markets. 
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relative affluence as wages and spending boosted the town's economy. However the period 
also shows that this trajectory came under threat as alternative energy sources were 
developed which threatened mining employment, and which came at a time when the town's 
other main employers were becoming increasingly exposed to global trends. To what extent 
was this understood at the time? Were alternative trajectories possible and if so why were 
they not taken? 
The final section, decline considers the period 1971-2000 and covers the pit closure 
programme and economic decline of the town. Whilst the publication of the Energy White 
Paper in 1967 had planned for a decline in mining the sudden contraction of the mining 
industry following the 1984/5 miners strike was unforeseen. The privatisation of the industry 
in 1993-4 led to further closures. An industry that had employed 180,000 miners in 120 
collieries in 1984, had by the mid 1990's been reduced to 16 collieries employing only 6,000 
workers. The closure of the Doncaster area collieries would be dramatic in speed and scale 
and coincided with the decline in the town's other main employers. The result was a perfect 
storm for the local economy from which the town still struggles to recover. Decline may well 
be a fact of industrial life but should decline have happened at this pace and at this scale? 
Why was this and what were the implications for the town's economy and its subsequent 
development path? 
4.2 The early period 1900-1945 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Despite 50 years of engineering, Doncaster's outlook and culture in 1900 was closer to the 
19th than to the 20th century. 'Squires' and 'gentry' still occupied the numerous halls, and 
along with the clergy they continued to exercise influence over the surrounding countryside. 
So thoroughly was this culture embedded that "colliery companies were more than industrial 
intruders in a slightly old fashioned agrarian society, they were practically foreigners" 
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(Oakley, 2002, p.4). However between 1903 and 1914, large areas of land around 
Doncaster were acquired, and by mid-1912, over £6 million had been invested in the new 
coalfield (DG, 13/1/1911 ).36 By the outbreak of the First World War with the national industry 
at the peak of its production levels, the Doncaster area collieries were employing 
approximately 20,000 people.37 Mining also came to develop key inter-linkages with wider 
sectors and business as well has having wider socio-political impacts on the town. Many of 
these impacts divided public opinion at this time. Whilst none foresaw the subsequent impact 
of decline, the Doncaster Gazette would provide testimony to these ongoing debates which 
allows for an analysis of the extent to which mining during 1900 and 1945 established 
processes in Doncaster that were inexorable. In particular the pages of the Gazette provide 
evidence of early concerns regarding the potential impact of a dominant mining industry. It 
also highlights the failings of the town's corporation in this regard which it argued failed to act 
early and decisively enough to create the infrastructure for a modern industrial town which 
utilised rather than became dependent upon coal. Although this section explores impact over 
the period 1900 -1945, it is sub-divided in to the Edwardian period 1900-1914, and the inter-
war years to allow greater focus on early transformative impact. 
4.2.2 The Edwardian period 
The first sods were cut in March 1905 at Bentley and in October of the same year at 
Brodsworth. Mines were opened at Brodsworth in 1907, and Bentley in 1908. Bullcroft and 
Yorkshire Main collieries opened in 1911, followed by Askern Colliery in 1913 whilst other 
pits were in the process of development at Rossington and Hatfield. As early as 1910 Table 
4:1 shows that Doncaster's collieries employed 7,830 men. It also shows that figure rose to 
36 Several joint ventures were established to share the cost, and risk of sinking mines in what was an untried coalfield. Bentley 
Colliery for example was owned by Barber and Walker from Nottinghamshire. Brodsworth Colliery Company Lld had strong 
Derbyshire connections, being half owned by.Slaveley Coal a~d IronCompany an.d Hickleton Colliery Company. Staveley went 
on 10 develop interests in three other local pits, Yorkshire Main Colliery near Edhngton, Bullcroft and Markham Main (Oakely, 
2002). 
37 In 1913 output from South Yorkshire was 27 million tons. Peak production in In South Yorkshire was 1929 when it produced 
33.5 million tons or 13% of national output. 
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over 25,000 by the end of World War Two. Doncaster's new, deeper pits, benefited from the 
use of modern technology, and often produced between 5-6000 tonnes of coal per day; ten 
times the output of the average coal mine thirty years earlier.38 Local mines also reflected 
national trends in terms of size with three of the six pits open by 1910 employing over 1000 
mineworkers. This number increased to eight by 1920 and by 1927 all eleven local pits 
employed over a 1000 mineworkers.39 
Table 4:1 - Employment in Doncaster collieries 1910-1945 
Colliery 1910 1920 * 1927 1945 
Bentley 1,200 2,565 3,129 2,932 
Brodsworth 2,111 2,930 4,180 3,418 
Cadeby 3,750 2.167 2,560 1,500 
Denaby n/a 1,943 2,410 1.850 
Hatfield n/a n/a 2,150 2,523 
Markham Main n/a n/a 2,189 2,632 
Rossington n/a 1,128 2,500 2,248 
Yorkshire Main 257 2,694 3,500 2,592 
Bullcroft 205 2,437 3,125 1,718 
Askern n/a 1,389 1,500 1,524 
Thome 307 n/a 1,200 2,460 
Total 7,830 17,253 28,033 25,397 
38 Doncaster collieries were the first in many regards: For example Yorkshire Main was the deepest mine In the UK at 908 
yards. It was also had practically the whole of the pe"!1anent surface pla.nt laid out before sinking. with the whole of the prime 
movers including winding engines under one roof. ThiS penmtted the boilers to be situated next to the various engines saving 
considerably on steam. Hatfield Main was the first colliery in the UK to be sunk using the cementation process (in which cement 
was injected into strata to reduce water). Sheffield Archives. Memoranda and certain statistics as the production of coal. coke 
and bye products in the coalfield of Yorkshire in relation to the coalfields of the UK 25th November 1921. SY187/B11/2 
39 By 1920 there were 37 collieries in the .sO.uth Yorkshire coalfield that employed more th~n 1000 persons out of a total of 80 
collieries In the coalfield. These large collieries accounted for 97.128 of those employed With the other 43 collieries employing 
7686. Total employed in the south Yorkshire coalfield in 1920 was 104.814. By comparison. in the west Yorkshire coalfield only 
20 of the total of 89 collieries employed over 1000 persons at this time representing 51.917 out of a total of 68.189 employed at 
this time. Sheffield Archives. North Country and Yorkshire Coal Annual 1921. Published by the British Statistics Co. Ltd. 
Cardiff. SY 187/B11/2 
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Source: Taylor (2001) * Memoranda and certain statistics as to the production o( coal, coke 
and bye products in the coalfield o( Yorkshire in relation to the coalfields o( the UK 25th 
November 1921, Sheffield Archives SY 187181112 
The miners who developed the new coalfield were not indigenous but migrants from 
neighbouring counties or, in the case of Markham Main, from Germany (Hill, 2001). This was 
typical of the wider Yorkshire coalfield with coalminers being 'Yorkshire' because of the fact 
that they worked in Yorkshire pits rather than because of their place of birth (Macfarland, 
1982). A study of nearby Denaby found that 'the new Denaby Main residents were all 
strangers ... of the 166 coalminers resident in Denaby only ten were of Yorkshire birth' (Hill, 
1982). Whilst some came over from Ireland (Bailey, 2007) over one third of Denaby's mining 
workforce came from Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire and Gloucestershire 
(Macfarland, 1982). During the development of the Doncaster coalfield at this time, the 
miners, like the money, came from towns such as Staveley in North Derbyshire, and from 
North Nottinghamshire. No miners came from the West Yorkshire coalfield however, as 
these men were considered by coal owners to be too militant.4o Durham coal masters and 
men also played an important part in the development of the virgin coalfield. Lord Joicey, 
Chairman and Managing Director of Lambton, Hetton and Joicey Collieries, the largest in the 
Durham coalfield remarked upon the extensive transference of energies and capital of the 
Durham coal masters to the development of the vast resources of the South Yorkshire 
coalfield. It was estimated that the migration from these areas during the Edwardian period 
accounted for approximately 22,000 people (Blackledge, 1951). 
Therefore the first and most obvious early impact of the development of the Doncaster 
coalfield was the district's population boom. Table 4:2 illustrates the extent of the increase, 
showing that the population of the local village of Bentley rose from 2,403 in 1901 to 6,487 
by 1911. Even the smaller hamlet-style villages were affected by the development of the coal 
40 Oral evidence from Frank Beresford who began work at Bullcroft Colliery when It opened and remained there for fifty five 
years 
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industry. The parish populations of Carr House, and Elmfield for example rose from 149 in 
1901 to 1426 in 1914. Edlington, site of Yorkshire Main, had a population of 158 in 1901, but 
this had risen to 5,298 by 1911. Adwick-Ie-Street's population rocketed from 436 to 6,973 
between the same years. As these hamlets developed into mining villages, their populations 
would increase further. For example by 1921 Adwick-Ie-Street's population had risen to 
11,838 and Bentley's to 12,941 (OM BC, 2002). It was suggested that whilst the 
transformation of small agricultural settlements on the western exposed coalfield had been 
slow and gradual, the scale of developments on the concealed Ooncaster coalfield meant 
that the process has been intensive in both time and area (Blackledge, 1951). In 1932 the 
Ooncaster Official Guide described the former agricultural villages has having been 'thriven 
on the production of coal'. 
Table 4:2 - Population increases in selected mining villages In the Doncaster coalfield 
Year Adwick le Armthorpe Bentley Brodsworth Edlington Rossington Ooncaster 
Street Borough 
1901 436 381 2,403 398 580 371 10,472 
1911 6,973 625 6,487 301 5,298 3,029 48,472 
Source: DMBC, 2002 
With the exception of the railway-dominated wards of Balby and Hexthorpe whose 
population increased from 6,781 to 11,570 between 1901 and 1911, the town of Ooncaster 
experienced a less dramatic population rise. The Borough of Ooncaster at this time was 
comprised of six wards: North, St Georges, Central, East, West, and South (appendix 5) and 
the town showed little interest at this time in extending its boundaries further to 
accommodate the new mining population. 
Miners looking for accommodation during the early years of mining in the area found few 
houses near the pits, and soon developed a fondness for the attractions of the town which 
by 1912 included three picture palaces, two music halls, three billiard halls and 135 places 
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(excluding clubs) licensed to sell alcohol.41 Despite these leisure amenities there was little 
accommodation available. All spare houses were quickly filled and sitting tenants working at 
the GNR Plant works, many of whom were on short time for much of the Edwardian period, 
would often find themselves displaced by the more affluent miner.42 That said, of the sixty 
three hotels and bed and breakfast lodgings in the town most of them where aimed at the 
more affluent market, probably associated with the races. The little affordable 
accommodation that existed in the town was therefore soon overwhelmed. The town's 
corporation showed little interest in resolving this problem. In fact quite the opposite was true 
with the corporation instead favouring an expansion of 'villadom' on Town Moor and Thorne 
Road (DG, 30/12/04). On the question of hosting the new mining population the corporation 
argued that it was not their responsibility to 'find dwellings for them. They have got here by 
stealth more than anything else. They can usually find accommodation elsewhere' (DG, 
19/3109). Whilst the housing problem eased somewhat after 1908 with the development of 
the new pit village at Brodsworth (DG, Jan, 1908), the attitude of the town's corporation 
ensured that housing Doncaster's new working classes remained the major social question 
of the Edwardian period. 
4.2.3 Impact on business and trade 
Despite the inertia of Doncaster's corporation the town itself began to reflect something of 
the character of its changing surroundings. For example, between 1908 and 1912 there was 
a 50% rise in the number of fish shops,43 and whilst the town's public houses benefitted from 
the custom of miners, publicans as well as cafe owners soon became concerned by the 
41 The Gazette Commercial and General Doncaster Directory, 1912 
42 In 1913 up to 10/- or more was being offered for homes with a premium on top of that (DG, 1/8/03). Also in that year a 
correspondent to the Doncaster Gazette wrote that house buying was a 'ordeal at once patience exhausting, nerve wrecking, 
and temper trying' (DG, 24/10/13). In the Local Go~ernment Board InqUiry (CIA 1606) the cause was put down to COlliery 
developments in the district, and want of accommodation near these collieries. 
43 The Gazette Commercial and General Doncaster Directory, shows 57 fish and chip shops by 1912. This Is higher than 
registered in Kelly's Busin~ss. Directo~ which show 26 fish shops In 1900 and 48 in the 1936 directory. Both directories 
however indicate a substantial Increase In number. 
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number of working men's clubs that were beginning to appear.44 By 1912, thirteen Working 
Men's Clubs were registered in the local business directories. The town's social hierarchy 
were reported in the local press to be aghast as the Georgian respectability of Doncaster's 
Hallgate Road was penetrated by wealthier mining families and families profiting from 
mining. The Doncaster Gazette described 'how residential parts of the town swarm with 
strangers, who prove to be new residents brought here by their connection in some capacity 
or other with the various enterprises' (DG, 3/3/13). 
Many of the local inhabitants would have seen this as a price worth paying, as mining 
brought with it a much needed increase in trade and employment, adding an element of 
permanency which the seasonal trade of village life often lacked. However, some members 
of the town's corporation believed that the mining population would merely represent a 
temporary boom for local trade, suggesting that when the pit villages were completed, so 
trade would disappear from central Doncaster. There is some evidence to support this 
prediction. For example, the Co-operative Society was the first enterprise to respond to the 
trading opportunities provided by the development of Doncaster coalfield, as it had been to 
the arrival of GNR 50 years earlier,45 and opened its first mining branch at Woodlands in 
September 1908 where at this time it was guaranteed a monopoly of trade. By 1912, 
membership of the Co-op had risen from 7,158 in 1903 to 12,964: cash sales were reported 
to have risen by 87% during the same period (DG 11/9/08; 1/3/12). Nevertheless the wider 
impact on trade in the town was positive. In fact local reporters suggested of Edwardian 
Doncaster that there had never been a time when so many shops were being enlarged and 
private houses turned to businesses premises (DG 17/9/09). 
It was therefore as a general shopping centre that Doncaster first benefited from the 
development of the local mining industry. One 'Special Commissioner' caught up in the spirit 
M Doncaster Gazette Commercial and General Doncaster Directory. 1912 
45 In fact the Cooperative had shown itself to particularly enterprising in that it reacted to the potential business opportunity 
before the trading boom. The importance of the town was recognised in 1903 when the Cooperative Society held its Annual 
Congress in the town. 
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of the times wrote that the town was witnessing a 'revolution in Ooncaster's life.' He noted 
that, 'the change that has come over Ooncaster has not been one of numerical growth but of 
type' (SOT, Jan, 1913). The changes in the town were reported to have been 'more rapid 
than in any other part of England, resembling what had taken place in Western Canada' 
(OG, 1/8/13). The weekend scene in Ooncaster's shopping centre was transformed, as 
comparatively well paid and traditionally high-spending miners browsed around the town's 
shops.46 Visitors to the town were astonished at the transformation of Ooncaster which they 
observed had been largely rebuilt by shopkeepers turning the town into a busy shopping 
centre (SOT, Jan 1913). The development of Trafford Street and the widening of St 
Sepulchre Gate, with the wider business opportunities for builders and decorators, provided 
further evidence of the town's growing prosperity, and from 1910 many of the towns 
engineering firms had to work overtime to meet the increasing demand (OG 30/12/10; 
17/1/13). Increasing affluence brought about by the coalfield developments attracted new 
banks to the town. One local reporter observing that if a bank is the hallmark of industry, 
then the new found prosperity was further reflected in the number of bank branches opened 
in the towns High Street. Branches opened included the National and Provincial, Lloyds, and 
the Sheffield Banking Company (SOT, Jan 1913). 
The level of commercial activity during the Edwardian period is reflected in the market for 
business capital and is evident in the advertising pages of the Doncaster Gazette. The sale 
of business property alone would support a small economy comprising of auctioneers, 
surveyors and solicitors who specialised in the conveyance of business assets from the 
distressed, destitute and dead to the energetic, enterprising, and entrepreneurial. Another 
indication of Ooncaster's economic transformation is the number of businesses registered in 
.e Brodsworth Colliery opened in 1907 paying 7/6d per shift (4113d per week). In 1913 Edlington Colliery was advertising 200 
colliers jobs at 8/3d to 9/- for a shift on the face. Compared with Ooncaster Corporation workmen from 211- to 24/- a week (OG, 
5/9/13); Railwaymen (on short time for much ~f the Edwardian pe~iod and e.xcluding engine drivers on 6/- a day) on average 
20/3d a week (OG, 20/9/07; 17111111). National average full time earnings for men In skilled and unskilled Industrial 
occupations was 28/6 in 1906 and 301- in 1914 according to Census of Production for these years. Comparative high wages 
continued with the modern pits around Ooncaster said to have paid the highest wages In the country some earning as much as 
£4 per week _ OMB~, 'Do.nc~ster, a silver link wit~ its commerce and indust~es, and its potential purchasing power (Doncaster, 
1936)'. South Yorkshire Olstnct Board agreed minimum of 6s 9d compared With older West Yorkshire 55 6d (Baylies, 1993). 
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local directories which increased from 936 in 1900 to 2,056 by 1936. By far the largest 
numbers of businesses registered were in the retail sector. As shown above, mining impact 
was not limited to retail with increasing levels of affluence and demand also boosting other 
sectors. Table 4:3 shows the dramatic increase in the number of professional businesses 
registered in the town's directory. Often seen as a key indicator of levels of regional 
affluence the table shows that the number of accountants registered in the town increased 
three-fold whilst a doubling of other professions registered is typical. 
Table 4:3 - Professional and trade businesses registered In the local directories 1900-
1936 
Profession 1900 1936 Trade 1900 1936 
ArchitecUsurveyor 12 18 Decorators 12 25 
Accountant 8 28 Plumbers 7 12 
Auctioneer 11 20 Joiners 4 6 
Solicitor 18 43 Slaters 3 5 
Total 49 109 Total 26 48 
Another sector boosted by the arrival of the local coal industry was the construction industry. 
Much of this activity involved the production of clay, brick and tiles as well as wider building 
trades and illustrates how some coal owners tried to make a profit out of other products and 
assets of the collieries. Between 1900 and 1936 the local directories show that the number 
of brickworks registered increased from three to five. One of which W J Hardy was leased 
from the Askern Coal and Iron Company Ltd in 1911.47 One local brick works was 
developing a productive capacity for 240,000 bricks per week by 1922 (DG, 24/4/1922) with 
coal owners extracting both rent and royalties from leaseholders. Askern Coal and Iron 
47 Doncaster Archives. Agreement to lease a Brickworks. Askem. Askern Coal and Iron Company Lld to W. J. Hardy on behalf 
of intended Company 7'h January 1911. DV IYBO/B. Other brickworks included the Doncaster Brick Company; the Cocking and 
Company of Balby and David Sharrat and Sons Lld of North Bridge. 
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Company Ltd charged a royalty of 1/16d per brick sold over 1000.48 Other coal companies 
diversified into power supply to support tenants. Doncaster Collieries Association Ltd for 
example supplied electricity to Askern Brick and Tile Company Ltd which involved them in 
both the construction and maintenance of power lines.49 The growth of the local construction 
sector is also reflected in the local business directories which show fifty-nine building 
contractors registered in 1936. Many of these businesses were indigenous such as Mr J. P. 
Crawley of Armthorpe, who leased North Field Sand and Gravel quarry from Earl Fitzwilliam 
in 1922.50 However the development of the coal industry also attracted businesses from 
across the country. H. Marshall and Sons Ltd for example was established in 1900 in 
Derbyshire but moved to Toll Bar, Bentley in 1903 to be at the centre of the new coalfield. 
They would go on to build houses for let in both Bentley and Carcroft (Official Guide, 1951). 
Another, the Edlington (Yorks) Land and Development Company Ltd was originally 
established in Pontypridd but would be responsible for building large parts of the COlliery 
village of New Edlington between 1910 and 1922 having acquired the land from the Staveley 
Coal and Iron Company. 51 Table 4:4 also shows the range and number of related tradesmen 
registered in local directories in 1900 and 1936, all of which increased. 
48 This would have produced a handsome profit for landlords and coal owners. For example the terms of the agreement 
between Askem Coal and Iron Company Ltd and Askem Brick and Tile Company Signed In 1931 stated that over the course of 
the 35 year leasehold a royalty of 1/16d per brick sold over 1000 (and the same for tiles) was payable. In addition for the first 
year there was a land rental cost of £18.19/4d (£1.10/-. per acre) followed by £50.111 6d (£4 per acre). A royalty was also 
payable at 4 pence per ton for all clay or brick earth 'got but not made into bricks'. Doncaster Archives. Licence to work a 
Brickfield in Askem and Norton, The Askern Coal and Iron Company Ltd to Askem Brick Company 18th February 1931. DY. 
YBO/24 
48 Doncaster Collieries Association charged 1/5d per unit for the first 10,000 Board of Trade (BoT) units per annum and 1d per 
BoT unit after this. In Doncaster Archives Agreement for the supply of electricity. Doncaster Archives. Doncaster Collieries 
Association Ltd. and the Askern Brick and Tile Company Ltd. 101 May 1934. DYIYBO/34. 
50 Doncaster Archives, Agreement to lease a sand and gravel pit, Armthorpe. RI. Hon W.C. de Meuron Eart Fitzwilliam with J.P. 
Crawley 101 March 1922. DYIYBO/14 
5t The village of New Edlington was built to house workers at the Yorkshire Main colliery which was owned by the Staveley Coal 
and Iron Company which had earlier bought the land in Edlington and the lease rights to exploit the coal reserves within this 
and adjoining land of the Battie-Wrighton of Cusworth Estate. The land (approximately 20 acres) was originally sold on the 22nc1 
December 1909 to Staveley of Derbyshire for £4.200. A few days later on the 31" December 1909, the Staveley Company sold 
6 acres 2 roods and 23 perches of land to Arthur Thompson a Balby builder for housing development. Just over 6 weeks later. 
Thompson sold the land and the houses he had built on it to 4 Cardiff based parties for £4,763. On 16th December 1910 the 
Staveley Company sold for £2,928, 41 acres, 3 roods .and. 7 perches to these 4 parties .. now operating as Edlington (Yorks) 
Land Development Company Ltd, part of the land which It had bought from Batlle-Wnghton a year earlier. See Doncaster 
Archives, Edlington (Yorks) Land Development Company Ltd and its successors. Deeds and associated papers 1910-1966. 
DY/EDLO/1-54. 
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In other areas the development of ancillary activity was less obvious. For example although 
there were twenty seven coke ovens plants in south Yorkshire in 1919, none of these were 
in Doncaster.52 Business directories also show that although there was an increase in the 
number of engineering and manufacturing businesses registered in the town, this was less 
evident in the mining industry. Table 4:4 shows the number of mining related businesses 
registered in 1900 and 1936. It shows that whilst the number increased between these 
dates, there were fewer businesses of this type registered in local trade directories in 
comparison to all other sectors, and with other towns. Nevertheless there were exceptions, 
the most notable example of mining related business was Blandford Gee Cementation Co. 
Ltd, which was founded by two local mining engineers in 1922. The firm would go on to work 
with hundreds of pits (Official Guide, 1958). Table 4:4 also shows that only one mining 
manufacturing business was registered in the local directories by 1936. Given the modern 
nature of Doncaster's pits, and the range of contracts for machinery firms, this is somewhat 
surprising. However Doncaster was slow to develop indigenous mining machinery firms and 
contracts were often carried out by established firms outside of the town. For example during 
the 1920's, Rossington Colliery awarded contracts to Gullick Dobson of Wigan (Grundy-
Warr, 1989). Local directories therefore provide early indication that whilst spin-out and start 
up opportunities in wider engineering and manufacturing were available (and that some of 
these would be related to mining) there were nevertheless few mining manufacturing firms in 
the town at this time. Directories do suggest however that service-sector business 
opportunities existed at this time, most notably amongst the coal merchants and distributers, 
which increased in number from nine in 1900 to twenty three in 1936. 
52 Sheffield Archives. By-product coke oven plants in south Yorkshire 1919. Coke oven managers year book 1919. 
SY187/B11/2. This number did not change after nationalisation. The closest coke oven plant in 1947 being Bawtry Coke Oven 
and Bye-Products Plant at Bircotes owned by Barber and Walker and Co. Lld 
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Table 4:4 - Mining related businesses registered in the Local Business Directories 
Type of business 1900 1936 
Mining engineer 2 5 
Mining machinery 0 1 
Colliery agent 2 3 
Chimney sweep 4 8 
Coal merchants/distributors 9 23 
Coal Factors 0 3 
Colliery furnishers 0 3 
Total 17 46 
Whilst increasing levels of affluence and business activity during the Edwardian period were 
welcomed by many, these did not prevent an influential section of the town's local traders 
and their representatives from complaining about the Doncaster Gazette's non-stop 
'booming' of Doncaster. The 'anti-boomers', fearful of a challenge to the status quo, pointed 
out that Doncaster was no "El Dorado" and that the attraction of new businesses from 
outside the town had led to greater levels of competition, resulting in higher rents often 
driving out local businessmen (DG, 24/2/11 ).53 This led to the formation of the Doncaster and 
District Tradesmen Association to protect local trades from the ill-effects of the boom (DG, 
10/2/11). At its inaugural meeting in 1911, Councillor 8almforth, the owner of the local 
confectionery firm Parkinson and Son, reported that of the thirty-three places of business on 
one street in the town, only fourteen were held by local tradesmen (DG,24/2/11 ).54 Whilst 
8almforth was accurate in his analysis, the work of this Association of local business was at 
this time inconsistent with the wider interest of the town, and was more an indication of an 
institutionalised conservative mentality endemic within the local corporation. 
53 Many local businesses were squeezed out. Those that stayed found rents doubled (DG, 24/2/11). 
54 There was certainly a degree of inward migration of business with the Doncaster Gazette commenting on a 'large demand for 
shops from outside businesses' (DG, 24/211911). 
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Reflecting on the attitude and policy of the town's corporation, one 'Special Commissioner' 
for the Doncaster Gazette wrote that Doncaster may be reckoned 'amongst the most 
apathetic of places to have greatness thrust upon it', suggesting that many old Doncaster 
residents "would have preferred to be left alone in their handsome villas with their snug 
incomes". They were reported to have lived in Doncaster because it was quiet, clean and 
well-mannered, and the breath of industrialism was to them unpleasantly tainted (DG, 
10/2/12). A Doncaster Chronicle reporter found ·older members of the town who rued the 
arrival of coal predicting a 'black future." (DC, 18/2/1910). Such divergent perspectives 
reflected the fact that the development of the Doncaster coalfield brought two substantial 
forces into direct contact: on the one hand colliery development, which at this time 
represented modern, progressive business, employing industrial workers from outside the 
region who brought with them their own cultures; and on the other hand old slow agricultural 
communities, with a traditional way of life and long established customs led by a squirearchy 
with their estates, country houses and limited horizons (Oakley, 2002, p.263). On one side of 
the divide was the Trades Council which from 1903 pressed the town's corporation to grasp 
the opportunities offered by the arrival of coal and establish a clear industrialist policy (DG, 
20/11/03). This shift in trajectory was also supported by the Gazette, which recognised that 
creating a flourishing industrial society would require greater levels of public investment (DG, 
24/4/08). On the other side was the more conservative, traditional tradesmen and shop-
keeping class (DG/10/03; 9/11106) which dominated local politics and the town's corporation 
at the time. A culture had therefore developed within the local authority which was based on 
centuries of trading experience, and closely associated with Doncaster's status as an 
important racing and market town. One of the key legacies of this had been a conservative 
mentality with the town's corporation coming to see its principal role as one of guarding the 
town's wealth which, along with the September Race Week guaranteed the town's low rate 
status.55 This issue was one of considerable political as well as social and economic 
55 In 1913 the corporation owned 2,548 acres of land inside and outside the Borough. Total capital value of property (excluding 
coal under 1,500 acres of corporation which was estimated to be worth £450,000) was £1.410,942, Of this £987.398 was 
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importance, with many of the towns electorate having been attracted to the town because of 
its low rates (DG, 10/2/12). The facts are however that for the early years of the Edwardian 
period the Plant Works was on short time and local businesses suffered as a result. 56 The 
arrival of relatively well paid and traditionally free spending miners not only led to greater 
levels of competition but it also broke the local trade's dependence on the fortunes of the 
GNR, enabling Doncaster to become "one of the busiest and most flourishing centres in 
South Yorkshire" (Phillips, 1977, p.62). The town's ancient motto 'Comfort and Ease' could 
well have been changed at this time to 'Commerce and Enterprise' such was the impact of 
mining on the town's economic fortunes. 
4.2.4 Impact on industry and business 
Doncaster had long been an important communications centre. Well served by road, rail and 
water, Doncaster in this regard is untypical of many other coal towns which tend to be 
characterised by their geographic isolation. The opening of the Doncaster area coalfield 
would provide further stimulation to the borough's communications and provide future 
development opportunities. The coalfield attracted vast amounts of capital for the railways, 
which was invested in a 'spread eagle' policy (DG, 9/1/1912). As a pit was sunk so a line 
was laid to link the colliery with its markets at home and abroad.57 In January 1911, a 
contract was secured to open a new line connecting the Doncaster coalfield with the 
Barnsley to Hull line at Gowdall. One line entered the Doncaster area at Bramley Yard in the 
Parish of Micklebrins, disturbing Lord Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Hunt. With the expansion of 
the railways however, congestion became a serious problem. It was for this reason that the 
three mile Doncaster- avoiding line was built, running from Hexthorpe Junction to Bentley 
owned in its capacity as a municipal authority, and £423,544 as an Urban Sanitary Authority. After taking Into account debts of 
£606,738, this left a surplus of property over loans of £808,204. (Local Government Board Inquiry, 1914; DG, 24/4/08) 
!Ill 'Trade had not been so bad for many a year' (13112/03). By 1904 the town had £300 less retail business per week (DG, 
1/1/04). 
57 South Yorkshire coal trade was initially dependent upon local markets notably the Sheffield metal trades, and supplying 
household coal. However railway lines to Hull opened up a 910bal market for local coal. The proximity of the South Yorkshire 
coalfield, and later the Doncaster coalfield meant that new collieries were able to take advantage of these international markets 
(Oakley, 2002) 
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Junction. This line was opened in July 1910, and was described by the Great Central 
Railway as being essential for the transport of coal. However, the Great North Road, which 
was the main access to the north of the town, ran across the main railway lines at 
Marshgate. As the volume of rail traffic increased, so road transport suffered from 
congestion at the level crossing. To ease this problem, powers were applied for to construct 
a bridge over the railway lines. The question of bridge building and the resultant effects on 
the rates split the town almost in half. Nevertheless, the anti-bridge campaign was defeated, 
and in 1910 the Marshgate road-widening bridge was completed. 'For the first time local 
residents were forced to come to terms with the consequences of their industrial future' 
(Steward, 1972, p.27). Other areas of Doncaster's transport were also boosted by the arrival 
of the coal industry to the district. The canal and river system linking Doncaster with the 
Humber was boosted by the construction of a new junction canal in 1905 (Duckham, 1964). 
It was hoped that the arrival of the coal industry would give a similar boost to other local 
industries. By 1914 there is some evidence that the prospect of an abundant supply of cheap 
fuel was attracting new business to the area. The Yorkshire Patent Fuel Company, for 
example, opened at Bentley in 1912. This factory used small coals (smudge), compressing 
them into small oval blocks (briquettes) for commercial and domestic use. This development, 
according to the Gazette was the natural outcome of the coalfield development in the 
neighbourhood of the town (DG, 16/2/1912). In the same year H. Mitchell and Sons 
(Doncaster) Ltd was established in the town. The firm specialised in tubular construction and 
structural steel works and provided chain annealing services as well as producing lifting gear 
and colliery haulage rope. Another, P. A. Mudd and Co, had originally established a branch 
works at the aerodrome near the racecourse but increasing demand led to it setting up a 
works in the town's Intake ward, specialising in repairing heavy castings for collieries and 
steelworks. Whilst these represent examples of firms whose sole customer was the coal 
industry, other local businesses arrived which had a more diverse customer base. Examples 
of these included E W Jackson and Sons Ltd which established a car manufacturing firm at 
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Greyfriars in 1904. Jackson was not a mass production enterprise in scale or methods, but 
one that relied on the traditional skills of local coach makers, and in the four years up to 
1914 only one hundred 'Cheswold' cars were produced (Barber, 2007), Nevertheless it was 
a significant development introducing a small motor manufacturing industry to Doncaster and 
which in 1913 produced the first motor ambulance for the local collieries. 58 Another, Wild and 
Sykes, Ironmongers of Doncaster was founded in 1913 and was a wholesale and retail 
ironmonger supplying materials to a range of local manufacturers and domestic customers, 
but developed much of its business originally through sales to local collieries. 59 
Despite the arrival of new industry, a labour market was developing which provided few 
employment opportunities for women. The arrival of the new mining population had 
presented local officials with the challenge of an under-employed female population. By 
1911 the census shows that only 937 women were in work out of a female population of 
12,042. Most of those employed (882) worked in domestic service.6o The town's established 
confectionery manufacturing cluster which included Parkinson's and Nuttalls would provide 
further employment opportunities,61 as would the arrival of light industry such as the 
Cleckheaton firm George Anderton and Sons which opened Victoria Mills at Strawberry 
Island, and Wallpaper Manufacturers Co (later Roxeth Wallpapers Ud). However 
employment opportunities for women would remain limited in the inter-war period 
(Abercromie & Johnson, 1922). 
5& Jackson abandoned vehicle manufacture in 1914 when it began to undertake aeronautical and engineering work for the 
government. After the First World War it became a distributor to a major motor manufacturer. The firm closed In 1983. 
Doncaster Archives, EW. Jackson and Sons Ltd, DY/JACK 
59 Wild and Sykes originally operated from 7 Market Road. In the early days William Wild travelled by bicycle around local 
collieries to do business. The firm became a Limited company in 1961 but closed in 1999. Doncaster Archives, Wild and Sykes 
Ironmongers of Doncaster, DYIWILD/3/112 
60 Census 1911 (Vol. X, table 15b, pA56) 
81 The oldest of Doncaster's confectionary manufacturers was Parkinson and Co. which had Its origins In the family grocer and 
tea dealing shop in the High Street that opened its door in 1817. Samuel Parkinson diversified Into making baking powder and 
then butterscotch, and gained royal patronage after the visit of Queen Victoria in 1851. Under new ownership after the family 
died out in 1893, the firm began to make boiled sweets and in 1905 moved to successively larger premises opening new works 
in WheaUey in June 1914. After Parkinson's chief rival, Killingrey, went out of business In 1901, William Nuttall, who began by 
making boiled sweets for market sale, progressed to his own shop and acquired a small factory In WheaUey In 1903. Here he 
invented a mint-flavoured sweet, marked as 'Nuttall's Mintoes.' By 1914 Nultall's was employing 250 people (22/5/1914). 
114 
The failure to attract light industry for the town's increasing female population, and more 
broadly the town's inability to attract sufficient industries from emergent sectors remained a 
focus of attention for the Doncaster Gazette. Whilst the Ooncaster coalfield expanded, the 
newspaper argued that the conservative forces on the town's corporation consistently 
retarded the potential of using the local coal industry as the Plant Works had done earlier in 
the century to attract a 'busy hive of industries' (OG, 19/12/05). To this end the paper argued 
that the town's corporation must act quickly and decisively by offering cheap sites to 
potential industry as opposed to what they saw as the more traditional corporation policy of 
making quick profits from exorbitant rents. It was clear that this would require a fundamental 
change of attitude on behalf of local decision makers.52 
There is some limited evidence of a shift in attitude in the later Edwardian period with the 
establishment of the town corporations Industry Propagation Committee (IPC), which under 
the chairmanship of the Labour Councillor Mr Kay aimed to attract engineering firms to build 
on the town's growing reputation in this sector. Kay, having worked in the cotton mills of 
Halifax as a boy, also hoped that Ooncaster would be able to diversify its economic base 
further and become 'as much a proved textile field as a proved new coalfield' (OG, 3/1/13). 
The I PC met just three times between 1907 and 1911 63 and any hopes it had proved to be 
forlorn as it had to refer to the powerful Estates Committee, whose apathy according to Kay 
had already resulted in one potential motor business in the town going instead to Coventry 
(OG, 3/12/09). 
Concern that Ooncaster's political leadership was failing to grasp the opportunities to use 
coal to develop new economic opportunities for the town, was not limited to the local 
townspeople. The extension of the Yorkshire Coalfield to Ooncaster had been the subject of 
discussion at the 1910 British Association conference. One speaker, a Mr H. Culpin, spoke 
82 "Through past neglect on the part of our rulers. improvements involving considerable expenditure press almost In battalions 
for a settlement at one and the same time" (DG. 2111/13) 
63 Doncaster Archives DMBC Special Committee Minutes Industrial Propagation Committee 1907-1911. AB 2/5/3 
115 
of how he looked forward to the day when Doncaster would take over many of Sheffield's 
manufactures. The Sheffield Independent noted in this regard however that were this to 
happen the Doncaster Corporation would have to show a more practical sympathy to 
industrial developers, who it argued had received no real incentive to locate in the town. In 
fact until this point Doncaster's Corporation had pursued a policy totally at variance with any 
real and strategic desire to develop and diversify the town's industrial base. For example, 
where it came to attracting new industry, Doncaster's policy-makers preferred policy was to 
offer land for sale rather than offer it as leasehold which was the preferred option of business 
(DG, 1/8/13; 13/1/11). It also dampened demand from prospective business by valuing land 
at excessive levels based on house building prices which were at a premium in Doncaster at 
this time. By 1913 all potential building land in the area had risen to a minimum value of 
£250 per acre, where previously its agricultural value had been £35 per acre (Local 
Government Board Inquiry, 1914 Q/A pp. 256-264). These points were highlighted during the 
1914 inquiry into the town's application to extend its boundaries. The West Riding County 
Council representative on the inquiry summed up his case by declaring that in ten years 
Doncaster had undergone radical change as a result of colliery development, yet the 
Corporation had maintained an attitude of lethargy and indifference. The inquiry's conclusion 
pulled no punches stating that "never had it heard before of a case where a Corporation 
demonstrated such a total failure to disclose the duties of their existing area" (Local 
Government Board of Inquiry, March 1914, pp 183-4). 
Steward in his study of Edwardian Doncaster suggested that the building of the Marshgate 
bridge represented a critical juncture in Doncaster's modern history reflecting a grudging 
acceptance of its industrial future. The issue certainly provided a clear branching point 
(Mahoney, 2000) in terms of the town's development path. The decision to extend the town's 
boundaries perhaps is a better example of a fundamental cognitive shift. The town's 
corporation had been forced, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, by the momentum of coal 
developments to build bridges, widen roads, improve transport, improve sanitation, and 
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extend gas, electricity and water supplies to the surrounding mining villages. Having been 
forced to build outside the town's boundaries, the new mining population and industry used 
the town's amenities yet paid rates to the urban authorities. The Doncaster ratepayers up 
until this time were, in fact, subsidising these areas. 64 Forced by the logic of this momentum 
the town expanded its boundaries on the 1 st of November 1914 and Doncaster became a 
Municipal Borough. This extended the town's boundaries to include Wheatley Urban District 
Council, Balby with Hexthorpe Urban District and Carr House with Elmfield Parish. 
Doncaster's boundaries were thus extended beyond 1,695 acres to cover 4,831 acres. As a 
result of this change its population rose from 30,918 to 50,860 and its rateable value rose 
from £186,671 to £283,583. Grandiose plans were drawn up to develop twelve 'self 
contained and well defined towns' within the orbit of Doncaster which would then act as the 
capital of the region (Steward, 1972).65 
4.2.5 Changing image 
The decision to extend the town's boundaries represents a critical juncture in the town's 
history. It represents one significant example of how the momentum of mining was beginning 
to impact on the town's economic development. Coal effects were however complex and 
often paradoxical and highlight more worrying trends which would subsequently be 
associated with industrial lock-in. Two examples illustrate how mining began at this early 
juncture to affect the town's subsequent economic trajectory. The first highlights how coal 
came to affect the town's external image, this example focusing on its impact on the local 
landed classes. The second example focuses on how coal began to determine local skill 
profiles and employment aspirations. 
84 Local Councillor's were faced with the dilemma of keeping the rates down for property owners, whilst providing the services 
and utilities needed. Colliery development enhanced the rateable value of the district adding extra financial burden whilst at the 
same time increasing the income of any parish within which the pit was located (Oakley, 2002) 
65 The town's population continued to rise and by 1939 the County Borough of Doncaster's population had reached almost 
65,000 with a contiguous urban area arou~d the town of 47,000. The Census returns show that, with the exception of Coventry, 
the population of Doncaster was Increasing at a faster rat~ than any other t?wn In the country outside of Greater London 
(DMBC, 1936). The town's rateable value also continued to rise from £384,590 In 1926 to £504,320 in 1936, whilst Doncaster's 
Rural District Council remained the richest rural area in the West Riding. 
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Whilst paradoxically mining began to replace agriculture in the immediate area around the 
town, the subsequent rise in population from mining developments also resulted in a larger 
market for farm produce.66 The increased profits accruing from market tolls also swelled 
town corporation coffers. Between the years 1906/7 and 1911/12 market profits increased 
from £1,464 to £2,264 (Borough Accounts). Such was Doncaster's reputation as a major 
regional market that the Royal Agricultural Society held its Annual Show at the town's 
racecourse in July 1912.67 It was expected that the new mining population would provide 
financial support for the show. The Doncaster Gazette stated that the show demonstrated 
that the 'district still retained its former agricultural characteristics', However, the Great Show 
was poorly attended, and much of the blame for this was reported as being due to the town's 
mining image (DG, 14n/1911). 68 
The town's changing image was also both a cause and an effect in the shifting social 
character of the town, and was particularly discernible in the demise of the local landed 
gentry. The British landed class had come under increasing pressure from the end of the 
19th century as agricultural prices in general fell and duties increased. Some local 
landowners, such as Mr Waiter Long, despite the growing market for agricultural produce, 
saw these longer term factors as the beginning of the end for his class and sold up and left 
the area. For other prominent families however coal represented a financial bonanza (Elliot, 
1997), providing a variety of ways to make money. Long, for example, profited through 
selling or renting land. Another local landowner, Sir William Cooke, sold his land at Bentley 
to Barber and Walker and Co, a Nottingham based colliery company, It was also the Cooke 
family who in 1913 sold land in Wheatley to a syndicate of financiers and industrialists to 
138 For example the cattle market moved from the market site to the Docking Hill Fairground site to allow for expansion in the 
retail market. 
87 Doncaster markets are amongst the best for the size of the town to be found in the country (Souvenir of the Coop Congress, 
1903). They covered over 3 acres and their capital value (1913) was £59,698; the Corn Market was seen as one of the 'most 
commodious and best frequented in the north of England. In 1913 over 100,000 livestock were sold in the market (Local 
Government Board Inquiry, 1914) 
88 Yet entries for the Show increased. In 1909 these were a record 2,000 entries with miners contribution e.g. pigeon and 
garden produce being evident (DG, 2nJ09) 
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build Ooncaster's first industrial estate (OG, 17/1/13). Mining royalties also became a 
substantial part of the gentry's income. By 1909 for example Charles Thelluson was earning 
nearly £20,000 a year in royalties from Brodsworth Colliery.69 
Paradoxically, the money received from coal royalties was itself seemingly indicative of the 
increasing 'unattractiveness' of the area as a place to live. Sir William Cooke, a member of 
the oldest Ooncaster family, was said to have 'happily boarded up the ancestral home of 
Wheatley Hall and headed south when Bentley Colliery provided enhanced income but spoilt 
the view, and probably the hunting' (Oakley, 2005). Others however remained and took an 
active interest. Thellson helped to develop Woodlands Model Mining Village, whilst the 
Fitzwilliams of Wentworth Woodhouse, owners of the neighbouring Oenaby and Cadeby pits, 
acted as speculators, buying mineral rights for the Sandall Estate from the town's 
corporation to add to their Cantley mining interest, as well as leasing land in Armthorpe for 
quarrying purposes. 
4.2.6 Skills 
The towns Technical School was established during the Edwardian period and developed a 
strong focus on scientific rather than an artistic education (OG, 18/9/03). In doing so it in 
many ways pre-empted the recommendations of the Spen Report published in 1938 which 
would recommend a greater focus on technical education. Previous courses offered in the 
town had been dominated by the GNR, and although the technical school continued to cater 
for the full range of local industry (Oept of Education, 1927) 70 the introduction of the first 
mining test course in 1911 (OG,1/12/11) was a clear reflection of the shifting trajectory of the 
local economy. Whilst this vocational shift did not affect all of Ooncaster's children. with the 
S9 This figure was used as part of a speech by Lloyd George in Newcastle on 9th October 1909 and not directly attributed to any 
particular Landlord. However the Sheffield Daily Telegraph subsequently Identified Thelison as the landlord In question. See 
Oakely (2005) 
10 The Technical School continued to provide training for the engineering and building trades, as well as commercial courses 
(Dept of Education, 1927). 
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town's Grammar School for example maintaining a focus on character building 'not churning 
out mechanics and clerks' (OG. 3/8/06),71 it was a significant indicator of the relationship 
between local industry, education and skills, and aspiration. One former pupil of Ooncaster's 
Beechfield School reflecting on his experience as a school child in 1909, stated that 
aspiration was a luxury, with teachers at Beechfield focused on preparing pupils for the local 
industry (OS, 26/7/2001). 
A greater focus on the development of skills for employment in local industry had initially 
been noted approvingly in the Gazette,72 and the town's Technical Schools' focus on skills 
for mining in particular would subsequently be commended by HM Inspectors in their 1926 
report on Further Education in Yorkshire (HMSO, 1927).73 This report identified positive 
signs of student demand, finding that whilst there had been problems of attendance, 
particularly to evening classes, due to shift work, nevertheless of the 560 students enrolled, 
250 of these came from the villages around the town. However the report also provides an 
early warning of a narrowing curricular, finding that student demand at the school was 
focused almost exclusively on the provision of mining and engineering courses with very little 
provision evident in commercial subjects. What is also noteworthy is the early signs of an 
emergent basic skill trajectory with few students progressing beyond the first year. The HM 
inspectors report found that in Ooncaster only 0.42% of students progressed onto senior 
courses (Oept of Education, 1927, p. 30). 
71 However, between 1901-11, 42% of boys (especially scholarship boys) became clerks of one sort or another (DG,3/8/06; 
Doncaster Grammar School Register). Of Doncaster High School girls between the same years, 113"' became Elementary 
School teachers and 1/3'· stayed at home (DG.6/1 0/11; 25/7/13). 
72 One report in the Gazette com~en!ed on the ~rk of Mr Grac~ ~he Principal of the town's Technical School, who through his 
championing of vocational education had made It a most enterpnslng and go ahead educational body (DG, 30/8/07). 
73 Department of Education. General report of HM Inspectors on provision of Further Education In the geographical County of 
Yorkshire for the period ending on 31 11 July 1926 (HMSO, 1927). 
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4.2.7 Summary 
By the end of the Edwardian period coal mining whilst not dominant had a clear impact on 
the town across a range of socio-economic variables. However it has also been shown that 
the nature of the local coal industry's development was not inexorable and that the local 
authority played a role in constraining further development which might have built on what 
was at this time a vital industry to the British economy. This section's focus on local agency 
has been used to highlight the wider self- sustaining coalition which at this time was locked 
into a mindset that preferred cheap rates to the provision of incentives to new factory 
development. This is indicative of an embedded institutional lock which can be seen in the 
local corporation's attitude to earlier attempts at industrial development rather than any 
foresight as to any debilitating effect on the town's future economic fortunes. The national 
mining industry reached its peak production during the Edwardian period and at this time 
provided key locational advantages, which the Gazette argued were not developed, and was 
boosting local business through a range of inter-linkages and multipliers. That said there is 
evidence that mining's influence was beginning to affect the town's image and skills base 
both of which would come to be viewed as determinants of industrial lock-in. 
4.2.8 Inter war years 
The development of the coal field continued to affect the development path of the town 
during the inter-war years although there was little effort in the early post-war years to 
extend the town's boundaries further, and it wasn't until 1927 that Doncaster became a 
County Borough. There is however evidence of a more active industrial policy amongst the 
local council from the early post-war years. In May 1920 Doncaster's first Town Planning 
Committee was inaugurated, and in 1922 the town's first economic planning report was 
published. The report highlighted the shift in culture that the coal industry had brought about 
stating that, "up till quite recently the county ... was but remotely connected with any ideas of 
industrial development" (Abercromie & Johnson, 1922, p.6). Of greater relevance however 
121 
was the report's clear warning to local decision makers to act to prevent the town becoming 
locked in to a narrow dependence of a few large employers, one of which was coal. Whilst 
welcoming the positive contribution made by the town's industry both directly through jobs 
and indirectly as a magnet for other industry, the report warned against complacency and of 
replicating the experience of neighbouring Sheffield whose dependence on steel resulted in 
high levels of unemployment during the early 1920's. Instead it argued that the town should 
act decisively and invest in the development of appropriate infrastructure. In this regard the 
report suggested that the local authority needed to act to grant access to large areas of land 
zoned for industrial development, but in particular it needed to act to further extend the 
town's road and rail network which it argued was needed for the development of a diverse 
and modern economy community. Inaction amongst the town's elected officials, and diversity 
of industry, were also the central themes of the Gazette's editorial entitled "Towards 
Industrial Greatness" which looked back on the year 1925. In it the paper drew a comparison 
with less successful towns such as Barrow and Middlesbrough whose economies were 
stagnating at this time. The article again stressed the need for the town to use the coalfield 
as a catalyst for wider industrial development. This view was echoed in the same year at the 
5th Annual Dinner of the Doncaster Chamber of Trade. In calling for more local industries, 
the Chamber also joined the Gazette in pointing an accusatory finger at the Corporation's 
poor record of attracting and developing new industries, particularly in emerg ing industries 
such as car manufacturing. Within a year the Gazette highlighted another missed opportunity 
to diversify the town's economic base in this direction when the Michelin Tyre Company 
decided to locate in Stoke on Trent rather than Doncaster (DG, 5/3/1926). 
It would be wrong to suggest that the town's leadership was totally inactive, nor that the town 
was completely unsuccessful in its efforts to attract new business, as the decade saw a 
number of notable industries established in the town. The most important examples being 
the St Helen's based glass manufacturers Pilkingtons which set up in Kirk Sandal! in 1920, 
and the electrical manufacturer Crompton Parkinson which was established on the Wheatley 
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estate?4 Both firms would go on to be major employers throughout the century. The decision 
by Radiance toffee makers to move from Scunthorpe to Doncaster also provided further 
evidence of the significance of the town's confectionery manufacturing cluster. Local trade 
directories provide further evidence of the growing significance of local food and 
confectionary manufacture. They show that in 1900 there were 86 businesses registered in 
this category, but that this number rose to 217 by 1936. However on the whole the scale and 
type of industry attracted to the town remained an issue of considerable concern. This 
concern led to the publication of the North West Development Scheme in September 1929, 
and a more concerted effort on the part of the local authority is evident between 1928 and 
1936 during which time the council purchased land, built roads, organised a rail link, and 
improved the canal, with the aim of making some five hundred acres of Wheatley Hall estate 
more attractive to industry. The largest of the new plants to arrive at Wheatley Hall was 
British Bemberg, an English subsidiary of a German company that had developed a process 
for making artificial silk. It opened in 1931 and quickly employed a workforce of almost a 
thousand including German managers. War led to their repatriation and the expropriated 
premises passed into the hands of British Nylon Spinners, later becoming ICI Fibres. Other 
significant industry which located in the town during the inter-war years included 
Cementation, which developed as mining engineers and specialist ground engineers, and 
Coalite and Chemical Product Ltd which was established at Askern in 1929.75 Also 
established were branch plants of the paper manufacturer Eburite Corrugated Industries and 
T.B. Morley and Co. Ltd, a Leeds based manufacturer of electrical light fittings?6 However of 
most significance was the establishment of International Harvesters which set up in 1938 
manufacturing tractors on in its plant on Wheatley Hall Road (Teanby, 2004). During the 
74 Other industries established during the inter war years included Darlington Fence Company (1925). Higgins and Parkes Lld 
(1921). Stavely and Spink Lld (1925) although reformed as A.E. Spink Lld in 1929. selling sinks and bathrooms. the tool seller 
David W. New Lld (1925) and Fields Radio and Co. Lld (1933) 
75 Coalite and Chemical Product Lld was originally formed in Barnsley In 1917. It would also set up another site at Rossington In 
1971 (Doncaster Official Guide. 1970). 
7e Other firms established during the 1930's included Nevin and Stovin Lld (1935) a plumbing retailer, and Fox and Co 
(Insurance) Lld (1931). 
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inter-war period therefore the economic structure of the town appeared to be relatively 
diverse and not dominated by coal. This impression was broadly maintained in census 
evidence. 
4.2.9 Industrial structure and dominance 
By 1927 the local mining industry was employing over 20,000. Mining employment density 
was however unevenly spread in the area. The 1921 census shows that the South Yorkshire 
coalfield had thirty six areas with over 10% male employment in mining. The town of 
Doncaster was one of these with a score of 10.3%. This percentage remained the same in 
1931 and represented some 2,169 miners. This figure had risen dramatically from the 
thirteen miners registered in the 1901 census, and the 417 registered in 1911.77 However 
this was still considerably less than neighbouring areas such as Barnsley which had a 
proportion of 33%, and was also well below the aggregate for the rural districts which was 
28%. In mining wards on the outskirts of the town greater concentrations of proportional 
male employment in mining is evident. For example in Adwick le Street it was 68% and in 
Bentley 56%. Census returns also highlight other industrial and occupational concentrations. 
The 1921 census for example recorded particular employment concentrations in metal 
(17%). The census noted in this regard that Doncaster resembled Sheffield in having a high 
proportion of blacksmiths (12.4%). By contrast with Sheffield however Doncaster also had 
one of the highest proportions of fitters (22.6%) in the West Riding of Yorkshire. There was 
also a high proportion of employment in the railways, with 729 drivers recorded as living in 
the area, and a high proportion of builders (56) (National Census, 1921). 
Evidence from census returns therefore suggest that by 1931 the coal industry's numerical 
dominance in the town itself was still not clear with census returns showing that the majority 
of the town's male residents remained employed in the manufacturing and transport sectors, 
71 Census of 1901 County of York, table 35a, p.258; Census 1911, Vol. X. Occupation and Industries, table 15a, p.418. This 
was not unique to mining as many other Doncaster employees lived outside the town at this time. For example 40% of 
corporation workers lived outside the borough boundaries, with this proportion being even higher for railway and Plant workers 
(LOcal Government Board Inquiry, 1914). 
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particularly the railways, whilst domestic service remained the dominant activity for the 
town's female residents.78 However, whilst numeric dominance is not evident at this time the 
impact of coal was beginning to manifest itself through spending multipliers as well as 
through its various supply chain relationships with many of the towns local businesses 
supplying the local collieries with goods and materials (e.g. ICI supplied the coal industry 
with explosives and Crompton Parkinson's supplied it with cables and other electrical 
equipment), all of which suggests a growing level of local dependence on the economic 
fortunes of the coal industry. The extent to which the town was dependent upon coal at this 
time can be gauged on the occasions when there was a break in mining employment. Two 
examples are used to explore this. Firstly the impact of the Great Depression on local 
employment but also business activity, and perhaps more clearly through wider impacts 
during times of mining industrial disputes. 
4.2.10 Dominance, depression and vulnerability 
Along with iron and steel and heavy engineering, coal was one of the key Yorkshire 
industries which were relatively depressed during much of the inter-war period. This was 
reflected in unemployment levels in the West Riding of Yorkshire which were worse than the 
UK average. Unemployment here averaged 20.1% or 1.7% above the national average of 
18.4% (Fogerty, 1945).79 The impact of unemployment in the local coal industry on 
Doncaster can be gauged through the 1931 census, which records that just 295 miners were 
out of work within the town, compared with 2,080 in neighbouring Barnsley. The low levels of 
mining unemployment in the town can be explained by the fact that most miners lived in the 
surrounding pit villages and not the town at this time. However, it may also be an indication 
78 Between 1901-11 census shows GNR employed nearly 6.000. who mostly lived In Hexthorpe. Between these dates census 
shows a slight decline in male railway staff (exc. Plant workers) in the Borough, from 1.440 In 1901 to 1.428 In 1911. 
79 Doncaster was located in the southern industrial district of the West Riding. considered In the broadest application of the 
term. extended northward from Sheffield to Skipton and eastward from Sheffield to Doncaster. 
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of the Doncaster coalfield's relatively early stage of development which insulated the town 
from the worst excesses of the depression. Barnsley, by comparison, continued to 
experience particularly high levels of unemployment, fluctuating between 45% and 60% 
during the period 1932-35, whilst both Rotherham and Sheffield experienced similar levels of 
unemployment. Doncaster, on the other hand was the net recipient of unemployed migrants 
from the wider Yorkshire area (Bailey, 2007) during the 1930's, and would only reach 
national levels of unemployment over the course of the decade (Fogerty, 1945). In fact 
unemployment in the town fell in 1936 to 4,185 from 4,751 in 1935 (DG 12/11/36). This fa" 
was partly due to increased levels of employment in public works, and also the increased 
employment in the construction sector brought about by the building of RAF Finningley 
which began in 1935. The relative boom in the local building trade convinced the Yorkshire 
Federation of Building Trades' Employers to hold their annual dinner in Doncaster for the 
first time in February 1936. Further good news was reported by the Juvenile Advisory 
Committee which reported an increasing number of young people placed in jobs in 1935. 
However whilst the Committee reported that young people were finding employment in 
engineering, building, clerical, and shop work, it also noted that the town was faced with a 
growing surplus of unemployed boys and especially girls, many of whom chose to look for 
employment elsewhere (DG, 27/2/36). 
Levels of business activity provides further evidence of the impact of Depression on the local 
economy. The trade sales pages in the Doncaster Gazette between 1931 and 1936 for 
example indicate that whilst business remained busy, sales were predominately made up of 
small shops changing hands, a process which adds little to the vitality of the local economy. 
More typically there was a general lack of business confidence in the opportunities in the 
town. This is indicated in the attendance figures at the town's annual trade exhibitions 
organised by the Doncaster and District Chamber of Trade. Whereas the 1935 event had 
attracted 21,805 attendees, only 18,446 people attended the 1936 event (DG. 13/10/36). 
Given that 1936 was the peak year for business start-ups in the UK during the entire inter-
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war period (Hudson, 1987) the reduction is a significant indicator of the declining levels of 
confidence amongst existing and prospective businesses and entrepreneurs. Whilst 
declining levels of business activity cannot be directly related to the problems experienced 
by the mining industry at this time, it does support the analysis drawn from wider studies 
which show the localised effect that depression has on levels of business activity (Foreman-
Peck, 1985; Hudson, 1987). Broadly it shows that small business activity is an indicator of 
regional levels of affluence not a creator of new employment opportunities during times of 
recession. 
Faced by these and other negative indicators, the town's Mayor Councillor Watson 
nevertheless remained positive about the town's future economic outlook. In 1931 he 
suggested that Doncaster had 'reached rock bottom, ' and that he looked forward to a revival 
in trade including the development of new industries attracted by the town's relatively low 
rate status, and with the possible future development of the Doncaster airport (DG, 2/1/31). 
Although the airport was not developed, a similar level of optimism is evident five years later 
with the town's Mayor, Councillor T.H Johnson, keen to 'talk-up' the town through an 
unequivocal statement that the town should not be regarded as a distressed area, nor he 
stressed would it ever be (DG, 13/2/1936). However, in what was a significant observation 
on the challenges facing the local authority in attracting new industry to the town, he argued 
that efforts were becoming frustrated by what he described as an ill thought-out regional 
policy which was wrongly pushing industries towards distressed areas, when it should be 
encouraged to come to areas which were purely industrial areas (DG, 13/2/1936). The 
development of regional policy from the early 1930's marked a critical juncture for many 
regions not just Doncaster or the Doncaster area. There would be by necessity regional 
winners and losers, and at this time Doncaster would be a loser. As indicated in Johnson's 
statement regional policy would reduce local agency. 
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The Doncaster Gazette which had pressed the local authority for greater action throughout 
the century adopted a less sanguine tone than that of the town's Mayor, pouncing on one 
unsuspecting national newspaper reporter who had the temerity to describe Doncaster as a 
'bright spot' in industry in the North of England. The newspaper rejected this reporter's 'false 
optimism' arguing instead that much more work was needed to attract new industry in the 
face of increasing competition from other towns (6/2/1931). In the same article the paper 
raised two key and related issues which are significant in understanding Doncaster's 
relationship with mining and the nature of the town's subsequent economic decline. 
Firstly, throughout the inter-war years the Gazette expressed a concern that the town's 
economy was becoming imbalanced in favour of a growing dependence on the fortunes of 
what can be shown at this time to have been a small number of relatively diverse employers, 
but which operated in traditional industrial sectors. The Gazette focused its concerns in 
particular on the potentially damaging impact of any growing dependence on the local coal 
industry. Throughout the period the newspaper remained of the view that the town's principal 
industry was the Plant Works. In this regard investment in a new Plant assembly line during 
the 1920's was seen as 'heaven sent' compensation for the dislocation in employment in the 
surrounding coalfields (DG. 1/1/26). An article published in the Gazette in 1936 and 
reflecting on the dislocation in the mining industry speculated on the dangers of the town 
locked-in to a mining trajectory. Submitted by local born novelist Seam us Fraser, the letter 
reflected on his childhood in the town, pondering on, 'what will happen to Doncaster and its 
district when the coal seams are exhausted.' Each colliery village he noted has its 'tragic 
ominous knot of white muffled unemployed spitting at street corners' (DG.1 0/9/36). 
Secondly, having previously viewed the local mining industry as providing locational 
advantages for greater economic diversification, the Gazette came over the course of the 
inter-war period to adopt a more negative perspective. The newspaper's position shifted over 
this time to one which viewed the mining industry as a barrier to the creation of new 
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economic trajectories. This issue was discussed in Chapter 3 and dispelled through the 
example of the Dutch State Mining company, but like many other subsequent commentators 
on the coal industry the Gazette argued that 'where there is coal it might truly be said that 
there are peculiar problems which make the attracting of new industries especially difficult' 
(OG, 6/2/1931). The newspaper did not specify what these 'peculiar problems' were but 
previous and subsequent articles would focus on wider socio-political issues which down the 
years became associated with a specific image. Part of this image 'problem' would be 
associated with concerns that the town might become engulfed by the politics of the coalfield 
which often manifested itself through industrial relations. 8o 
4.2.11 Industrial relations 
Although industrial relations in the mining industry were low key for much of the early part of 
the century, the national miner's strike which broke out on March 1st 1912 was to bring local 
miners to the forefront of attention in the town. As the country's newest coalfield, the 
conditions of labour question did not arise in Doncaster; the men's interests in this respect 
had been covered by the price lists that the area's miners had recently obtained. A factor 
reflected in that late into the strike the Gazette felt able to write that, 'in the Doncaster 
neighbourhood, the past strike week has been extremely devoid of incident' (OG. 22/3/12). 
Rumours of the military stationed in Wheatley, whilst unfounded, would therefore have been 
unnecessary. The town's miners were said in fact to be in holiday mood, playing a football 
match against mine officials watched by 1000 spectators. Whilst the strike did not greatly 
affect the majority of the town's miners, nevertheless relief funds and distress committees 
had to be set up in some areas. The impact of the strike was felt beyond those employed in 
the industry with many of the town's industries intrinsically linked to mining, and would suffer 
accordingly. Doncaster Glassworks was the first victim, closing through a lack of coal for the 
800ne of the of the reasons why the Progressive majority on the town's corporation made no move to incorporate Bentley into 
the Borough. despite the fact it was almost physically merged with Doncaster and used many local government services was 
that they wished to avoid being engulfed by the politiCS of the coalfield (Barber, 2007). 
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furnaces. The closure of the Balby Wire Works would follow. The Plant Works returned to 
short time working as a result of the lack of rolling stock to repair. As transportation of coal 
diminished, locomotive drivers began work-sharing. Many local tradesmen also suffered 
through the lack of work. As a result of the unemployment caused by the strike, the 
Ooncaster Board of Guardians set up a labour yard for those thrown out of work. As the 
strike dragged on, coal became a rare household commodity and bags of coal reached the 
price of two shillings on the black market. A shortage of gas at the Carcroft gas works led to 
dark nights at Woodlands, as night lights remained off. Nevertheless, the strike remained 
solid in Ooncaster. 
Whilst this particular strike appeared devoid of incident and was reported in a largely positive 
manner, by 1921 the Gazette's tone began to shift. It commented in relation to the national 
strike that broke out that year that 'one strike is very much like another, and Ooncaster, is 
unhappily now so frequently involved in these industrial disputes that we find ourselves 
writing very much the same story over and over again as they occur' (OG. 6/4/21). The strike 
lasted for 94 days and was quick to have an impact on the town as restrictions on fuel forced 
many local firms to close for the duration of the dispute or shift to short time working (Elsey, 
1997). Notable examples of closures included Ooncaster Wire Works which shut down in 
April of that year, followed by Balby Wire Works, Kilner Brother's Glass Works, Baker's Steel 
Works, and Stanley Oil Works. Barnett's Wagon Builders was also forced onto short time 
(OG. 8 & 29/4/21). The General strike which broke out in 1926 also highlighted the growing 
interrelationship between mining and the fortunes of the wider economy, for example leading 
to the closure of watchmakers Robert Farr & Sons and resulting in the Cooperative Society 
selling off two of its branches (Hill, 1989). 
The strike was also notable for highlighting the divisions within the local Labour Party. The 
Gazette reported signs of serious differences between the general body of labour supporters 
in the Ooncaster district and the extreme element, including members of the Trades and 
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Labour Council of which Mr Edgar Davies, an avowed Communist, was head (DG, 
23/7/1926). The difference was most clearly articulated between the Communist-dominated 
Council for Action which coordinated local strike activities, and the Doncaster Labour Party 
(DLP). Whilst the former saw the strike in terms of socialist revolution, the DLP maintained a 
moderate tone throughout, even to the extent that its own Executive Committee minutes 
make no reference to the militant activity undertaken in the district during the last stages of 
the dispute.81 To what extent did the arrival of mining impact on local politics? 
4.2.12 Local polities 
Doncaster's political history during the early part of the century could be said to be more a 
reflection of the changing circumstances of the town and district rather than an instrument of 
its change. Before the town became associated with mining, Doncaster was like a political 
barometer, reflecting national trends. The political balance being held between the town's 
agricultural and railway interests, with a virtual monopoly of the direction and leadership of 
working class politics held by the town's railwaymen. 82 However with the arrival of the mining 
industry, the railways' political dominance ended. 
During the early part of the century, the GNR's dominance of Doncaster's industrial workforce was 
seen by the town's Trades' Council as a disadvantage for the newly formed Labour Party, and they 
hoped that the influx of ?rganised miners would give local trade unionism a boost and rouse the 
town's largely apathetic workforce.83 The arrival of the miners did not however seem to have had the 
politicising effect many hoped it would. Many of the town's local elections remained uncontested, and 
the town's miners remained largely independent of other trade unionists. 84 There was also a distinct 
lack of fraternity amongst the industrial working classes. In 1905 for example, the Yorkshire Miners 
81 Yet this resulted in the conviction of 94 men for offences such as intimidation, blocking roads (Teanby, 1983) 
82 The dominance of rail would extend beyond working class politics. From 1895 -1906, Mr Fison, a GNR Director, held the seat 
for Doncaster 
83 In 1905, the York Factory Times reported on the town's 'sleepy county apathy', and Margaret Bondfield criticised 'sleepy 
Doncaster', in her frustrated attempts to unionise the town's shop assistants (DG, 11/8/05; 25?10/07) 
&4 Even as late as 1912 only one seat out of six was contested. 
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Association (YMA) did not invite the Doncaster Trades Council to their first demonstration (DG, 
2317/05). This lack of working-class cohesion within the town was again evident several years later 
when attempts to maximise the working class vote, and increase representation in the town received 
a blow with the railwaymen and Goole dockyard workers refusing to support a miner's nominee. 
Gradually however the effects of an organised workforce, affiliated to the Labour Party in 1909, 
manifested itself in the spread of confidence at grass roots level. The Trades Council felt confident 
enough to unveil ambitious plans to build a new trade's union club to rival the town's Mansion House 
(Steward, 1972). 
The town's population and mining vote was growing faster than anywhere in the country. 85 
This was at a time when the mining vote was becoming increasingly important in the country 
accounting for approximately seven out of every one hundred votes cast (Gregory, 1968). 
The effect the local mining vote was having on the two other major parties however provides 
a direct comparison of their electoral fortunes. The Liberal Party had long since benefited 
from mining support. In 1900 for example, the Yorkshire Miners Association (YMA) had 
supported Mr A. Black the defeated Liberal candidate, in direct opposition to the wishes of 
the Trades Council and Doncaster Labour Representative Committee. In 1906 the victorious 
Liberals gained over 62% of the votes cast with the mining vote again a contributory factor 
(Teanby, 1983). This support continued, and undoubtedly helped the Liberals to win the seat 
during the elections of 1910, during which the town's miners were singled out for special 
electioneering. The Liberals, confident of future mining patronage, subsequently unveiled 
plans to erect a new Liberal club in the town. For the Conservative Party however, events 
took a different turn. Having lost the election in 1910, the Tory candidate Mr Whitworth, 
blamed the mining vote for his party's failure. He announced in January's Doncaster Gazette 
that, 'the dog was wagged by the tail, for the mining vote was practically solid against us' 
(DG, 18/1/10). The Yorkshire Post also blamed the Tory defeat on 'The miners' vote, which 
now absolutely settles what Doncaster's representation shall be' (DG 23/12/1910). By 1912 
85 Having increased from 30% to 50% of the electorate in eight years, Gregory (1968, p118) 
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the President of the Conservative Association found great difficulty in finding anyone to 
stand for the Doncaster seat. The task for the Tories was made even more difficult by the 
1918 Representation of the People Act which not only enfranchised all men and all women 
over thirty, but also reduced the area and changed the nature of the constituency. The 
question was now becoming not whether the seat was safe from the Conservative Party, but 
whether Labour could attract a sufficient number of votes from the Liberals (Teanby1983). 
For twenty years after the Reform Act of 1885 the loyalty of the Yorkshire miners to the 
Liberal Party had remained unshakable. However from 1900 this mood began to change. 
Whilst supporting Liberal candidates in the 1900 and 1906 elections, older Liberal voting 
miners were gradually replaced by younger socialist orientated miners attracted by the ideas 
of the Independent Labour Party (ILP). By 1908 the president of the YMA broke with the 
union's traditional support for the Liberals stating that a miner should stand as Labour 
candidate at the next general election (DG, 27/11108). Whilst it is wrong to suggest that 
miners represent a 'monolithic bloc', whose support for the Labour Party is unconditional and 
guaranteed (Harrison, 1978; Taylor,1984; Richards, 1986; Supple, 1987), nevertheless in 
Doncaster the potential political muscle of the miners was making the town a favourable 
constituency for future Labour candidates. The local trade directories reflect this change, 
with the 1910 Doncaster Directory for example, not only giving notice of a Division League of 
Young Liberals, but also of a Doncaster and District Independent Labour Party which held 
branch meetings twice a month and 'Labour Church Services' every Sunday (Teanby,1983). 
In 1912 the Doncaster branch of the British Socialist Party was inaugurated by Ben Tillet and 
Lady Warwick. The increasing importance of the town's new mining vote can be further 
demonstrated by the fact that, of the seven divisions in Yorkshire proposed for sponsorship 
by the YMA, only two were actually sponsored. The Doncaster division was one of them. In 
1914 Mr Roebuck, a YMA man, was selected as the Labour candidate. 
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Before the First World War the county of Yorkshire had only six Labour MPs and few seats 
on local councils. However during the 1919 local elections Labour made large gains in 
Leeds, Sheffield, and other industrial towns. The number of Labour MPs in Yorkshire rose to 
twenty one by 1922, and in this year Doncaster also elected its first Labour MP. Mr. W. 
Paling, a miner from Bentley Colliery who having cut his political teeth on Bentley Urban 
District Council UDC, would represent the constituency until 1931.86 The Doncaster Gazette 
nevertheless felt able to reflect that just as Doncaster twenty years ago could be regarded as 
a safe seat for liberalism, it had subsequently turned into a collection of seats at least equally 
safe for a Labour candidate who has the backing of the miners union (DG. 9/1/31). 
Table 4:5 - General election results 1918-1938 
Election Electors Turnout Candidate Party Votes % 
1918 35,1 14 58.6 R. Nicholson Lib 15,431 75.0 
R. Morley Co 5,153 25.0 
Majority Lab 10,278 
1922 37,310 77.4 W. Paling Lab 13,437 46.5 
Sir R. Berwicke- Con 8,279 28.7 
Copley Nat Lib 7,161 24.8 
R. Nicholson 5,158 
Majority 
1923 39,027 68.4 W. Palling Lab 16,198 60.6 
W. St. A Warde- Con 10,514 39.4 
Aldam 5,684 
Majority 
1924 40,633 77.0 W. Palling Lab 16,198 52.7 
AS Matthews Con 14,800 47.3 
Majority 1,696 
1929 58,213 77.6 W. Palling Lab 25,295 56.0 
E.A Phillips Con 11,016 24.4 
J. T. Clarke Lib 8,842 19.6 
86 When the number of Labour MPs fell from forty to nine. 
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Majority 14,279 
1931 61,4 44 80.7 A.H.E. Molson Con 27,205 54.9 
W. Palling Lab 22,363 45.1 
Majority 4,842 
1935 66,925 77.7 A.Short Lab 29,963 57.6 
A.H.E. Molson Con 22,363 42.4 
Majority 7,952 
1938 68,632 75.4 J. Morgan Lab 31,735 61.3 
A. Monteith Nataln.Lib 20,027 38.7 
Majority 11,708 
Source: Cralg (1974) & Cralg (1977) 
Table 4:5 shows how the political affiliation of the Doncaster constituency shifted over the 
period. In 1918 the Liberal Party took 75% of the votes in the constituency. This however 
would represent a high point for the Liberals. Their position was squeezed by the rise of the 
Labour Party and the dominant two party system in the UK. The Labour Party's rise is clearly 
evident in the table. In 1922 it accounted for almost 47% of the constituency vote. With the 
exception of the 1931 election, this dominance would continue. Whilst the Labour Party 
quickly established its dominance in the parliamentary constituency, it struggled to maintain 
a minority presence on the town council in the 1920's, and although more successful than 
before, remained a minority party in the next decade. The town and parliamentary 
constituencies had significantly different boundaries before 1948 and so crucially different 
electorates. 
Whilst the town elected its first Labour Councillor in 1902, a John H Kay who went on to 
become the town's first Labour Mayor in 1913,87 an analysis of local politics and local 
election results in Doncaster during this period suggests that local politics during this period 
reflected, to a large degree, the interests represented within the town. Table 4:6 is indicative 
87 Kay won the town's North ward in 1902 with a majority of 106 over his Conservative opponent (OG, 7/11/1902). In the 
following year the constitution of the Ooncaster labour Representative Committee was published and the town also elected Its 
second councillor, Thomas R Steels. (OG 31/7/1903). It wasn't until 1911 however that the town elected a third councillor, W.E. 
Crawford in South Ward (Teanby, 1983) 
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of the fact that throughout the inter-war years the council was controlled by a Conservative-
Liberal coalition that in 1934 became a formal union of the two parties, the Municipal 
Progressive Association (MPA). Together they campaigned for 'progress with prudence' and 
against the perceived rise of municipal socialism. Where mining issues figured on the 
hustings there is some evidence of a sympathetic local council which in the mid 1930's for 
example supported local miner's claims for a two shilling per days rise, whilst condemning 
coal-owners demands for an increase in the price of coal. Compared to the parliamentary 
constituency there was a far greater diversity of employment among the town's electorate, 
many of whom were self employed. This diversity was reflected in the town's candidates and 
councillors. In terms of the Labour vote, whereas miners dominated parliamentary politics, 
railway workers dominated them in the town. Where local politics is indicative of the nature 
of the local economy they reflect a town with a broad and diverse economic base. In the 
1936 local election for example candidates included a Friendly SOCiety agent, a baker, and a 
printer/stationer. Mr Tom Lindley, the Independent councillor was a licensed victualler. The 
town's Mayor, T.H. Johnson was an architect. 
Table 4:6 - Local election results. 1928-36 (selected Wards) 
Ward 1928 1931 1933 1936 
St Georges Con Ind Con Independent 
Conservative 
Hexthorpe Lib Lib Lib Progressive 
Association 
St James's Con Con Con Progressives 
Association 
8alby Lib Lib Lab Labour 
(unopposed) 
Source: Developed from results pub/tshed in the Doncaster Gazette 
With the shift from the relative prosperity of the 1920's to the economic crisis of the 1930's, 
the electoral fortunes of Labour in Doncaster enjoyed a revival. Its share of 29% of the vote 
136 
in 1931 grew to almost 45% in the next year. Further gains meant that by 1934 Labour had 
nine councillors, more than a third of the total, and overall managed to retain this number 
until normal political life was resumed in 1945. 1936 however recorded a 2: 1 vote against 
Labour. Mrs Law, the Labour candidate for the St George's ward blamed the result on a poor 
voter turnout, which in St Georges had been as low as 39%,88 and expressed her hope that 
after a few years the workers would get over their apathy.89 However, according to Sir 
Ronald Mathews, the Chairman of the Don Valley Conservative and Unionist Party, the 
results had in fact demonstrated that workers were realising where their interest lay, and not 
merely voting in accordance with their trade union leaders (OG.12/11/36). 
A wider analysis of the impact of coal mining on Ooncaster would therefore suggest 
something of a cultural shift, as miners and mining began to influence the socio-political life 
of the town and thus affect its external image. Whilst this is clear from the changing physical 
appearance of the town centre and immediate area, it is also evident in the town's changing 
political complexion, with the local miners beginning to flex their political muscle in a variety 
of areas. This is particularly evident in parliamentary elections when the town's first Labour 
MP Mr Paling was the 'miners candidate'. It is however less evident in the town elections 
where Labour politics continued to be dominated by the railways. Local elections in 
Ooncaster across the early period show that the town continued to reflect the diversity of 
business and economic interests in the town and dominated by the Progressive Alliance. 
Where mining representation is less evident in local politics it is more clearly observable in 
other local institutions. This has been considered in terms of local skills and training 
organisations but is also apparent in the provision of healthcare in the town. The Ooncaster 
Royal Infirmary (ORI) had a system of management which recognised the financial 
assistance of its service users. In the early 1920's first mineworkers and then other 
88 Mean turnout for English Municipal elections that year was 45% (Davies & Morley. 2006. p.168). 
89 Ironically an Editorial in the Gazette two years earlier had bemoaned the fact that ten thousand electors had not bothered to 
vote while the 'Socialist electors' had ·tumed out to the last man', and 'the day was not far distant from when Socialists would 
control the Council' (Teanby, 1983, p. 74) 
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businesses set up hospital contribution associations and workmen's contributions made up 
half of ORI ordinary income by 1927/8. A new constitution in 1923 recognised the financial 
contribution of the miners to the hospital and entitled mineworkers to 11 of the 16 seats on 
the newly created board. The struggle to maintain this level of influence was evident in 1931 
when any increase in miners levies for the development of the town infirmary were said to be 
conditional on greater mining representation on the infirmary management board. 
4.2.13 Conclusion 
The impact of coal mining on Ooncaster by the end of the early period was neither universal 
nor linear. Even where change was discernible such as through colliery development in the 
area this did not proceed in a uniform manner nor did it result in identical outcomes. There 
remained for example differences between colliery companies, between miners, and 
between mining villages which would only begin to be diluted over time (Oakley, 2002). 
There were also clear differences between mining related activities in the surrounding area 
and the town of Ooncaster itself. This could be most easily observed in the physical 
landscape as once quiet hamlets became pit villages. The town's first Economic Planning 
Report was nevertheless unequivocal in its assessment of the impact of mining, stating that 
the miners had brought with them new occupations, and in doing so had altered the balance 
of the town's occupational structure (Abercombie & Johnson, 1922). Whilst railways 
continued to be viewed as the town's principal industry (OG. 1/1126), mining had by 1914 
replaced it as the area's largest industrial employer, employing 9,600 workers compared to 
the Plant works 4,600, and rising to 23,000 by 1927. The coal industry also began to impact 
on wider socio-political activities which extended to its political complexion although at this 
time local politics reflected the diversity of interests represented in the town. It also impacted 
on the nature of industrial politics. Both of which overtime came to be reported as indicative 
of a shifting culture in the town. Other impacts were also evident. For example in the growing 
influence that mining began to play within local institutions such as health, but of more 
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significance education, and in particular the industry's role in affecting local skills and 
employment aspirations. Although both of these factors would subsequently be identified as 
indicators of lock-in, the development path of the town was not inexorable at this time but 
better understood in relation to an embedded institutional inertia within the local authority -
the local educational system was at this time representative rather than a driver of skills 
policy. 
The Gazette argued that the town's leaders failed to act quickly or decisively enough in 
response to the challenges and opportunities afforded by the arrival of the coal industry. 
Windows of locational opportunities are narrow and whilst the arrival of mining had provided 
the town's railways with a welcome boost the town's competitive advantage as a 
communications nodal point was not developed significantly. In many regards the town's 
failure to build on the arrival of coal at this early juncture was critical as local agency would 
be limited from the early 1930's as regional policy began to determine the spatial distribution 
of industries. The town did develop new industry although a number of the more significant 
examples were branch plants which would also subsequently be associated with path 
dependent developments. However, where local newspapers are an indicator of key local 
debates then there is sufficient evidence from the pages of the Doncaster Gazette to 
suggest that the processes leading to a narrowing local development trajectory were also 
contingent on the lethargy and complacency of the local corporation (which for much of the 
period was dominated by the local Conservative Party) and from entrenched interest groups 
such as local tradesmen fearful of greater levels of competition, and from the racing press 
who saw the 'financial benefits accruing from the black flag of commerce', as detrimental to 
attracting racing visitors (OG, 3/10109). Together this self-sustaining coalition opposed 
attempts at greater industrial development in the town. Gradually, this position changed, 
something perhaps reflected in the civic banquet toast which changed in 1913 from 
"municipality and trade" to "industries of Doncaster and neighbourhood" (DG, 25/4/13). 
However the Gazette remained unconvinced as to the extent of the transformation and 
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continued to press the town's corporation for greater levels of activity to attract new industry, 
whilst at the same time warning of the potential consequences should coal be allowed to 
dominate the local economy. There was a more proactive industrial policy during the inter-
war years but the businesses that were established in the town were not on the scale or of 
the quality of those attracted in the wake of the railways. The local business directories also 
tell us something of the impact of mining on Doncaster. The relationships between industries 
and regional economies are complex, often developing various interdependencies. Some of 
these are evident in local directories which provide a record of the positive boost given to the 
town through supply chain linkages and spending multipliers. However these 
interrelationships are fine whilst the industry is growing, but less so when it is in decline, 
even during periods of industrial action when cessation is only temporarily. The extent to 
which mining had positive impacts on the town's trades and businesses is evident in both 
local business directories and in the pages of the Gazette. What is less evident is the extent 
to which mining provided the basis for direct spin-out or self employment opportunities. 
Business directories during this period highlight the limited number of opportunities offered 
by mining compared with all other sectors. This could have been one of the peculiarities 
associated with mining that the Gazette referred to. However, this too was not inexorable but 
also a factor contingent on entrepreneurial failure with the industry in general failing to invest 
in more innovative and emergent markets which was shown through the experiences of the 
Dutch mining industry to have been possible. So by 1945, Doncaster was no coal town, but 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the impact of the coal industry was growing and 
becoming increasingly dominant in the town. But there is also sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the nature of its dominance was largely contingent on wider institutional factors. 
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4.3 Mature period 1946-1970 
4.3.1 Introduction 
De-requisitioning and the return to peacetime production saw all local firms expand in the 
immediate post war years and by 1950 Doncaster was able to maintain the appearance of a 
successful and relatively diverse economy. Local town guides could legitimately report that 
local employment in the town was distributed across the production of a diverse range of 
goods, which in this particular periodical (1948) did not include coal. 90 Whilst missing from 
the Annual Guide, the newly nationalised coal industry continued to play a key role in the 
town's economic development throughout the period, both directly through employment and 
indirectly through increased purchasing power. However, whilst the local coal industry had 
been typified by employment growth, it began to decline from the 1960's. The resultant 
concerns within the town were compounded by the fact that decline in mining employment 
came at the same time as retrenchment by other key employers. By 1970 what had 
previously looked like a diverse economy was clearly exposed as an over reliance on the 
fortunes of a small number of large employers, including coal. The following assesses how 
this dominance manifested itself and explores the extent to which this was related to mining 
and inexorable. It argues that whilst the impact of mining was evident across a wide range of 
socio- economic and political factors, the nature of Doncaster's economic trajectory during 
this period was nevertheless largely contingent upon decisions made at all three levels of 
decision making. It shows that opportunities to alter the town's economic trajectory were 
available but were not taken, and this can be explained by recourse to the embedded nature 
of self-sustaining coalitions dominated by the National Coal Board (NCB) and the State. As 
with the earlier section it therefore highlights the diminishing level of local agency. 
90 Key local finns and sectors were listed as artificial silks (Bemberg); electrical equipment (Crompton Parkinsons), cinema 
seating (Gaumont Kalee Seating Lld), wallpaper (Roxeth Wallpaper Lld), electrical fittings (T S Morley and Co. Lld), milk bottle 
(PCS Milk and Co), agricultural implements (International Harvesters), oil refineries (Kenneth Thelwall Lld), tiled fireplace 
manufhacture (R 0 Arnold Lld). Others included, wire ropes (British ropes Lld), brass (Peglers Lld), iron works (Wood house 
and Sons Lld), flour millers (T Hanley and SonYd), woollens. (T Anderton and Son Lld), wire fencing (Darlington Fencing Co), 
wagon builders (Thomas Burnett), and confectionary (5 Parklnson and Son Lld; W. Nuttall, and Radiance Lld) (Official Guide, 
1948). 
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4.3.2 Economic structure 
Table 4:7 shows the distribution of employment in the Doncaster area by sector in 1951, 
1961 and 1967. It shows that coal mining continued to be a dominant sector throughout the 
period. Table 4:7 shows however that mining employment had peaked and would decline 
throughout the period from 28% in 1951 to 23% in 1967. This resulted in the loss of 4,600 
local miner's jobs between 1959 and 1967 (Table 4:8) which represented 18% of total local 
employment. Job losses came as part of a wider rationalisation in the UK coal industry, and 
although the numbers were less than the Yorkshire and Humberside regional reduction 
(25%) and much less than the national picture (35%), they came despite the change in the 
National Coal Board's retirement policy, which in 1960 resulted in compulsory retirement of 
all men over 65 years old. 
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Table 4:7 - Employment by sector 1951-67 
Year Primary (%) Manufacturing Construction Distribution * Services 
1951 28 29 8 16 22 
1961 27 30 6 * 33 
1967 23 31 9 39 
* Figure not available for 1961. 
Figures for 1967 from DEA (1969) 
Despite this decline in employment, coal mining would remain the Doncaster area largest 
single employer throughout the period. By 1967 the NCB employed 20,800 workers, 
whereas within the Yorkshire and Humberside region and nationally the primary industries 
represented 7% and 4% respectively of total employment (DEA, 1969). Although most 
employment in the local mining industry was at the local collieries in the surrounding villages, 
about 2,000 people were also employed in the town itself at the Doncaster Area 
Headquarters of the National Coal Board. The significance of the coal industry to the town at 
this time is perhaps best symbolised by the new multi-storey office block, Coal House, which 
the NCB built on College Road in 1966, and by the decision to locate sections of the national 
administrative organisation concerned with purchasing and stores, computer services, 
finance and production, to Consort House. Many of these new posts were filled by women, 
itself indicative of a gradual labour market trend towards female employment in the town. 
Table 4:8 - Decline in employment in coalmining 1959-1967 
Industry 1959 1963 1967 1959-63 1963-67 1959-67 
Coalmining 25,400 22,300 20,800 -3,200 -1,400 -4,600 
Source DEA, 1969. Figures rounded up 
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Table 4:9· Employment changes 1959·1967: Summary 
Industrial Total Employees Total Employees Changes 1959-67 
category 1959(%} 1967 (%) 
(%) 
Males Females Males Females Males Females Total 
Primary 26.5 0.9 21.3 1.2 - 5.2 + 0.3 - 4.9 
Manufacturing 22.8 7.5 22.2 8.4 - 0.6 + 0.9 + 0.3 
Construction 5.1 0.5 8.2 0.5 + 3.1 - + 3.1 
Services 16.8 15.8 17.7 21.1 + 0.9 + 5.3 +6.2 
TOTAL 71.3 24.6 69.6 31.3 - 1.7 + 6.7 + 5.0 
.. Note: Due to rounding Individual components do not necessarily add up to the total (DEA, 
1969) 
Table 4:7 shows that the largest sector by employment in 1951 remained manufacturing 
representing 29% of all employees and that employment in this sector would grow marginally 
throughout the period, representing some 30,500 people by 1967 (DEA, 1967). However, 
table 4:9 shows that all of this growth was accounted for by female employment, with male 
employment in manufacturing actually declining between 1959 and 1967. Although the 
largest individual industry sector, vehicle manufacture (6,800), had a predominately male 
workforce, there was also strong sectoral employment evident in engineering and electrical 
goods (4,400), and in the manufacture of electric motors and electrical components. Table 
4:10 shows that female employment tended to be clustered in this sub sector. Crompton 
Parkinson Ltd and GEC Machines Ltd are two examples of female dominated engineering 
companies in the town. By 1976 Cromptons employed 1500 people, 2/3rds of whom were 
female and GEC employed 640 of whom 421 were female (Official Guide, 1976). 
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Table 4:10 - Employment and gender, 1976 
Company Employment Male Female % of females in 
in 1976 workforce 
BREL 3250 3050 20 0.6 
British Ropes/Bridon 1778 1436 342 19 
Cementation 500 420 80 16 
ICI 2400 2300 10 0.4 
GEC Machine Ltd 640 219 421 66 
International Harvesters 4000 3760 24 0.6 
Mining Supplies 1000 950 50 5 
Peglers 1905 1306 59 3 
Pilkingtons 420 370 50 12 
Rockware 1100 970 130 12 
Source: Based on figures In Doncaster Town GUide (1976). 
The manufacturing sector employment was relatively widely spread over a range of other 
activities and firms, including tool-making, and also the manufacture of mining machinery 
and equipment. Whilst no mining machinery firms had been established in Doncaster before 
the war, greater levels of activity are evident following nationalisation of the industry. Seven 
mining manufacturers were registered in the local business directories in 1967. Two of which 
were Don Valley Engineering Co. Ltd (which was established in 1947, and specialised in the 
design of coal preparation plant) and Mineral Wealth and Co Ltd (which was established in 
Askern in 1967, manufacturing underground cutting equipment): Employment in the 
remaining metal-using industry (4,300) was, as with vehicles, substantially dependent on two 
firms, Peglers and British Ropes. 
The textile industry provided 4% (3,700) of the Doncaster area's total employment. The most 
significant firm was British Nylon Spinners which had been established in the town in 1955 
on the former site of Bemberg Ltd. Three firms in the glass industry making plate glass, 
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glass bulbs and containers accounted for 80% of the 4,200 employees in the bricks, pottery, 
glass and cement industry. The remainder were in smaller firms, mainly employed in brick, 
tiled fireplace and concrete manufacturing. The 7,200 employees in the remaining 
manufacturing industries covered a wide range of industries and small to medium sized 
firms. These included lubricants specialists such as Kenneth Threwell Ltd of Churchill Road 
Doncaster, which produced specialist oils for the coal industry, but did not include any coke 
plants.91 
Over a quarter of the 7,200 employees were in the food, drink and tobacco industries, baking 
and sugar confectionery being the major activities with smaller numbers in flour milling, 
brewing, milk products, poultry processing, preserves and soft drinks manufacture. Much of 
this is reflected in the local trade directories of the time. Table 4:11 for example shows the 
numbers of food and confectionary manufacturers registered in the Local Business Directory 
in 1967. It shows that Doncaster continued to have a significant cluster in this sector, with 
the numbers of businesses registered in the local trade directories rising from 217 in 1936 to 
378 by 1967. 
Table 4:11 - Food and confectionery manufacturers registered in the local business 
directory 1967 
Bakers 17 
Confectionery 16 
Brewers 4 
Ice cream 6 
Milk products 1 
Mineral water 4 
Total 48 
., Whilst the NCB took over most of the colliery based coke plants after nationalisation none were developed In the Doncaster 
area and of those remaining in private hands the closest was the Bawtry Coke Oven and By-Products Plant, owned by the 
Barb'er and Walker Company Limited. 
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A rather smaller proportion of local people were employed in clothing and footwear, although 
many of these were women, many of whom were employed at SR Gents, a multiple tailoring 
firm, and at Montague Burton, a men's clothing manufacturer which had moved into the town 
in 1950. Other manufacturing industries included wood machining and sawmilling, 
newspaper printing and publishing, iron founding, smokeless fuel manufacture. 
The local construction industry grew from 5.1 % in 1959 to represent 8.2% of total 
employment by 1967. This significant increase in employment followed a slump in the 
immediate post war years, with local firms especially small firms suffering from a shortage of 
materials (DG, 25/10/45). The sector began to recover from the early 1950's due to 
significant investment in new building projects such as the Doncaster Bypass Station and 
Thorpe Marsh Power Station. Whilst employment levels fell back, particularly in 1956 with 
the local industry affected by the worse gales to hit the town since 1936, employment levels 
recovered and grew over the course of the 1960's. Much of this employment growth was 
associated with access to local authority building contracts related to the re-development of 
the town centre, particularly the construction of the Arndale (1964) and Waterdale (1965) 
Centres, as well through large school contracts and the continued investment in roads. 
Whilst this level of investment did not appease all local business interests it was a significant 
factor in the buoyancy of the construction sector during this period, and is reflected in the 
increased number of construction businesses registered in the local directories which 
reached 487 in 1967. 
The service sector witnessed the greatest increase in employment during the mature period 
increasing from 22% in 1951 to 39% by 1967 although this proportion was still lower than 
that for the Yorkshire and Humberside region (43%) and the national economy (51 %). Much 
of this growth was in female employment and reflected the increasing importance of the 
public sector to local employment, particularly in education and health care. There was also 
a rise in services more broadly for example in catering and motor repairing services, and 
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within the professional and scientific and miscellaneous services groups (DEA, 1969). The 
rate of growth in the distributive trades group in the area was higher than that recorded 
nationally and contrasted with a small decline regionally, with retail distribution accounting 
for four fifths of employees in distributive trades. This increase is reflected in the increase in 
the number of businesses registered in the local business directories which in 1967 reached 
2,357. 
Despite Doncaster's acknowledged status as a communications nodal point, transport and 
communications was the only sector to contract during this period falling 28%, losing 
employees at a faster rate than regionally or nationally due to the importance locally of 
railway employment. Again this decline is evident in the local directories which although 
indicating 110 businesses registered, an increase of five from the 1936 entry, it nevertheless 
reflects a significant reduction in proportion with the numbers of businesses registered in 
directories in 1936 and 1967. 
4.3.3 A rich town 
For much of the period the local newspapers were openly promoting Doncaster as a 'rich 
town' (DG, 3/2/55). The Macmillan boom of the later 1950's had helped ensure that the local 
building trades had full order books. When combined with new motorways being built and 
industrial estates planned at Kirk Sandall and Marshgate, the economic future of the town 
looked promising (see appendix 8). Rising levels of affluence were reflected in an 
entrepreneurial spirit evident in the reports of new businesses started or bought, many of 
which involved former employees. AE Spink Ltd for example was bought by a number of 
former employees upon being demobilised from the army in 1945 (OG, 1956), J.A Gaunt, an 
instrument manufacturer was started by the town corporation's ex-clock repairer, and the 
former sales department chief of Bemberg Ltd also set up in business making rayon and 
nylon for women's underwear, and employing many of the women who used to work with 
him at Bemberg. Established businesses also benefitted and the town's shops remained 
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busy throughout the decade. One returning visitor from Australia was reported as being 
amazed at the quantity and variety of goods to be bought in the shops in the town compared 
with five years previously (DG, 15/12/55). The overall level of business confidence extended 
to the surrounding pit villages with the Rossington Chamber of Commerce being revived in 
1956 (DG, 19/1/56). 
Much of this relative affluence was underpinned by the mining industry, either directly 
through employment or indirectly through supply chain contracts or consumer spending 
power, with output at Doncaster's pits reaching record levels in 1954 leading to higher 
bonuses and more money spent in the town's shops (DG, 5/1/55). One happy car salesman 
stated that the best customer for cars were the miners, who he suggested, are happy to pay 
high prices (DG, 26/5/55). Doncaster's relative affluence was also identified by one 
government survey which compared retail turnover in 1950 and 1961. It found that the figure 
per head of population in Doncaster as £157 in 1950 and £299 in 1961. The average for a 
dozen similar towns in Yorkshire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire 
was significantly lower, at £123 and £213 for these two years (Barber, 2007). If Doncaster 
had come to occupy the humble role of shopkeeper to the colliery population, as the Gazette 
had warned half a century earlier, it certainly seemed to have benefited from it. Table 4:12 
shows production at local collieries continued to improve and in 1967/68, Doncaster's 
collieries produced over nine million tonnes of coal, with the main customer, the electriCity 
generating board taking about a third of output. 'Bull week' at Christmas 1967 saw 
productivity increase by 25% on the same week the previous year, rising from 38 cwt per 
man to 48.6 cwt and with three of Doncaster's pits: Brodsworth, Rossington, and Markham 
breaking production records (DG, 21/12/67). 
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Table 4:12 - Coal productivity at Doncaster area collieries 1963-68 
Year Tonnage %ofGB total 
Output of saleable coal ('000 tonnes) 1963/64 9,848 5.2% 
1964/65 10,272 5.6% 
1965/66 9,750 5.6% 
1966/67 8,601 5.2% 
1967/68 9,349 5.7% 
.. 
.. Source: Ministry of Power Statistical DIgest, 1967 
4.3.4 Earnings 
The extent to which Doncaster maintained its level of affluence can be gauged from an 
analysis of local earnings. Although statistical information about earnings is not available for 
areas as small as Doncaster, nevertheless regional data of the earnings of male manual 
workers in different manufacturing industries are available and can be used to provide some 
estimate of earnings levels in the study area. This of course involves assuming that the local 
level of earnings in each industry was the same as the regional level. Table 4:13 shows the 
proportions of males employed in the Doncaster area in those manufacturing industries in 
which regional average earnings in 1968 were respectively above and below the regional 
average for all manufacturing industries. 57% of males in manufacturing in the study area 
were in industries with earnings above the regional average of 425s. 8d compared with only 
41 % regionally. Moreover 35% of the town's male workers were in industries receiving 30s. 
or more above the regional average, whereas the corresponding regional proportion was 
only 20%. The composition of the lower half of the table also reveals a relatively favourable 
position for the town's inhabitants. Only 1 % of the town's workers were in industries 
receiving 30s. or more below the regional average compared with 16% regionally. It seems 
reasonable, therefore, to draw the broad conclusion that the earnings of adult male 
employees in manufacturing were significantly higher in Doncaster than in the wider region, 
and thus nearer to, but still below, the U.K. average, which in April 1968 was 456s. 6d. 
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Table 4:13 - Average weekly earnings of adult manual workers April 1969 
Males employed in those manufacturing industries in 
which the regional average weekly earnings for male 
manual workers were: Percentage 
Doncaster Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
(a) above the overall regional average (425s. ad. ) 
40 /- or more above 26 16 
30/- or more above but less than 40/- 9 4 
20/- or more above but less than 30/- 2 5 
10/- or more above but less than 20/- 13 a 
Less than 10/- above 7 a 
TOTAL 57 41 
(b) below the overall regional average (425s. ad. ) 
Less than 10/- below 22 20 
10/- or more below but less than 20/- 9 12 
20 /- or more below but less than 30 /- 11 11 
30/- or more below but less than 40/- - 12 
40/- or more below 1 4 
TOTAL 43 59 
Note: The employment statistics on which this table IS based relate to mld-1967 (DEA, 1969) 
Although there are no equivalent regional statistics of earnings in coalmining, the national 
average weekly earnings of males twenty one years and over (all classes of mineworkers) 
employed in the industry, including allowances in kind, was 513s. 3d. in April 1968. This was 
a substantially higher figure than the regional average for adult manual workers in all 
manufacturing sectors, and maintained the broad trend previously identified during the 
1950's (Barrett Brown, 1967).92 Although these two rates are not strictly comparable, 
92 ThiS appears to be a continuation of the situation during 1950s when miners were found to be the amongst the most highly 
paid manual workers. with weekly wages (excluding allowances) 29%. and hourly wages 49%. above the averages for Industry 
as a whole (Barretl Brown,1967, p.141). 
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particularly since coalmining earnings fluctuate from area to area and from colliery to colliery, 
nevertheless the generally productive and viable nature of the town's collieries suggest a 
level of earnings at least not below the national level and probably above, a conclusion 
supported by information available in the National Coal Board's Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts, 1967/8. The Doncaster Area study (1969) shows average weekly 
earnings of wage-earners (all ages) in the Board's Doncaster Area to be 462s.2d, including 
allowances in kind, compared with the corresponding Great Britain average at the time of 
450s. 
4.3.5 Housing 
Average earnings are only one way of assessing the wealth of a particular area. The 
rateable value of a house is a general indicator of its size, condition and environment 
(although rates tend to vary in different parts of the country) and is often used as a proxy for 
a locality's wealth, with houses over £100 at the time tending to be associated with 
professional occupations. Table 4:14 shows that whilst Doncaster had a lower percentage of 
cheap houses than both the Yorkshire and Humberside region and England and Wales as a 
whole, it also had a lower stock of the more expensive housing.93 lt is also perhaps indicative 
of the fact that between 1946 and 1966 whilst private enterprise constructed slightly more 
than 2,000 houses, the local authority had committed to clearing poor quality working class 
housing and over 6,000 council houses were built (Barber, 2007). 
93 Various Yorkshire area studies show something of a variety. In Halifax and Calder Valley for example houses with a rateable 
value less than £30 accounted for 57%. In Huddersfield and Colne Valley this figure was 48%. Sources: Halifax and Calder 
Valley, An Area Study, HMSO, 1968. Huddersfield and Colne Valley, An Area Study, HMSO, 1969. Joint Doncaster Area 
Study, HMSO, 1969. 
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Table 4:14· Housing (rateable value) 1968 
Under £30 £30-55 £56-100 Over£100 
Doncaster 11.1 53.4 31.2 2.6 
Yorks & Humber 28.5 41.0 22.6 3.7 
England & Wales 14.2 27.3 38.8 17.1 
Source: Dept of EconomIc Affatrs, 1969 
4.3.6 Politics 
Local affluence could also be reflected in the changing political complexion of the town. 
Having developed into a relatively safe Labour seat before the outbreak of the Second World 
War, Doncaster became a marginal Parliamentary seat for much of this period, with the 
town's electorate shifting from Labour to the Conservatives during the relative affluence of 
the 1950's. Table 4:15 shows that during two successive elections (1951 and 1955) the ex-
railway worker Ray Gunter was defeated by the Marlborough and Cambridge educated 
Conservative Minister Anthony Barber. This was a result of some significance as it 
represented one of only two seats that the Labour party lost in the Yorkshire area between 
1944 and 1974.94 Gunter's immediate replacement, W.E Garratt, a nominee of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) was also defeated in 1959. Garrett and Gunter's 
candidature also illustrates the limited relationship between the parliamentary constituency 
and the mining industry at this time. Only Harold Walker, who would go on to represent the 
town for over thirty years from 1964, had any real connection with the mining industry, his 
father having been a Lancashire miner. However Walker, was a toolmaker, and like all other 
candidates whilst emerging from active trade union roles, this was more typically associated 
with the transport and manufacturing industries. A similar picture emerges from an analysis 
of local politics. 
94 The Doncaster Gazette in reporting on the forthcoming elections could not however fail to show its political colours noting that 
during the town's mock election held some days prior to the General Election, the youngsters of the town had voted 
overwhelmingly for the Liberal party, which the paper suggested promised a different political future for the town. 
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Table 4:16 • General election results 1950 ·1970 
Election Electors Turnout Candidate Party Votes % 
1950 56,081 85.6 R J. Gunter Lab 24,449 50.9 
A P. L Barber Con 23,571 49.1 
878 1.8 
1951 57,581 86.2 AP.L Barber Con 25,005 50.4 
RJ. Gunter Lab 24,621 49.6 
384 0.8 
1955 58,117 81.8 A.P.L. Barber Con 24,598 51.7 
RJ. Gunter Lab 22,938 48.3 
1,660 3.4 
1959 58,505 84.5 AP.L. Barber Con 26,521 53.6 
W.E. Garrett Lab 22,935 46.4 
3,586 7.2 
1964 57,746 82.7 H. Walker Lab 23,845 49.9 
Rt. Hon. AP.L Barber Con 22,732 47.6 
G.P. Broadhead Ind 1,201 2.5 
1,113 2.3 
1966 56,013 81.2 H. Walker Lab 25,777 56.7 
J.M. Whittaker Con 19,689 43.3 
6,088 13.4 
1970 59,755 74.9 H. Walker Lab 22,658 50.7 
P.Davies Con 19,431 43.3 
W.T.W. Blades Lib 2,648 5.9 
3,227 7.3 
. . Source: Craig, F.WS (1971) Bf/tlsh Parliamentary Election Results 1950·1970 . 
The enlargement of the council, planned but not put into effect before the war, meant that 
there were now twelve wards returning 36 councillors. Table 4:16 shows local election 
results for the period 1945-1972. It shows that the Labour Party won control of the Council in 
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1945 for the first time, winning twenty six seats.95 It also shows that Labour would remain the 
dominant party in the town throughout the period holding clear majorities other than in 1951 
and 1969. However, table 21 shows that of the twelve wards which now made up the town96 
only half could be considered to be 'Labour wards'. These wards tended to be in the central 
or railway dominated wards of Hexthorpe and Balby, with the more affluent areas such as 
Town Fields, St Georges and Bessacarr consistently returning Progressive, Independent 
and/or Conservative councillors. As with the earlier period, local election results show that 
they continued to reflect the diversity of the local economic base, and where labour politics 
was concerned the railway industry tended to provide the largest number of candidates. A 
number of reasons can be put forward to explain the paucity of mining candidates. They 
include a general reluctance of Yorkshire miners to join the Labour Party as individual 
members, and a more systemic failure by miners to organise and mobilise their full delegate 
entitlement (Oakley, 2002). However the continued dominance of the railway industry in 
Doncaster local elections at this time was perhaps more a practical reflection of the reality 
that the majority of local miners at this time preferred to live close to their places of work and 
stand as candidates in Rural Council elections. 
Thus despite almost half a century of mining involvement in the area only two of the twenty 
two Labour Councillors elected to the Doncaster Council in 1945 were associated with 
mining. One of these, a Mr Herbert Martin, was a Publican who had previously worked as a 
Deputy at Bullcroft Colliery (DG, 15/11145). Six Labour Councillors were associated with the 
railways, and six with the town's manufacturing industry. Of the six candidates for the Bye 
Election in 1945, six were railwaymen and none were miners (DG, 27/9/45; 18/10/45; 
15/11/45). There is no evidence that this changed over the course of this period. For 
example, of the twenty seven candidates standing in the 1955 local election only one was a 
miner although a local coal merchant also stood. The railways again provided the highest 
95 Labour won 26 seats, Progressive 8, Independent 2 (DG, 8/11145) 
96 Includes Cantley from 1951 
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number of candidates, and in the same year the position of town Alderman was won by a Mr. 
Ogden who was an engine driver. Table 4:16 also shows the continued success of the 
Progressive Party and reaffirms that local politics during this period remained representative 
of a wide range of local interests, with no one sector or interest dominating. Overall diversity 
is best reflected in the Progressive Party candidates who tended to be drawn from small 
businessmen. During the 1945 election for example candidates included builders, 
auctioneers, surveyors, butchers, and other businessmen.97 
91 See candidate biographical details in DG, 27/9/45; 18/10/45 
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Table 4:16· Local election results. Doncaster wards, 1945·1972 
Ward 45 46 47 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
, Balby L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L l Nd Nd Nd L L L L C L L L 
8essacarr I I P I I P I I P I I P I I P I C C C C C C C C C C cl 
Central L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L 
Hexthorpe L L L L L P L L L P L L P L L L L L L C L L C C C L L 
Hyde Park L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L C L L L 
Intake L P P P P P L L L C L C C C C C L L L L L C C C L L L 
St Georges L P P P P P P P L P P L P P P P P L P P P P P C L L L 
StJohns L I I I I I L I I I I I I I I L L L L I L L I I L L L 
Town Fields P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P C P C C C C C C C C C 
Westfield L L L L L L L L L L L L LL l L L L L L L L L C C L L L I 
Wheatley L P P P P P P L L P L L L C C C L L L C C C C C C L L 
Woodfield L L L L L L L L L P L L L L C L L L L L L L C C L L L I 
Source: British Local Election Results 1889-2003 
nd no data 
Key 
L = Labour C = Conservative P = Prog ressive I = Independent 
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4.3.7The contingent nature of vulnerability 
Political issues remained focused on the town's economic fortunes, principally the attraction 
of new industry. The Progressive Alliance Councillor Mayor E.H. Shaw, fought the 1945 local 
elections on a platform of 'cheap land, education, housing and the attraction of new industry' 
(DG, 18/10/45), although her campaign like other Progressive candidates before her also 
stressed the caveat of a need for prudence. This caveat clashed with the more pro-
investment policy urged by the Gazette which campaigned on the need for the local authority 
to prioritise investment in a modern economic infrastructure it was argued was needed to 
attract and retain new businesses and their families. In more enterprising boroughs, the 
paper suggested 'commodious community centres had been provided, whereas in 
Doncaster there had been no town planning', which it argued had resulted in overcrowding 
and an overall shortage of housing (DG, 1/11145). Greater levels of planning and investment 
followed the election of a Labour council in 1945. However the council's prioritisation of 
investment in affordable housing was at the expense of larger dwellings and led to clashes 
with the Doncaster and District Federation of Building Trade as well as the Progressives. 98 
Moreover, Samuel Smiths (Tadcaster) Brewery Ltd argued that this policy was at the 
expense of wider business opportunities with the council switching the use of land from 
warehouse and light industry to residential purposes (DG,19/1/56), and indicative of an anti-
business policy, with the Council accused of rating businesses and shopkeepers on current 
day (1955) values rather than the 1939 values that it had used to assess householders (DG, 
28/1156). It is certainly true that the council's prioritization of social housing led to an 
imbalance in the housing mix which would subsequently have negative consequences in 
terms of attracting professional and managerial staff, but underestimates efforts to attract 
new business. In fact the Council's efforts to attract new business were often blocked by 
local people in Progressive dominated wards. For example, the Council felt obliged to refuse 
98 Mr W. Lister, President of the Doncasler and District Federation of Building Trade questioning the rate of house building In 
the town. He suggested that eighty-tw~ private houses had been built in 1953, ~04 In 1954, and 1351n 1955. Only two schools 
were built during this period, one of which was bUilt by a member of the Federation (DG.16/2/56). 
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planning permission for Ruddick Meishaw Ltd, a civil engineering company from Wealdstone 
to build a new factory in Bessacarr due to complaints from local residents (DG,16/2/56). 
Local opposition to the factory remained despite plans to build on an ex-quarry site. 
Problems with planning permission would continue to hamper efforts to attract new business. 
Don Valley MP Richard Kelly's promises to fight red tape to help a London firm set up a new 
factory in Armthorpe, came to nought as the Rural Development Council refused to extend 
the leasehold beyond ten years. Ford Motor Company was refused planning permission to 
develop an old sports ground at Sprotborough for light industry and warehouse use (DG, 
21/12/67). 
4.3.8 Contingent nature of locational advantages 
Whilst local agency remained a factor in determining the town's economic development path, 
wider external factors were also prominent at this time. The extent to which the town's 
development path was contingent on factors outside of the town's control can be considered 
via an analysis of survey data from new and prospective business which focus on the town's 
locational advantages. 
Between 1945 and 196853 manufacturing firms located in the town. Table 4:17 shows that 
in terms of employment the most significant businesses were established in the immediate 
post war period and included ICI Fibres which manufactured nylon fibre99 and Crompton 
Parkinson (1946), which produced motors and light fittings. Both firms expanded to become 
major employers within the town. ICI Fibres employed 500 workers in 1955, but grew to 
employ seven times as many by 1971, with Crompton Parkinson's employing 1,500 by this 
date (Barber, 2007). Other significant firms to set up in the area during this period included 
Bartol Plastics (1960) and Mining Supplies (1969). Smaller manufacturing businesses 
included Doncaster Engineering Co Ltd founded by Frank A. Stanbridge in 1947. However, 
many of the new businesses started in premises vacated by other firms, suggesting that the 
99 Closed in 1996 
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net impact was not always optimal. The best example of these was British Nylon Spinners 
(BNS) which effectively replaced Bemberg Ltd. BNS was typical of many of the town's 
manufacturers producing products and materials for a range of local industries. The nylon 
produced by BNS for example was used for carpets and car tyres, but also for colliery 
conveyor belts (OG,1976). 
Table 4:17· Analysis of fifty three manufacturing units established between 1946-68 
Periods in which units Total Employed at: 
were established Number of cases Mid-1960 Mid-1967 Mid-1968 
1946-1953 28 3,797 4,630 4,819 
1954-1959 9 4,334 4,194 3,957 
1960-1968 16 60* 1,000 989 
1946-1968 53 8,191 9,824 9,765 
Source: Department of Economic Affalfs (1969) 
*Two units established in early 1960 account for this figure. 
Table 4: 18 shows that of the new businesses to locate in Doncaster between 1945 and 1968 
a high percentage identified the town's status as a communication centre as the key 
locational factor. Although this percentage was slightly lower than in the period before 1945 
it shows nevertheless that communications remained the basis of local competitive 
advantage. This advantage could have been extended further had the town Corporation 
Airport Committee pushed forward with its plans to develop the local airport. The 
development of Doncaster airport had been the subject of discussion for some time although 
the war had given the initiative a much needed boost with the airport playing an important 
role in the repair of bombers. Subsequently development plans were submitted, which 
attracted private sector interest, and which were based on extending the airport's 
connectivity within the region, especially in relation to Sheffield. However, the City of 
Sheffield's opposition to the initiative ended the development (DG, 2/8/45). When the airport 
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returned to commercial use in 1953, the estimated cost of competing with other municipal 
airports was judged to be too great (Barber, 2007) and Doncaster would have to wait 
another half a century before it would have its own airport. 
Table 4:18 - Advantages of location pre and post 1945 
Number of firms quoting each advantage 
Groups of Advantages 
Pre-1945 Post-1945 Total 
Labour 9 19 28 
Of which availability of female labour 3 9 12 
Communications 17 12 29 
of which road 7 9 16 
of which rail 6 5 11 
of which air and canal 4 3 7 
Proximity to Markets 1 9 10 
Links with the Coal Industry 5 6 11 
Of which supplies of materials and power 4 3 7 
Proximity to Supplies (other than coal) 6 2 8 
Other miscellaneous factors 8 16 24 
Total firms responding 24 27 51 
Source: Department of EconomIc Affalfs (1969) 
Doncaster could also offer access to cheaper strategic resources such as gas and electricity, 
low cost of water, and important local resources such as sand, gravel and limestone. Table 
4:18 shows however, that coal remained an important source of energy during this period. 
Prospective industry also identified positive environmental factors. These included a good 
supply of affordable housing, the facilities of a well developed service centre in the 
modernised central area of Doncaster, and a good supply of land for industry. Available land 
included large areas, well located in relation to the motorway pattern planned for the mid-
1970s, and included a wide range of industrial premises especially on the Wheatley Hall 
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industrial estate (Appendix 8).100 Notably however, whilst the stock of factories was said to 
be of good quality, its quantity was seen as comparatively restricted as much of the available 
industrial land was owned by the National Coal Board. Although the local Coal Board was 
prepared to sell land for factory development this was not without conditions. For example, in 
the case of possible factory development on the Broomhouse Lane site at Edlington 
(Yorkshire Main), the Coal Board took active steps to prevent any new potential industries 
recruiting miners from the local colliery. Whilst the Board expressed a willingness to consider 
the sale of land, this would be based on the explicit understanding that any agreement must 
be based on two conditions. Firstly, and in order to retain its own workforce, any new 
industry must prioritize female employment. This condition followed an enthusiastic response 
in 1966 to the Coal Board's call for voluntary redundancy which resulted in local pits 
reporting a shortage of labour. Whilst this might be interpreted as a reflection of wider 
disillusionment amongst local miners it was also seen as an indicator that miners could only 
be attracted and retained in local collieries if their wives and children also had appropriate 
job opportunities (DG, 17/11/66). The second condition effectively gave the Coal Board veto 
powers over use of land and is illustrative of how dominant industries and employers are 
able to influence the nature of local economic trajectories. In a letter dated 13th June 1967 
and discussed at the Light Industry Committee of Doncaster's Rural District Council, the 
Coal Board stated with regard the potential use of the Broomhouse Lane site, that the 
Council should keep the Coal Board informed so that they might 'have the opportunity of 
making observations on any specific developments,.101 As the Coal Board Area Director, 
Peter Treselles stated, 'Yorkshire Main makes a great deal of money and obviously we have 
to protect our resources' (DG, 14/12/67). Negotiations between the Board, the Rural District 
Council and a number of prospective firms dragged on for over a year but would prove to be 
fruitless. The Area Estate Manager of the Board subsequently accepting that 'the difficulty 
100 The A1 (M) Doncaster By-Pass was opened in 1961. Work on the M18 began in 1967 and was completed in 1979. 
101 Doncaster Archives, RD/DON/2I17l1 Minute book: 687. 
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was probably the clause designed to ensure that the Board's capacity to recruit labour, was 
not seriously impaired.'102 
The influence of the Coal Board in this case is clear but its demands were never seriously 
challenged within the local council which tended to be dominated by mining interests. 
Committee minutes from the Rural District Council Light Industry Committee and 
subsequently the town's Industrial Development Committee show that between April 1967 
and April 1969 the issue of Broomhouse Lane site was a standing item on the agenda. They 
show that during this time the Coal Board's clauses were never challenged by the Council 
representatives with decisions deferred on more than one occasion. They also show that the 
Council could have exercised an option to purchase the land outright from the Coal Board 
thereby removing any restrictions on land usage but this option was only recommended in 
April 1969 by which time much of the interest in the site had gone. 103 
That this particular opportunity came at the time of the publication of the White Paper on 
Fuel Policy in 1967 is significant. The White Paper identified that the declining share of the 
energy market held by coal and the increasing need for mechanisation to reduce costs and 
increase productivity would result in a continuing and permanent decline in employment in 
the industry. In this regard it represents a critical juncture in Doncaster's subsequent 
economic trajectory. Whilst senior members from the Coal Board, such as Mr William 
Crookes, Director of the Purchasing and Stores Division acted as an unofficial ambassador 
for the town in its efforts to attract new industry (DG, 7/12/67), this clearly must not be at the 
expense of the interests of the Coal Board. In this regard its attitude seemed to be at 
variance with the attitude of other large employers, a tangible illustration that as long as the 
Coal Board remained a dominant player in local decision making, and irrespective of the 
longer term needs of the community, mining would remain a constant in any envisioned 
102 Doncaster Archives, DRDC Industrial Development Committee 9 April 1969, DRDC RD/DON/2/1711 
103 Doncaster Archives, DRDC RDIDON/17111 
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economic future.104 The prosperity of the town (and wider area), it continued to be argued, 
'had been built on coal and it can confidently continue to depend on coal' (Doncaster Official 
Guide, 1967/8, p. 45). 
Consideration of any genuinely alternative scenarios which for example included a post coal 
future for the town was left to the Gazette, which suggested that it was not 'too early to think 
about such a thing.' The newspapers support for the local mining industry had always been 
qualified by an overriding concern that coal might come to dominate the town rather than act 
as a magnet for newer industry, andlor as the basis for related business opportunities 
though diversification. Diversification opportunities extended to coal's legacy as well as to its 
principal product. The Gazette argued: 
Surface buildings would be fine for other use. Every pit is linked to a railway. Pits have more 
sidings than other industry. Every pit has an in-built power supply. In fact they could own a 
natural gas supply. The gas from several local pits has been drained off already and piped to 
Manvers Main carbonisation plant. In other pits it is piped to the surface and dispelled. This 
is a major selling factor (DG, 14/12/67). 
Unsurprisingly this particular campaign did not go without criticism particularly within the 
mining unions and mining-dominated Rural District Councils, whose gate keeping role 
cannot be underestimated when assessing the nature of economic decline. However the 
Gazette's campaign by highlighting the need for longer term local economic planning was as 
relevant to those immediately involved in the industry as it was to all other stakeholders. In 
planning for the demise of the coal industry the paper highlighted the possibility of 
diversification into alternative and emerging energy sectors. Crucially it also recognised the 
need for local authorities to be given early warning of planned closure so as to give them 
104 Minutes from the DRDC Light Industry Committee show that access to land owned by British Rail for example, whilst often 
the subject of protracted negotiat!o~ did not include the 'red lines' introduced by the Coal Board in the Broomfield House Lane 
site example. There were other Similar cases at thiS bme, for example access to land and bUildin~ owned by Pilkington Brother 
Limited, were offered up willingly in support of the local council efforts to attract new industry. 15 h November 1967. Doncaster 
Archives, RD/DONI Minute book: 694 
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time to attract and establish new business, and that any pit closure should guarantee work 
for redundant miners both in decommissioning, and also in the new factories. 
Image 
The town's Annual Guides provide an alternative, if not always objective perspective on the 
contingent nature of the town's locational advantages. Produced essentially as glossy 
marketing literature to promote a certain image of the town, the guides paint a picture of a 
modern town within a rural and historical setting. References to industry, and certainly coal 
mining, are more implicit than explicit with coalmining not included as a Doncaster industry 
until the 1967/8 Guide, and this inclusion the result of the Coal House development in the 
town centre. However a careful reading of these documents provides insight into the town's 
sense of identity. The 1951 Guide introduces the town thus: 
'From certain aspects, Doncaster would barely appear to be a thriving centre of a large 
industrial area. So pleasant it seems with its tree lined roads and open spaces - Its 
industries are mainly placed on the Western fringes of town, away from its residential areas' 
This image is maintained throughout the decade as the Guide's author continues his journey 
into the town from the north, down the Great North Road, past the racecourse and 
Bessacarr, entering the town through Bennetthorpe. By avoiding other routes in to the town, 
the guides were able to carefully avert the reader's eye from what was clearly perceived to 
be the less attractive aspects of the town. Some of these aspects, particularly the numerous 
mining spoil tips and derelict sites were identified as inhibitors to the town's policy of 
attracting new business (DEA, 1969). The changing physical environment also became an 
issue of some concern to the town's residents. A survey of the local population in 1972 found 
that 79% of respondents were in favour of doing more to improve the appearance of spoil 
tips. Efforts were made by the local council to address this problem but their endeavours 
were often contingent on the support of the Coal Board whose action was also contingent to 
a degree on wider institutional considerations. For example, Doncaster council offered to 
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move waste from Cadeby Colliery to use as in-fill at Doncaster Carr, but this suggestion was 
blocked by the Coal Board which was concerned that independent action on behalf of the 
local council would hinder their efforts to access government subsidies to deal with spoil tips 
(Don caster Civic Trust Newsletter, June, 1972).105 The town's inability to address the more 
observable aspects of its mining image had a direct effect on its success in attracting new 
business and employees, as well as preventing migration. The Doncaster Gazette reported 
on a John Moorhouse, a linotype operator who having recently returned from Australia said 
he would not be staying in 'dirty Doncaster' (DG. 14/12/67). A negative attitude towards the 
coal industry might be expected within the town, but it was also not unheard of in the 
surrounding mining villages. A representative of a group of Haworth residents who 
campaigned to change the name of their street from Colliery Street told the Doncaster 
Gazette 'we are not rough miners' (DG,7/12/67). 'Rough miners' might have been extended 
as a metaphor for the growing militancy associated with local NUM officials in the Doncaster 
coalfield and which would become a key factor in the town's external image. However for 
much of the period Doncaster miners were considered to be moderate. At one meeting at 
Thorne Colliery in February 1955, Aneurin Bevan 'chided the local miners for their right wing 
conservatism' (DG, 10/2.155).106 
Skills and employment 
Table 4:18 shows that a significant advantage of the town as a location was the availability 
of labour. It had been noted that young workers in particular had a fine reputation with 
incoming industries particularly due to their adaptability (DEP, 6/1/1969).107 However, two 
related trends threatened to undermine this advantage. Firstly, employment opportunities for 
105 Additional money was subsequently found for reclamation schemes for disused collieries and spoil heaps (Official 
Guide,1976) c 
106 Although Bevan's comment was more broadly addressed to young miners In general and the issue raised in particular within 
the context of miners implicit support for the introduction of charges in the NHS (OG, 10/2/55). At the same meeting in Thorne. 
Alf Cox the Thorne Colliery Branch Secretary reminded Bevan that he was amongst some of the 'most militant miners In the 
country' 
101 Ooncaster between the years 1951-66, was identified has having a young population with 62% under the age of 40, 
compared with the GB average of 57.5% (OEA, 1969). 
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Doncaster's school-leavers were limited both in quantity and variety, and secondly a low skill 
trajectory was developing. Both trends had been evident in pre-war Doncaster but became 
marked during the post-war era. As the discussion above shows, coal was clearly not 
embedded at this time in all aspects of local life, nor was mining the career choice of 
Doncaster's youth. Whilst mining had become increasingly mechanised offering a higher 
proportion of jobs of an electrical or mechanical type, and promised potentially higher 
earnings, nevertheless Doncaster school leavers preferred a career in engineering. The 
1955 Doncaster Youth Employment Sub Committee Report for example showed that of the 
651 boys placed in jobs in that year, 111 boys were going into this trade. Whilst the service 
sector provided two-thirds of all jobs for women in the area by 1967, the Doncaster Youth 
Employment Sub Committee report also found that the preferred career option for local girls 
in 1955 was also manufacturing, with 431 out of 1,041 going into that sector. 108 However, the 
high demand for jobs in engineering could not be met, a fact also evident in the number of 
applicants for places as electricians, plumbers and other trades which were also found to be 
oversubscribed. 
Whilst Doncaster's youth had been identified as an advantage, there was evidence at this 
time that the town's skill base was not matching the wider economic realities of the time, but 
instead it was becoming locked in to a low skill trajectory threatening future economic 
competitiveness. As early as 1955 the Doncaster Youth Employment Sub Committee Annual 
Report identified a shortage of skilled workers in the town, particularly within emergent 
sectors. For example skill shortages were reported in the growing radio and TV industry 
(DG, 27/1/55), a factor which might help explain the decline in the numbers of related 
businesses registered in the town's Business Directories during this period. In 1936 there 
were thirteen radio and TV engineers registered, in 1957 this had risen to twenty three, but 
108 The report also identified significant numbers of girls going into distribution, especially Into drapery. 
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the number registered had decreased to nineteen by 1967.109 Skill shortages were 
particularly evident in managerial, professional and white collar jobs, a shortage earlier 
attributed in part to the town's poor housing mix. Table 4:19 shows the small proportions in 
the managerial and professional categories in comparison with the region, and particularly 
England and Wales. 11o 
Table 4:19 • Employment by job category (males) 1966 
Numbers occupied in each category 
per 1000 occupied male population 
1966 
Doncaster Yorkshire and England and Humberside Wales 
Managerial, Professional 90 129 152 
Skilled manual and own account workers 415 415 383 
Non manual workers 123 142 170 
Personal service, semi skilled and agricultural 265 205 178 
Unskilled 70 89 83 
Armed forces 37 21 36 
Total 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Based on the 1961 Census and published DEA, 1969 
A low skill trajectory should not however be seen as an indicator of poor educational levels 
amongst Doncaster school leavers but more a reflection of the nature of the local economy. 
Studies show that central Doncaster maintained its position in the top ten County Boroughs 
with the highest proportion of young people staying on at school. A proportion found to be 
well above the national average (DEA, 1969). The contrast with the surrounding pit villages 
in this regard is stark. Where the area as a whole is considered, a higher proportion of 
children with an IQ of over 130 were admitted to Grammar schools in the Doncaster coalfield 
,ca Doncaster Yearbook and Street Directory 1936. Doncaster Directory 1957, Blair's County Borough of Doncaster Directory 
1967. 
110 The town's record in attracting professional workers compared unfavourably with other regions. The West Midlands for 
example had been more successful than Yorkshire in attracting Finance and Banking, Professional and Scientific Services and 
public Administration (DEA, 1969). 
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area than in the rest of the West Riding, but only 1 % of these children went on to university. 
The overall percentage of pupils in the area staying at school beyond GCE's was also low 
compared with the national average. In the UK as a whole, 50.7% left school at age fifteen, 
whilst in the area the figure was 60.6%. Poor progression is also evident in Table 4:20 which 
shows the proportion of students completing further education. The number of Doncaster 
students completing study is considerably lower than both the region and the UK as a whole. 
Table 4:20 - Students completing further education in 1961 
Area Male % Female % 
Doncaster 4.8 4.6 
Yorks/Humber 6.2 5.6 
England/Wales 9.2 B.B 
Source: based on 1961 census 
Low attainment and progression should not be seen as an indicator of declining investment 
levels in local education, again more a reflection on the nature of the local economy. By 
1964, the local authority had spent slightly under half of its total capital expenditure since the 
war on schools (Barber, 2007). In 1971 Doncaster spent £121 per primary pupil (£5 above 
average), and £223 per secondary pupil (£12 above average). In terms of capitation 
(equipment) allowances were also high when compared with the West Riding (Pratt et ai, 
1973). One comparative study concluded that there was no lack of local talent, nor evidence 
of an anti-educational culture within the wider coalfield (Barrett Brown, 1967). Rather there 
was a 'big waste of pupil's ability' due to the yawning gap between educational achievement 
and job opportunities (YHS 1958-61). 
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Table 4:21 - Unemployment by age group, 1967 (%) 
Males Females 
Area 20 and 40 and 20 and 40 and Under 20 Under 20 
under 40 over under 40 over 
Doncaster 13 44 43 35 37 28 
Yorkshire and Humberside 10 40 50 28 35 37 
Great Britain 10 40 50 24 41 35 
Source: DEA (1969) 
Unemployment in the town grew steadily during the 1960's. Table 4:21 shows that this was a 
particular problem amongst the young people who had previously been identified as one of 
the town's key assets. As the Doncaster Evening Post suggested, the central and immediate 
problem for the area, was at the same time viewed as its greatest opportunity - the growing 
pool of young labour (DEP,13/8/69). Table 4:21 shows unemployment amongst women 
under 20 to be particularly acute and reflects the dominance of large manufacturing firms 
and the coal industry. By 1967 there were on average three unemployed women for every 
vacancy in the Doncaster area whereas nationally there were generally more female 
vacancies than unemployed (DEA, 1969). The lack of local job opportunities forced women 
to look for work outside the area. It was estimated that four hundred women travelled out of 
the area every day to places as far away as York, Bradford and Halifax, to work in a variety 
of industries which included motor vehicles, food, and woollen and worsted (DEA, 1969). 
4.3.9 Dominance and lock in 
By 1967 the picture painted by indicators as diverse as census returns and annual guides 
remained one of a town with a diversified economic base. What is not immediately evident 
from these sources however, is the increasingly vulnerable nature of the local economy. In 
particular the extent to which the town had come to be dominated by a small number of large 
firms. By 1967, for example 60% of all manufacturing employment was provided by eight 
firms, and 83% was accounted for by twenty one establishments with 250 or more 
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employees. These firms were a key factor behind the wide fluctuations in employment in the 
manufacturing sector despite the diversity of industries represented locally. For example 
whilst employment in engineering and electrical goods increased by 91 %, this expansion, 
the largest in the manufacturing sector, was due to increases in a number of small and 
medium sized establishments, a number of the more significant of which had established 
themselves in premises vacated by other firms. In comparison, vehicles, the area's largest 
manufacturing order, was the only order in this sector to show a substantial reduction, falling 
by 39%. This reduction was due to a decline in numbers employed by British Rail, and the 
closure of the Briggs Ford plant. 
It was noted earlier that whilst local agency can be identified as a determinant factor in the 
nature of the town's economic development path before the 1930's, from this decade 
onwards a more active state role through formal regional planning began to reduce the 
significance of local agency. The loss of employment in the town's railway and car industry 
provides two examples of how government policy affected the development path of 
Doncaster during the 1960's. In the case of the railways, reduction in employment followed 
the publication of the two-part report The Reshaping of the British Railways (BRB, 1963). 
Known as the Beeching Report after its author it resulted in massive cuts in the country's 
railway network. In the case of the car industry Doncaster had initially benefited from the 
wartime dispersal of industry when one of the plants of Dagenham based Briggs Motor 
Bodies, now converted to wartime production, was relocated to part of the LNER wagon 
Works at Carr Hill in 1940. Production of military aircraft parts ceased in 1945, but the firm 
remained there, producing car components for the Ford Motor Company which took over the 
firm in 1953, and Carr Hill went on to become an assembly plant for the Ford Popular. 
However Briggs, which along with other local motoring and engineering firms had previously 
been hit by the impact of petrol rationing caused by the 1956 Suez crisis,111 was closed 
", During 1956 many of the problems within the local motor and engineering Industries were due to petrol rationing which had 
been caused by the Suez crisis. The likely consequences of British intervention given the state of Arab nationalism at the time 
and the wider cold war context which meant that Britain (with France) would be isolated should not have come as a surprise to 
the British government were clearly foreseeable. Rationing subsequently led to a fall in demand at Brlggs, the town's principal 
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down when production was transferred to Liverpool in 1960 following regional policy 
inducements to support the development of a new Ford Plant at Halewood. This choice of 
location was in itself sub-optimal but further serves to highlight the diminishing level of local 
agency as pressure from multinational companies such as Ford also came to affect the 
nature of local and regional development paths (see Scott, 2009). The significance of the 
reduction in local employment in vehicle manufacture can be seen when compared to a 
national reduction of 5%, and just 2% in the region. The level of local vulnerability is also 
apparent when various inter-linkages and multiplier factors are considered. 
The extent to which existing, and in particular non indigenous businesses are embedded in 
the area, and make use of local suppliers has been identified as a key factor in reducing the 
negative effects associated with branch plant syndrome (Simmie et ai, 2008; Scott, 2009). 
The Doncaster Area Study published in 1969 highlighted the vulnerability of the local 
economy in this regard. Key findings from the study identified that only 10.4% (by value) of 
the listed materials purchased by Doncaster's eight dominant firms came from within the 
area. Imports provided 5.2% of purchased materials with about 84% coming from home 
suppliers, but which were located outside the area. The level of dependence on local 
supplies however varied between industries. ICI for example obtained 88% of its supplies 
from the local collieries. Similarly Pilkington's Glass used locally produced dolomite. 
However on the whole local linkages were of comparatively little importance. Pilkington 
Glass began running down its Kirk Sand all factory in 1967, preferring to concentrate its 
activity on its Lancashire plant (DG, 7/12/67). Another local study based on data drawn from 
a sample of the largest firms in Doncaster which together employed 14,000 workers, found 
that 67% of sales were in the home market although only 2% of these were in Doncaster 
itself. The remaining 33% of sales was accounted for by exports including substantial 
motor manufacturer. and resulted In the firm operating on a four day week from March 1956.111 The outlook was sufficiently 
bleak that three hundred of the firm's employees were expected to be laid off during the following year. Many other local 
businesses were struggling as a result of petrol rationing. The lack of clarity from national govemment regarding the decision of 
supplementary applications was also harming local business, with on this occasion 400 workers at John Fowley's engineering 
works placed on a four day week (DG. 20/12/56). 
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numbers of tractors and agricultural machinery manufactured at International Harvesters. 
The lack of a local industrial market was identified as of considerable importance by 
Rockware as it resulted in high distributions costs (DG, 7/12/67). Of equal concern was the 
fact that whilst firms expressed their satisfaction with research and development facilities 
and with technical information services in Doncaster, few actually carried out research and 
development in the town, suggesting a degree of local vulnerability to rapid technological 
changes. The degree of vulnerability was not solely an issue for the town's main 
manufacturers but equally relevant to the wider service sector whose growth was largely 
dependent on serving the needs of local industry and population. Any reduction in demand 
for labour by anyone of the town's main employers therefore was likely to have a 
pronounced effect on the local employment situation. 
4.3.10 Conclusion 
By the end of the 1960's Doncaster was described as a 'youthful, modern and dynamic area' 
(DEA, 1969, p.128). On the surface the economic infrastructure remained reasonably 
diverse, and certainly untypical of many coal dominated areas. Despite a gradual decline in 
the numbers employed in the local pits there appeared little sign of any major collapse in 
local employment. However, beneath the glossy rhetoric of the town's Official Guides, by 
1969 warning signs were clearly evident. What in 1950 had on the surface looked like a fairly 
balanced and diverse economy was by this date shown to be a precarious dependence on 
the commitment and fortunes of a few dominant employers in shrinking industrial sectors, 
including coal. Whilst fluctuations in unemployment in the area during the period 1957-67 
had broadly followed the regional and national pattern, there would be a marked 
deterioration from 1968 relative to both the regional and national economy. The deterioration 
was such that the Doncaster area had unemployment rates which were also slightly higher 
than the average for existing Development Areas. Despite this worrying economic outlook, 
the town was still found to have a competitive advantage in its geographic position, although 
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opportunities to utilise this advantage were not developed. The town was also found to have 
a young and adaptable workforce, although over time this advantage had become eroded 
and was by the end of the 1960's largely unskilled with many having been trained for 
employment in what was, even according to the National Coal Board, an industry in decline. 
This did not prevent the Coal Board from continuing to predict a 'very secure future' for 
mining in the area (Treselles in Doncaster Gazette looks at Doncaster, 1969). A number of 
options were considered to address the town's economic problems, one of which included 
encouraging travel to work outside of the town. However given the limited employment 
opportunities in the adjoining parts of the region this was not a viable option, raising fears of 
permanent migration particularly amongst the more highly skilled. 
Doncaster by 1969 was showing typical symptoms of branch plant syndrome with the local 
economy becoming increasingly vulnerable to market fluctuations, with low levels of local 
embeddedness amongst key employers, high levels of dependence, low levels of white 
collar and professional job opportunities, and reduced and narrowing skills levels. This was 
evident at the time and supports a conclusion that Doncaster's development path was not 
inexorable but better understood in terms of policy failings at multiple levels of decision-
making. 
In the previous period the lethargy of the local corporation was highlighted as a key factor in 
determining the economic trajectory of the town. In particular it was noted that the early 
years provided a window of locational opportunity when a more active industrial policy could 
have built on the advantages of the coal industry. Whilst greater levels of investment are 
evident during the post- war years the role played by the local authority again highlights 
failings at a local level, but it also shows how policy decisions can have both intended and 
unintended consequences. For example the decision to prioritise social housing in the early 
post-war years at the expense of larger and more expensive houses policy addressed a 
pressing social need, and along with similar investments in wider local infrastructure 
underpinned the successes of the building trade during this period. However the resultant 
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local housing mix would subsequently provide a barrier to the attraction of white collar 
professionals. However as with the inter-war period the extent of local agency was often 
limited. In some cases agency was contingent on local factors such as was evident in local 
political debates, but more significantly limited by external factors associated with wider 
regional and national considerations. The loss of Ford to Liverpool for example highlights 
how regional policy produces both winners and losers. In this specific case, having 
previously been a winner in 1940 with the wartime dispersal of industry, Doncaster became 
a loser. The actions of the Coal Board are also illustrative of the contingent nature of the 
town's trajectory at this time. The Coal Board continued to be an influential voice in the town 
but especially within the surrounding mining areas. Its role in determining the town's 
development path is best illustrated by its actions to minimise competition for local male 
labour, the majority of whom did not see mining as their preferred career. Whilst the Coal 
Board's actions might be considered as logical given the Coal Board's investment in the 
area, its actions were not in the best interests of the town in the longer term. The timing of 
this intervention is crucial, coming as it did at the same time as the publication of the 1967 
Energy White Paper. The White Paper planned for coal to have a declining share of the 
energy market, and was a policy supported by a broad political consensus all of which 
suggested an industry in decline. If this was the case, better to have acted at this juncture of 
the industry's development path in order to enable new skills and trajectories to be 
developed. Or alternatively act in a more entrepreneurial way and break the industry's 
narrow path by diversifying into other markets as was suggested by the Doncaster Gazette. 
The Gazette's proposal for pre-emptive action to create a new development path was not 
dissimilar to that contained in the Maclaurin Scheme published some thirty years earlier as it 
envisaged the utilisation of the 'unique' advantages that local colliery sites offered to 
diversify into new energy sources. Coming as it did after the publication of the Energy White 
Paper and linked to the town's strong communications base this could be considered as 
representing a critical juncture, providing an opportunity to review the town's economic 
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future, and where necessary realign local skills before the planned decline in the industry. 
However as was shown in Chapter 3 this was unlikely to be supported given that the State 
continued to view mining as a single product industry, which although in decline still offered 
profitable exploitation, and which was not encouraged to diversify in spite of any potential 
negative impacts on coal communities. The experiences of Doncaster during the period 
1946-1970 therefore are consistent with many other coal areas in that local development 
paths were largely determined by self-sustaining coalitions which in the case of Doncaster 
between these years was increasingly dominated at a state and Coal Board level. 
Two other significant developments should be mentioned as they highlight not only the 
changing nature of the town's economy but also suggest the possibility of a shift away from 
previous policy. Firstly, as local industry declined so the service sector grew in significance. 
This was particularly evident in public sector employment as government sought to intervene 
to mitigate the impact of retrenchment in traditional industry. However the wisdom of this 
policy has been challenged in terms of stage of production and was contingent on the 
existence of political consensus over the merits of a mixed economy. Growth in the wider 
service sector was also evident although much of this growth was dependent upon local 
wage levels, which had been bolstered for much of the period by increased productivity 
levels at the local collieries. Also options for future economic growth continued to be based 
principally on what had been the basis of regional policy throughout the century, that of 
attracting new industries to settle in the area's industrial locations. Nevertheless for the first 
time in local publications there was an additional reference to economic strategies based 
upon self help, on the need to build small industrial units at low rent, with a view to 
supporting the possibility of developing indigenous new local enterprises (DEA, 1969). 
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4.4 Decline 1971-2000 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The developing problems in the Doncaster area economy had been acknowledged outside 
of the town and in 1970 the area was granted Intermediate Development Area Status, which 
offered government grants for industry, training schemes and support for the clearance of 
areas of dereliction. However any competitive advantage offered by this status was diluted 
as the policy was subsequently extended to other neighbouring areas. The publication of the 
Plan for Coal in 1974 held out the prospect of a more secure future for the local mining 
industry, but this would prove to be a false dawn as the return of the Conservatives heralded 
a more radical shift in attitude to the industry and would result in the closure of the deep coal 
mining industry in the UK. The election of the Thatcher government in 1979 represented a 
critical juncture not just for the history of the UK coal industry but also for the economic 
development trajectory of Doncaster. The pit closure programme coincided with an equally 
dramatic decline in the towns other dominant industrial employers and provided a 'perfect 
storm' challenge for local policy-makers. Faced by declining levels of employment and local 
affluence Doncaster attempted to realign its development path towards an enterprise 
economy typified by sustainable small and medium sized businesses. By the end of the 
century there was little evidence that the town had been successful in this objective. Coal 
and the legacies of coal were subsequently identified as a key determinant in what has 
variously been described as a lack of local entrepreneurial spirit (Fothergill, 1992), or 
cognitive lock-in (Hudson, 2005) and has subsequently been used to explain in part the low 
new firm formation rates in coal areas. This section explores the impact of coal on the town 
between 1970 and 2000 and assesses the industry's role in the town's subsequent 
economic decline. In particular it assesses the extent to which the town's relationship with 
mining by this date had established processes which were inexorable or whether the town's 
subsequent development path was contingent upon ill thought-through policy measures. 
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4.4.2 Gathering storm 
It had been a constant argument within the corridors of local government that firms were 
turning away from Doncaster because there were too few local inducements in comparison 
with other areas, and demands were made for an unequivocal council policy statement 
giving priority to industrial development. The town's Development Officer, Gilbert Johnson, 
faced by a mounting unemployment problem and a shortage of money thought that the town 
would be able to use its newly acquired Intermediate Development Area status as some sort 
of competitive advantage in its efforts to attract new industry to the town (DEP, 30/8171). 
However when the Hunt Report, published in 1969, also recommended that this status be 
offered to Leeds and Sheffield, as well as much of Lancashire, this hope was ended. In his 
annual report to the council, Johnson now placed the town's future prosperity in the hands of 
the government's new regional development boards (DEP, 25/3/72). 
The Hunt Report, had identified South Yorkshire and Humberside as one of two regions (the 
other being the North West), which needed massive assistance. In relation to mining it had 
predicted a fall in employment in the local industry from 100,000 in 1965 to 42,000 in 1975. 
The report however, whilst recognising the problems associated with declining local 
employment in the collieries, singled out Doncaster as a growth zone and one of the three 
locations with the potential for accelerated industrial growth. 112 Growth zones were defined 
at the time as areas which had: good communications (preferably access to the national 
motorway network); were large enough to support the full range of educational, social and 
cultural facilities; should provide technical education and training for skilled workers; contain 
sufficient industrial sites and room for urban expansion; offer a wide range of industrial and 
commercial services; and have an active and energetic local authority (Richardson, 1970). 
Hunt like previous reports chose to focus specifically on Doncaster's status as a nodal point, 
as did the local newspaper which suggested that it was as the last staging point for the 
112 The others were the south side of Leeds and Sheffield, Ellesmere Port, Warrington, Runcom, and the 
Preston/Leyland/Chorley area (Hunt Committee, 1969) 
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Humber ports for southern and midland traffic that future potential growth was foreseen 
(Doncaster looks into the 70's, 1969).113 As for how growth should be created, the Hunt 
Committee had nothing more revolutionary to suggest than the old policy of creating 
industrial districts (Richardson, 1970). 
The run up to the publication of the Hunt report witnessed a great deal of lobbying activity 
amongst the region's MPs, with the Yorkshire Labour MPs Group publishing a report on the 
'grey' areas of Yorkshire, warning of a need to diversify the area's industrial base. One of the 
report's authors George Darling, MP for Hillsborough, argued that there were too few of the 
more rapidly expanding modern science - based industries in the region for a properly 
balanced progressive economy, and echoing the complaint of Doncaster's Mayor forty years 
earlier, that government policy had effectively steered new firms away from the region and 
towards the Development Areas. The subsequent government rejection of the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Regional Strategic Review, which had demanded a radical review of regional 
priorities (Department of Environment, 1977) only served to fan the flames in this regard. 
The MP's report concluded that the region had only managed to maintain a relatively high 
level of employment through migration. The report therefore urged government to steer more 
new industry into the region whilst warning against the continuing drain of skilled workers 
and technicians to the West Midlands and the South East, and to a lesser degree the 
development areas (DEP, 21/2/69).114 The Doncaster District Development Council reported 
that whilst there had been a large number of outstanding development enquiries, particularly 
from foreign companies including Ford, these plans had been hit by a combination of 
external factors including the global recession, and the uncertainty regarding Britain's entry 
113 Twenty years later local entrepreneurs, such as Giles Hunter of COS Group remained convinced that his success to date 
was due to location (SY Industrial and Commercial Review, 28/4/88).113 
114 Doncaster, unlike other areas. did not have the advantages of Development Areas or Development District Status. But 
subsequently was designated an Objective 1 region for the 2000-2006 period and Is currently one of the 88 Neighbourhood 
Renewal Areas 
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to the Common Market (DEP, 25/8/71 ).115 Whilst one firm, Johnson's Air Fright, gambled on 
the UK's deliberations over entry to the European Community and located next to the town's 
airport expressing confidence that the local airport would be developed, opening up access 
to the Common Market, the broader international picture during the early 1970's looked less 
positive. In this regard the town's Development Officer, Gilbert Johnson's comments in the 
Doncaster Evening Post reflect a sense of powerlessness to affect the economic fortunes of 
the town, bemoaning the fact that not only had government policy effectively robbed the 
town of its one economic asset, that of intermediate area status, with the knock-on effect that 
potential and existing business were moving out of the town as they became eligible for 
development grant benefits in other regions,116 but also inflationary pressures caused by the 
global recession swallowed up his already limited development budget (DEP, 30/8/71). 
115 Committee papers of the Industrial Development Committee between April 1969 and December 1973 highlight the range of 
interest in developing or expanding business in the area. These include: Volkswagen. Coalite and Chemical Products Ltd. 
Bartol Plastic, Brook Motors. John Smedley. I & R Morley. J. Pullans & Sons, Hepworth Ceramics Ltd and Formica International 
Ltd. Doncaster Archives, RD/DON/2/171 
116 Industrial Development Committee 21/2/1972 RD.DON 2/171 
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Table 4:22 - Housing stock, 1991 
Housing 1991 Doncaster UA (%) GB 
High income families 0.1 9.9 
Suburban semis 7.4 11.0 
Blue collar owners 19.2 13.0 
Low rise council 32.5 14.4 
Council flats 3.9 6.8 
Victorian low status 18.2 9.4 
Town houses and flats 5.8 9.4 
Stylish singles 3.5 5.2 
Independent elders 6.5 7.4 
Mortgaged families 2.4 6.2 
Country dwellers 0.0 7.0 
Institutional areas 0.5 0.3 
Source: Hillier Parker, 1997 
Efforts were made by the local council to address issues and barriers highlighted in Hunt that 
it could affect. For example moves were made to improve the environment through 
reclamation schemes for disused collieries and spoil heaps (Official Guide, 1976), but wider 
environmental factors such as the poor housing mix (Table 4:22) and in particular the low 
density of high quality properties continued to hinder the town's efforts to attract new inward 
investment (Pieda, 1988). The town was also unsuccessful in addressing the town's growing 
militant image. 
The town's militant image was associated specifically with the two national miners' strikes of 
the early 1970's. These strikes had come after a long period of industrial calm and reflected 
a response to the threat of pit closure. The subsequent 'militant image' of local miners 
portrayed on television was reported in the local newspapers as frightening off potential 
businesses. One London firm, for example having watched television coverage of the 
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miners' strike, decided to look to Cornwall instead of Doncaster (DEP, 25/3n2). Whilst the 
South Yorkshire coalfield has often been perceived as a militant region, Yorkshire miners 
were in fact regarded as moderate for much of the post-war period (Taylor, 1984). The 
Yorkshire region of the NUM however was complex: controlled by conservative officials, 
whilst having a higher than average strike record. Much of the militant image was said to be 
due to 'firebrands' in the Doncaster panel of the NUM which "prided itself on its militant 
policies, and for initiating strike movements in the area" (Alien, 1981, p. 135). It was these 
'militant' branch officials that organised the strategy of roving pickets and who were to come 
to the forefront of national attention when leading the unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970. 
The perception of an 'enemy within' was promoted by the Doncaster Evening Post which 
warned its readers: 
Evidence is emerging of the part being played by outside extremists in fostering the spread 
of the unofficial pit strikes in Yorkshire ... it is not of course the first time that such elements 
have made use of industrial strife to further their sinister political aims ... there is already, it is 
claimed, a splinter group within the NUM dedicated to the spread of militancy, without regard 
for the consequences .. , the rank and file should beware of the insidious and unscrupulous 
propaganda now being aimed their way. 
Whilst an image of poor industrial relations would continue to hamper the town's efforts to 
attract new business, the reality was that prior to the strike wave of the late 1960's and 
1970's, Doncaster's industrial relations had been described as reasonably good (DEA, 
1969), with the record of stoppages in the area broadly in line with the rest of the region. And 
that other than the brief period around the miner's strike in the mid 1980's the town's 
industrial relations record continued to be reasonably good. 117 However the label had stuck 
117 An ACAS Survey, Working in Yorkshire and Humberside - a Review of the Industrial Relations Experience of Foreign 
Subsidiary Companies' undertaken in March 1987 survey found that twenty-three of the ninety-two companies reviewed had 
experienced some form of industrial action over the previous years, but that 99% of the same firms also stated that industrial 
relations were satisfactory or better, with 25% stating that they were excellent. Another local study also undertaken soon after 
the national miner'S strike found that contrary to their expectations, 44% of respondents indicated that industrial relations were 
not an issue of contention (Pieda, 1988). A similarly positive assessment was made a decade later with one survey showing 
that 77% of local managers working In the former South Yorkshire coalfield found that the area's economic competitiveness 
benefited from the current state of industrial relations (Bowes, 2000). 
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and three decades after the end of the miner's strike the militant image would continue to 
negatively affect the town's brand (Bowes, 2003; Begley et ai, 2005). 
Economic structure and dominance 
The inability of the town to attract new business meant that by the mid 1980's the local 
economy remained dependent upon a few large employers in what were now declining 
sectors. The growing dominance of these firms and sectors was evident in census data 
spanning both earlier periods. The extent to which sectoral dominance continued during this 
period can be illustrated by using Location Quotients (LQs). LQs express the percentage 
employment within an industry in an area, usually the country as a whole. The LQ can 
therefore be used as a measure of spatial concentration. A value of one indicates that the 
area in question has exactly the same proportion of its total employment within an industry 
as exists nationally. Values in excess of one indicate a concentration of industry and values 
less than one indicate under representation compared to the national average. 
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Table 4:23· Location quotients: Doncaster 1981 and 1984 
Category 1981 1984 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.51 0.65 
Coal extraction 14.89 14.85 
Mineral oil and natural gas extraction 0 0 
Mineral oil processing 1.18 1.09 
Nuclear fuel production 0 0 
Gas, electricity and water 1.17 1.29 
Extraction of other mineral ores 1.47 1.65 
Metal manufacture 1.03 2.74 
Manufacture of non metallic products 2.60 2.55 
Chemical industry 0.18 0.16 
Production of man made fibres 17.89 26.51 
Manufacture of metal goods 1.51 0.70 
Mechanical engineering 1.33 1.12 
Manufacture of office equipment 0.19 0.19 
Electrical and electronic engineering 0.53 0.52 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.07 0.11 
Shipbuilding and repairing 0.24 0.13 
Manufacture of aerospace and transport equipment 2.98 6.24 
Instrument engineering 0.03 0.20 
Food, drink and tobacco 0.74 0.59 
Textiles 0.34 0.12 
Leather, footwear and clothing 1.03 1.20 
Timber and furniture 1.18 1.40 
Paper, printing and publishing 0.22 0.15 
Other manufacturing 0.77 1.22 
Construction 0.72 0.63 
Wholesale distribution 0.51 0.61 
Retail distribution 1.00 1.05 
Hotels and catering 0.90 0.62 
Repair of consumer goods and vehicles 0.58 0.54 
Transport 1.22 1.24 
Telecommunications 0.47 0.52 
Insurance, banking and business services 0.38 0.46 
Public administration and defence 0.72 0.73 
Medical and other health services 0.80 0.90 
Other services n.e.s. 0.71 0.75 
Source: Census of EmploymentlPleda (1988) 
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Table 4:23 presents LQ's for the years 1981 and 1984, and provides a picture of the local 
economy just prior to the national miner's strike. Coal mining shows a particularly strong 
concentration representing almost fifteen times the levels of employment evident nationally. 
In this regard little had changed from the 1920's. This level of dominance would remain more 
or less constant even as the mining workforce declined over the course of the forthcoming 
decade (Pieda, 1988). Table 4:23 also provides information on the overall structure of the 
local economy and in particular other sectors where Doncaster was over-concentrated. 
Earlier census reports had shown high concentrations in trades associated with the railways. 
During the early 1980's concentrations were particularly evident in the man - made fibres 
sector which exceeded coal accounting for over 25% of local employment by 1984. The vast 
majority of this employment was still in ICI despite the firm having shed 64.4% of its 
workforce between 1971 and 1981 (Pieda, 1988). Over-concentration is also evident in a 
number of manufacturing sectors especially transport, and to a lesser degree in retail 
distribution. This sector continued to dominate in local business directories with 1,057 
registered in 1993 representing 50% of the total number of businesses registered. However, 
Table 4:24 shows that by 1993 only two retail businesses were large firms (over 250 
employees). 
Table 4:24 - Large firms, 1993 
Primary Manufacturing Retail Distltransport Public sector 
7 16 2 2 12 
Source: Doncaster Trade Directory 1993 
Table 4:25 extends the analysis of local economic vulnerability identifying those sectors 
which employed over one thousand workers, and which lost over 25 % of jobs between 1971 
and 1981. It shows that large jobs losses were estimated to continue over the period 1984 
t01988 and the sectors and companies where the greatest job losses were to be expected. 
Table 4:26 also shows the ultimate holding company and company location. This information 
can be used to understand levels of firm embeddedness in the area and supports earlier 
185 
analysis which showed local integration to be limited. Plastics are represented by three 
firms, Bartol, Polypipe and Rockware, with Polypipe Doncaster's only indigenous plastics 
firm at this time. Peglars, although originally founded in Doncaster was no longer 
independent having been taken over by the international conglomerate Tomkins. Bridon, and 
Mining Supplies (MS International) both originally started in Doncaster, and at this time 
remained independent. John Carr also started in the town. Whilst Doncaster had developed 
some successful indigenous industries, their success had meant that many of these had 
been acquired by other companies, which operated plants across a wider geographical area. 
The resultant loss of operating autonomy heightened the sense of local vulnerability to global 
trends. 
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Table 4:25 - Key sectors and key companies 1984-88 
Sector Empl Empl Empl Company Ultimate holding company Location I (1984) (1983/4) Est (1987/8) Est 
I 
Coal Extraction 15,324 15,000 7,500 British Coal British Coal 
Manuf. Non-melalic producls 2,491 1,000 1,000 Rockware Glass Lld Rockware Group PLC Northampton 
300 350 Pilkinglon Glass Lld Pilkington Bros Lld St Helens 
650 350 Bartol Lld Hepworth Ceramic Holdings PLC Sheffield 
Polypi pe PLC 
100 400 Polypipe Doncaster 
Tolal2050 Total 2100 
Prod.man-made fibres 1,299 1100 1250 ICI Fibres Lld ICI Lld 
Manuf. Metal goods 1016 1000 800 PeglarUd FH Tomkins PLC Wa Isa 11 
Mech. Engineering 3663 2000 1000 Bridon Bridon PLC Doncaster 
1100 1000 MS Intemational MS Industries PLC Doncaster 
Total 3100 Total 2000 
Manuf. Transport Equip 5690 2,500 2600 IH/Case Tenneco Corp USA 
3,000 750 BRElIRFS RFS Industries Doncaster 
Total 5,500 Total 3350 
Leather, Footwear & Clothing 1652 N/A 600 SR Gent SR Gent PLC 8amsley 
200 Two Steeples 
Total 800 
Timber & Furniture 1260 700 700 John Carr Group Rugby Portland Cement PLC Rugby 
Total 32,395 18,500 
--
--_. - -
--
--.-~ 
Source(s) Census of Employment, South Yorkshire Industrial & Commercial Directory (1984), Doncaster Business Directory (1987). 
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Table 4:26 also highlights those sectors were the town was under-represented. It shows that 
this tended to be in those new and emerging sectors considered important to future local 
economic competitiveness. For example, and despite the increase in the number of 
insurance, banking and business services businesses registered in the local trade directories 
(see appendix 12) table 4.23 shows it to be the most under-represented sector in the town 
(0.46). The latter finding is consistent with earlier and subsequent census data which shows 
Doncaster to be poorly represented in this sector compared to the national economy. Table 
4:26 and Table 4:27 show that despite Doncaster's manufacturing tradition it was also poorly 
represented in the high tech and high growth sectors in manufacturing, IT, electronics, or in 
tradeable services. Equally surprising was the limited sectoral emphasis in industries such 
as textiles and clothing, where the town had previously had concentrations, and where 
restructuring had been identified as providing development opportunities (Pieda, 1988). 
There is also limited evidence of development in distribution and warehousing, another 
sector where Doncaster had previously been identified as having a comparative competitive 
advantage. The decision in 1990 to locate the channel tunnel road-rail freight terminal in 
Doncaster altered this pattern and proved to be reasonably successful in attracting new 
business. However the local council's decision to close the town's airport in 1993 to make 
room for the Dome leisure facility provides a less positive example of a desire to extend the 
towns economic advantage as a nodal point at this time. 118 
Table 4:26· Employment in service sector: Comparison Doncaster and GB 1991(%) 
Service Sector Doncaster GB 
Distribution, hotel and catering 22.0 21.5 
Banking, finance and business services 6.3 12.1 
Other services 28.0 31.2 
Source: Hillier 1997 (based on 1991 Census) 
118 The more recent decision to bypass the town with the new high speed rail link may reverse this trend (See Department of 
Transport, 2006). 
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Table 4:27 • Sub sectors: Comparison Doncaster and GB 1991(%) 
High tech industries 7.2 16.2 
Retail distribution 11.4 10.7 
Source: Hillier 1997 (based on 1991 Census) 
4.4.3 Closure and decline - the perfect storm 
Despite the decline of the local mining industry from the late 1960's, the town would continue 
to remain heavily dependent upon employment in this sector. However, what had previously 
been a relative decline in mining employment became rapid between 1981 and 1992. Table 
4:28 shows that during this period four collieries were closed and the local industry lost 
11,037 employees, representing a reduction in manpower of 80%. Most of the Doncaster 
area pits closed during the 1990's, with only Rossington Colliery continuing to operate under 
private ownership, but with a vastly reduced workforce. 119 
Table 4:28 • Decline in employment in Doncaster collieries 1981·92 
Pit 1981 1984 1985 1986 1990 1991 1992 
Askern 1384 1434 1266 758 466 Closed 
Bentley 1299 1215 1022 880 605 630 654 
Brodsworth 2720 2650 1670 978 Closed 
Cadeby 1300 1186 325 Closed 
HatfieldfThorne 1870 1709 1352 1086 787 620 459 
Markham Main 1756 1450 1499 1348 738 736 730 
Rossington 1672 1580 1456 1177 766 820 873 
Yorks. Main 1752 1200 1424 Closed 
Total 13,753 12,424 10,046 6,227 3,362 2,806 2,716 
.. Source: Bf/tlsh Coal, 2002 
119 In 2000 Doncaster collierie~ had a .workforce of just 563. Source: The Coal Authority. Based on production and manpower 
returns for the 12 month penod ending March 2000. Accessed at http://www.coal.gov.uklmedia/E88/6A1Licensing-Mining-
production-Stalistics-1999-00-FY. pdf 
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The impact of the decline in local mining employment was compounded by the fact that the 
town's manufacturing industries also continued to shed jobs. This was particularly true of the 
railway industry with British Rail Engineering Ltd continuing to reduce the scale of its 
operations before putting much of its work out to private tender (The Engineer, 2511/90). 
Table 4:29 suggests that whilst severe, the decline of the local manufacturing sector 
between 1971 and 1991 was not so great in comparison with the wider national picture. 
However in Doncaster it was the timing and speed as well as the scale of contraction which 
was the significant factor and placed tremendous pressure on the local labour market's 
ability to absorb displaced workers. 
The service sector absorbed many of those displaced from the manufacturing industry and 
this sector grew to account for 56% of total employment by 1991, increasing to further 
represent 79% of total employment by 2004. Whilst the largest sector within services in 1991 
was in local government (31%) much of the new employment in the town was within the 
retail sector, which was dominated by small businesses suggesting at one level that the town 
was managing a successful structural realignment both sectorally and in terms of 
organizational size. However, the ability of the service sector as a whole to absorb displaced 
workers from declining local industry was dependent upon the scale of demand for jobs and 
by the nature of the various spending multipliers and inter-linkages. 
Table 4:29 - Employment by sector: Comparison Doncaster and GB 1971-91(%) 
Sector 1971 GB 1981 GB 1984 GB 1991 GB Doncaster Doncaster Doncaster Doncaster 
Primary 22 5 23 5 20 5 8.3 3.3 
Manufacturing 33 36 27 28 27 25 21.8 21.2 
Construction 5 6 4 5 3 5 7.4 4.5 
Services· 40 52 46 62 50 65 56.3 64.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
.. Source: Census of Employment m HillIer Parker (1997) 
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The extent to which government policy affected the nature of decline and the scale of the 
subsequent challenge to the Doncaster economy is most clearly evident in the management 
of the closure programme. The onus was on government to determine the pace of closure. 
The speed of contraction was unparalleled and led to a perfect storm in the local economy. 
Beyond direct job losses, closure can be further illustrated in that the knock on 'multiplier-
effect' of pit closure also ensured that jobs were lost elsewhere in the economy. Whilst the 
nature of inter-linkages is complicated with many local firms serving a number of customers 
and sectors,120 one obvious measure of extent and impact would be those businesses 
identifiable in the local directories which directly served the needs of the local coal industry. 
Table 4:30 shows the number of coalmining related businesses registered in the local trade 
directories over the course of the century. In total seventeen businesses were registered in 
the local business directories as directly related to the coal industry in 1900, this increased to 
forty five in 1936, and peaked at seventy four in 1967, before falling to seventeen in 1993. 
Table 4:30 - Mining related businesses registered in local business directories. All 
periods 
Type of business 1900 1936 1967 1993 
Mining engineers 2 5 7 0 
Mining machinery 0 0 7 7 
Colliery agent 2 3 0 0 
Chimney sweep 4 8 0 0 
Coal merchants/distributors 9 23 54 10 
Coal Factors 0 3 2 0 
Colliery furnishers 0 3 2 0 
Contractors 0 0 2 0 
Total 17 45 74 17 
Source: Local Business Dlfectones (all periods) 
120 Wild and Sykes Lld for example was a local ironmongers which had a fairly diverse customer based but which had started 
by supplying local c,ollieries. in 1913 .. Order books ~how that by 1990 the~ no longer supplied the coal industry but continued to 
supply the industry s first tl~r suppher~ Cementation and Green and Blngham. Order. also show that whilst they still had a 
diverse range of customers including brickworks, local manufacturers as well as domestic customers, they had become heavily 
dependent on large local firms. The firm closed in 1991. Doncaster Archives, DYIWILD. 
191 
Table 4:30 shows seven mining machinery companies were registered in both 1967 and 
1993.121 Of these, two firms were registered under this broad classification in both years: 
Don Valley Engineering and Green and Bingham Ltd. One other, Mining Supplies Ltd, whilst 
not registered under mining machinery in 1993 continued during this period. Mining Supplies 
Ltd, was also the only local firm registered as a main supplier to British Coal, and the only 
local member of the Association of British Mining Companies.122 In this respect the figure 
was low in comparison with neighbouring areas. Barnsley and Rotherham for example had 
four firms registered, and Sheffield had seven (Grundy-Warr,1989).123 Placed within the 
wider context of engineering in the town, the 1967 trade directory includes twenty seven 
categories of engineers accounting for 155 businesses.124 Engineering related to mining 
accounts for five of these categories; mining, structural, mechanical, coal preparations and 
consulting, and has a total of ten businesses registered. 125 As the coal industry declined, the 
extent of these firms' vulnerability depended upon their ability to diversify whether through 
product differentiation or new submarkets, and in particular the extent to which they could 
break any dependence on British Coal contracts. In 1987 British Coal was Mining Supplies 
Ltd's only customer (Grundy-Warr, 1989), yet Mining Supplies was able to survive through 
its subsidiary (also at the Carr Hill site) which designed and produced specialised products 
over a wide range of engineering.126 Similarly, Cementation Skanska built its business on 
90% sales in the UK but was able to diversify to focus on export markets. 127 However, most 
mining manufacturing firms (as in the UK as a whole) produced components specifically for 
121 Mining manufacturing is classified under mechanical engineering (SIC, 1980) and in 1967 local firms were, Blandford Gee 
Lld, Cardox (GB) Lld, Don Valley Engineering, Green and Bingham Ltd, Huwood Ltd, Mineral Wealth Ltd, Mining Supplies Lld 
(Nobel Division). In 1993, Action VulcaniSing Services, Camsar, Deeweld Mining, Don Valley Engineering Co Ltd, Green and 
Bingham Lld, MSI-Mech Construction Lld, Simon Macawber Ltd. (Blair's County Borough of Doncaster Directory, 1967; 
Doncaster Directory, 1993). 
122 Bridon Lld was also registered which manufactured ropes for use In mining. 
123 Based on a survey in 1987. 
124 largest entries are for, electrical engineers (28), civil engineers (17), heating engineers (16), and agricultural engineers (9) 
125 However one mining firm, Blandford Gee Lld is registered under three different categories. 
126 This firm at time of writing now Cresco Industrial Supplies Lld. 
127 By the tum of the century 87% of its business was overseas (DS, 3/6/2002). 
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the deep coal mining, and found it extremely difficult to diversify into other areas of mining, 
let alone entirely new markets. The result was that in Doncaster mining equipment 
manufacturers such as Green and Bingham declined alongside the local coal industry (DS, 
19/10/2000). 
In addition to mining engineering linkages in Doncaster, business directories also include 
registrations of coal related service-based businesses. Most of these businesses were 
registered in the distribution pages, and are typically smaller in size (see appendix 12). Table 
4:30 shows the range of businesses registered, which included coal merchants, coal 
furnishers, and chimney sweeps. As coal declined as the principal source of domestic 
energy so too did these service industries. Many of the coal merchants had built their 
businesses over at least one generation. The longest lasting family business registered was 
Appleyard which first appeared in the 1936 directory and again in 1993 (although in the latter 
entry it was registered as part of a merger, Appleyard and Lumb Ud). Another Mr J.G. Kelly 
had been operating in the town since 1940, and in his role as President of the Doncaster 
Coal Merchants Association, and subsequently a Member of Doncaster Action Group 
Committee to promote the sale of solid fuel (OG, 1970), argued strongly for his industry. 
Their efforts however would be in vain. Table 4:30 shows the rise and decline of the local 
coal merchant businesses in the town. It shows that the number of coal merchants increased 
steadily over the century reaching a peak in 1967 with fifty four businesses registered. By 
1993 this number had been reduced to ten. 
The challenges for those who were made redundant, and for the local economy in general 
was also compounded by the wider multiplier effect, with many local businesses in the 
service industries also reliant on the purchasing power of miners and their families, which in 
1988 was estimated to be worth £35 million (Pieda, 1988). Declining purchasing power was 
evident from the late 1960's in the increasing number of stores unoccupied in the town's two 
shopping centres (Doncaster looks in the 1970's, Nov, 1969), but the impact would be felt 
more acutely as pits began to close. The Doncaster Chamber of Commerce estimated that 
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pit closure would result in one in four businesses closing (DMBC, 1992) and by the end of 
the 1990's retail vacancy in the town remained high. The challenge for local retailers was 
compounded by the opening of the Meadowhall shopping mall which increased competition 
for what was an already dwindling customer base. Located between Rotherham and 
Sheffield, Meadowhall was able to draw on a marketing budget of £2.5 million (Williams, 
1991) and by the mid 1990's was estimated to have attracted 7% of Doncaster's retail trade 
(Hillier Parker, 1997). 
4.4.4 Response to decline: regional strategy and self employment 
Whilst the decline of the coal industry had been evident in the region since the mid 1960's, 
the speed of contraction in the region was unparalleled. In Doncaster the closure of almost 
the entire British Coal owned deep mining industry in and around the town occurred between 
the years 1985 and 1993. This sudden withdrawal compounded not just the problems for the 
wider economy but also the difficulties both for agencies seeking to promote economic 
regeneration, and also for all those who had been encouraged throughout the 1970's by 
Lord Robbens, then Chairman of the NCB, to think of mining as life-long, secure 
employment. Not only did this prove to be misplaced optimism, but the speed of job losses in 
mining combined with retrenchment within the town's big manufacturing firms meant that ex-
miners found themselves having to compete for alternative employment (with comparable 
wages) within a shrinking labour market. Opportunities for work were thus limited, but 
equally opportunities for sustainable self employment vastly reduced as unemployment 
reduced the economic viability of the local economy. Table 4:31 shows that unemployment 
within the area peaked in 1986 at 19.2% before slowly declining over the rest of the decade. 
Unemployment levels in the town began to rise again at the start of the 1990's and by May 
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1993, in the wake of further pit closures, peaked at 13.8%.128 This figure compared with 
9.9% for Yorkshire and Humberside and 9.7% nationally. 
Table 4:31 • Unemployment 1973 ·1999 
Year Doncaster % Year Doncaster % 
1973 5.3 1991 12.4 
1981 15.8 1992 13.0 
1983 16.7 1993 13.8 
1984 17.2 1994 12.9 
1985 18.0 1995 12.8 
1986 19.2 1996 12.4 
1987 18.3 1997 11.3 
1988 16.1 1998 9.1 
1989 13.1 1999 8.5 
1990 9.9 
.. Source: DMBC Unemployment StatIstIcs 1983-1994; 1991-1993; 1995-1999129 
The particular vulnerability of central wards of Doncaster is reflected in the change in the 
unemployment rate from 1981 to 1991 across the entire Doncaster area (see appendix 13). 
Unemployment rates during this period show that the greatest rate difference was not in the 
mining wards but in the urban centre of the town, reflecting the impact of decline in the local 
manufacturing as well as the coal industry. The Intake ward experienced the highest rate 
difference (+2.21%) with the other central wards of Town Field (+1.09%) and Wheatley 
(+1.29%) not far behind. The mining wards experienced lower rate increases with a number 
of mining wards, for example Askern (-0.75%), and Hatfield (-1.09%) actually reducing 
unemployment levels. The Armthorpe ward, which contained Markham Main Colliery, (and 
128 The closure programme in 1993 also coincided with the decision by the government to end the Urban Funding programme 
which had subsidised improvement in local shops. This decision hit the town's small building firms hard, (The Doncaster Star, 
7/1/93 
129 All statistiCS based on high point for unemployment in each year 
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which was drawn into Doncaster Central in 1983} also reduced its unemployment levels (-
0.43%). 
Unemployment also reflected the changing nature of the local labour market. By May 1994 
there were 16,711 registered unemployed of which 13,495 were male and 3,216 female 
(Employment Service in A Matter of Fact, 1994). With the decline of the large scale 
manufacturers in the town, many of the local manufacturing jobs were now in the female 
dominated sub sectors such as clothing, textiles and light engineering.130 The shift in the 
nature of the local labour market is reflected in the fact that unemployment was highest 
amongst the male skilled workforce, with Table 4:32 showing that a quarter of all 
unemployment claimants by October 1993 were identified as craft or related. A high level of 
unemployment is also evident amongst the unskilled. Full data on the extent of low skilled 
unemployment is not available as large numbers of ex-miners in particular are hidden from 
the analysis, with many ex-miners subsequently registering for incapacity benefits. 
Unemployment levels were lowest amongst management and the professions, which 
continued to reflect the general lack of management positions available within the town, and 
was a factor undermining the flexibility needed by inward investors (Regeneration Unit, 
1994). 
130 One of the towns successes was in attracting clothing manufacturers such as Stainforth Fashions Industries Ltd which In 
1982 employed 280 mostly women. Of the established manufacturing businesses in the town In the early 1980's seven 
employed predominately women; Stainforth Fashions Industries Ltd. Sainsbury Spillers Ltd. S. Par1linson and Sons. Freezing 
and Cold Store Services Lld. GEe Machines Lld. Crompton Par1linsons Lld. and S.R. Gent Ltd. 
196 
Table 4:32 - Claimants by skills category 1993 
SOC Major Groups % 
1 Managers & Administrators 4.1 
2 Professional Occupations 1.5 
3 Associated Professional & Technical 2.7 
4 Clerical & Related 8.5 
5 Craft & Related 24.9 
6 Personal & Protective Service 5.9 
7 Sales & Occupations 7.1 
8 Plant & Machine Operatives 12.7 
9 Other Occupations 27.8 
10 No Previous experience 4.8 
Source: Employment Service (Oct 1993) 
The experiences of those made redundant from Doncaster pits also follow similar patterns to 
those of miners in other regions. The difficulty in finding alternative work is reflected in the 
Table 4:33, and is based on the experiences of those made redundant at two of Doncaster's 
collieries: Markham Main and Brodsworth. Perhaps the most notable finding being the high 
percentage of ex-mineworkers who had temporarily or permanently left the labour market 
through long-term illness. This figure is particularly concerning given the mean ages of the 
redundant miners in this study were thirty nine and forty three respectively. This age profile 
is consistent with wider studies conducted by the Coalfield Communities Campaign which 
found that more than a fifth of those made redundant since the miners' strike 1984-85 were 
under the age of forty. Also significant was the high levels of prolonged unemployment after 
pit closures, again a common place finding within the coalfields. Those ex miners from 
Brodsworth that did find alternative work, other than those who returned to mining, reported 
similar problems to that of other ex-miners, that they were at least £ 100 per week worse off. 
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Table 4:33· Redundant miners experiences, 1993 
% 
Employed by British Coal 1.75 
Employed full-time elsewhere 26.9 
Employed part-time elsewhere 4.0 
Self-employed 2.85 
(Total employment) 35.6 
Further education part-time 1.45 
Further education full-time Nil 
Employment training full-time 3.56 
Employment training part-time Nil 
Long-term sick 20.85 
Unemployed 35.6 
Retired 1.25 
Other 0.7 
Total 100.1 
Number of respondents 246 
Source: Aggregated data taken from two of the local collieries, Markham Main and 
8rodsworth. Labour market status. July 1992-September 1993 and based on Turner & 
Gregory, 1995 
Table 4:33 also provides data on self employment amongst former miners. The severity of 
the recession in the 1970's had caused the local council to reassess its priorities away from 
traditional areas such as housing and other environmental services to unemployment and 
job creation. Whilst existing businesses remained central to local planning, the Labour-led 
local council (see appendix 14) also decided that there was a need to encourage alternative 
regenerative measures, which would include a greater reliance upon the growth of an 
indigenous small business sector. 
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4.4.5 Local enterprise strategy 
The town's indigenous small business strategy can be dated back to 1969, and focused at 
that time on the need to build low rent small industrial units to encourage business start ups. 
A decade later green shoots were being reported in the local press and there was some 
optimism that the town could create a new economic trajectory driven by new and 
indigenous small firm growth. Councillor Welsh, for example, the Labour Chairman of the 
town's Industrial Development Sub-Committee, reported on a well attended seminar at the 
Mansion House on 5th October where small firms were able to hear specialist speakers on 
subjects relating to starting up and expanding small firms (OG, 12/1977). By the end of the 
decade with the country entering a new political era, a new spirit and lexicon emerged and 
entered the local economic vernacular. Mr W. Jackson, the local council's Chief Executive, 
was quick to recognise the shift in political mood stating that the town's future must be 
aligned with a 'more entrepreneurial direction' (Doncaster Digest, 1979). Specifically these 
statements meant that smaller businesses would be encouraged alongside a continued 
focus on growing the local service sector - particularly tourism. 
Increased support for small businesses was not perceived as presenting any real problems 
as a more entrepreneurial direction was said to fit well with what was described as, 'a degree 
of self help which has always been a feature of the district' (European Industrial and 
Commercial Review, 1976). The town's guide of the same year referred to Ooncaster's long 
tradition of adapting to change. This theme was developed in a chapter entitled 'Heritage 
and Enterprise', and drew its inspiration from the success of the local coal industry and its 
related tradition of inward migration. It stated that the 'backbone of the population comes 
from pioneering stock supremely capable of turning the geology of the area to economic 
advantage' (1976, p.59). 
Having harked back to a previous era for inspiration, culture change was associated with the 
future and therefore considered relevant for local education policy. The emergent 
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entrepreneurial spirit was the subject of a meeting of the Doncaster School's and Employer's 
Association, in which the audience was told that young people should be given more 
information and advice about self employment. Whilst this might have seemed improbable 
given that British Coal provided the Chair for this Association until 1989 (ICE, 1989), the 
subsequent scale of the contraction in the coal industry had led to the establishment of 
British Coal Enterprise (BCE) in 1984. Given the rising levels of unemployment in the town, 
BCE was one of a number of agencies established with responsibility for implementing 
government enterprise policy. BCE included as part of its expanding remit, the training and 
financial support for new start up businesses. By 1993, enterprise development had become 
central to the Doncaster partnership agenda. The town subsequently appointed a Young 
Enterprise Development Manager with a remit to promote enterprise generally, and Young 
Enterprise within schools in particular, with the latter initiative resulting in a 65% increase in 
participation rates, with 240 pupils accessing the scheme in 1993/4 (Barnsley and Ooncaster 
TEC, 1994). Further signs of an emergent enterprise culture were identified with increased 
demand from nascent entrepreneurs reported within the town. Representatives of the 
Ooncaster Business Advice Centre (OonBAC) and another local training and support 
company, Instant Muscle, informed one meeting that there was no shortage of people 
coming forward. In fact the speakers had to devote considerable effort to ensure that would-
be entrepreneurs did not let their enthusiasm run away with them (ICE, 1987). 
In the wake of the pit closure programme there was also no shortage of money available to 
meet the demand. Over £14 million of government money was pledged to help the town, and 
a raft of training schemes offered to redundant miners in the wake of the pit closure 
programme announced in 1992. Financial assistance was not restricted to redundant miners, 
with BCE offering funding to both new businesses and to existing local businesses wishing 
to expand. The Bounty Scheme for example offered a £400 one-off payment to companies 
willing to employ an ex-miner (OS 1/10/93). BCE reported that this scheme was responsible 
for the employment of more than 700 ex-miners from Markham Main (OS 5/4/93). Funding 
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was also available through BCE for British businesses wishing to diversify, expand or locate 
in coal areas, as well as overseas companies seeking to locate in Britain. The BCE 'plus' 
loan scheme to help struggling SME's offered up to £25,000 per business and a further 
£5,000 per employee (DS, 7/5/93). 
This broader focus which went beyond the immediate needs of ex-miners had always been 
part of BCE's mission although its 'objectives and methods were varied and often 
misconstrued.' They were also often poorly communicated. The wider public impression 
BCE contend in their 1996 Annual Review, was that the company had been set up to 'find 
jobs for ex-miners, or to promote the establishment of new private business by redundant 
miners', and to 'only operate in those areas where the NCB intend to close future pits.' 
However, as early as 1986 BCE had announced 'support would be offered to viable 
business projects creating new jobs in mining communities'. The employment of ex-British 
Coal employees, whilst always gratifying, 'was not a precondition of assistance'. This 
broader focus was a de facto recognition of the limitations of the 'enterprise' strategy, as 
BCE did not expect any significant demand from older ex-miners either for the opportunity to 
start up their own businesses or even for new employment (Rees & Thomas, 1991). Rather: 
... the critical demand arises amongst the younger generations even those expecting to leave 
full-time education in the near future, who grew up in the coal mining communities believing 
that their future employment prospects lay either directly or indirectly in the local colliery, and 
who found the changes in the coal mining industry now meant that the employment 
opportunities were reduced. (British Coal Enterprise, 1985-6, p.4) 
The decision in October 1992 to close a further thirty-one pits placed even greater pressure 
on the local agencies including BCE to create new job opportunities. As with earlier attempts 
to generate jobs, BCE schemes largely supported the establishment of sole traders. BCE's 
Annual Review for the year 1987/88 reported that 71% of all loans had been for amounts 
less than £15,000 and 93% for less than £50,000 (BCE, 1988). In the financial year 1992/3, 
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59% of loans were awarded to new businesses. Small loans were typical across all other 
local support agencies. Instant Muscle offered interest-free loans of up to £1,000 to enable 
its clients (usually 18-30 year olds) to qualify for the government's Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme. DonBAC's 1992 Annual Report shows that its loans ranged from £5,000 to £50,000 
(DonBAC, 1992). Faced by a deepening national recession, speed became a key 
determinant in the application process. BCE's 'Fast Track' loan scheme was subsequently 
introduced offering gap funds up to £15,000 (later to become £25,000) and the guarantee of 
a decision to applicants within twenty-one working days of receipt of a business plan (BCE, 
nd). 
The acute problems facing the Doncaster economy meant that speed and quantity were 
prioritised over a more strategic and careful process aimed at selecting and supporting 
businesses with growth potential. The nature of Doncaster's subsequent economic 
development therefore became contingent on a selection process that was largely 
indiscriminate but which would have negative longer term consequences for the nature of 
the local economy. Whilst the qualifying criteria for BCE loans was that 'the business should 
not displace jobs in other local businesses', many new firms that received subsidies from 
BCE and other agencies were often able to undercut and put their competitors out of 
business (Edwards, 1991). Whilst the company had an expressed aim to support businesses 
in the manufacturing sector, 40% of all businesses supported by BCE were in the service 
sector where displacement was typical. DonBAC, the town's principal enterprise agency was 
also complicit in this regard. It too had a stated mission to preserve and realign the town's 
traditional (manufacturing) skills but also failed in this regard. 131 Its 1992 Annual Report 
shows that it was in fact service based businesses which received the highest percentage of 
assistance (including financial assistance) from the local authority. Table 4:34 provides a 
breakdown of businesses supported between the years 1990 and 1992, and shows that 
131 This mission was evident for example in the Financial Assistance to Business scheme launched in 1986 which stated that 
DonBac would discriminate in favour of businesses engaged in manufacturing. Doncaster Archives, Financial ASSistance to 
Business in the Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Area, MBILEADI11109 
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while the numbers are representative of business in the town, the number of service based 
businesses supported by Donbac increased from 54% to 58% over these years. When 
services are combined with retail (another sector which tends to be based on micro 
businesses) this figure rises to 82% of all businesses. 
Table 4:34 - Businesses supported 1990-92 
Type of business 1990 1991 1992 
New businesses 3808 4669 5606 
Existing businesses 1003 1240 1503 
Total 4811 5909 7109 
Sector 
Manufacturing related 525 655 737 
Retail 1303 1516 1733 
Service 2619 3321 4090 
Other 364 417 549 
Source: Doncaster Busmess AdVIce Centre Annual Report 1992 
The town's development path from the late 1980's was therefore contingent on a local 
economic strategy which prioritised growing the service sector, particularly leisure and 
tourism, but which failed to take into consideration three key points. Firstly, as discussed 
above it was at variance with DonBAC and to a lesser degree BCE's 'stated' objective of 
maintaining and realigning the town's manufacturing skills base which the local directories 
(see appendix 12) show comprised of 172 businesses distributed across the three sectoral 
classifications. This number reflected 8% of all businesses registered. Appendix 12 also 
shows that manufacturing provided a constantly high number of businesses registered 
throughout, ranging between 8% and 13%. It was these sectors that provided the basis for 
newer and more sustainable economic trajectories. Doncaster's small business tradition in 
manufacturing was not dissimilar to that of Sheffield which maintained its long tradition of 
small scale manufacturing (Tweedale, 1995) and with which it has often been compared. 
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Whilst picking winners is not an exact science, a more disciplined focus on sectors which 
could build on but also develop the town's historic engineering skills offered greater potential 
for newer and sustainable economic trajectories. 
Secondly, the town's enterprise strategy failed to take into account the interrelationship 
between local services and the town's industrial sector. Whilst Doncaster's industrial sector 
was buoyant as had been the case for example during the 1950's and early 1960's, the 
town's service sector flourished. There were exceptions, such as the Doncaster Branch of 
Wilkinson Hardware Store Ltd which achieved a £2 million turnover in 1988, at a time when 
the town was experiencing 16% unemployment (Cuppleditch, 1998). However even this 
'anomaly' is probably a reflection of the economic problems in the town, with tighter 
household budgets and enforced leisure time resulting in more household DIY. Any threat to 
this local economic equilibrium was always going to be reflected across all local sectors. 
Between 1981 and 1984 for example, the local Food, Drink and Tobacco industry, and the 
Hotel and Catering industries lost 31 % and 26.7% respectively of its employment. These 
losses were directly related to a reduction in spending caused by the national miners' strike 
(Pieda, 1988). 
Thirdly, Doncaster's 'post-industrial' strategy appeared to ignore the fact that service based 
businesses tended to start small and remain small offering little by way of employment 
opportunities for the increasing number of unemployed in the town, and are more typically 
associated with high closure rates. Table 4:35 provides a summary of companies moving in 
to Doncaster in 1996 and shows that 90% of all new businesses that year were in the 
service sector. These businesses created 74% of the total jobs, compared with the new 
manufacturing business established during that year, which made up less than 10% of total 
business attracted to the town, but generated 26% of new jobs. 
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Table 4:35 - New businesses 1996 
Sector Number Jobs 
Manufacturing 7 248 
Service 13 79 
Retail 50 585 
Leisure 2 57 
Source: DMBC Inward Investment Untt 1996 
The result of the local enterprise strategy was that there were lots of new businesses started 
but a high proportion of which were crowded into businesses like fish and chip shops and 
hairdressers, which added little value to the well being of the local economy' (DS,1988). Net 
growth rates of registered businesses during the 1980's show that despite starting from a 
low base, Doncaster increased its number of new business at a higher proportion than both 
the region and the country as a whole. Table 4:36 shows that between 1981 and 1991 the 
town's net increase of VAT registered businesses was 33.9% against a UK figure of 28.4%. 
However, a substantial proportion of these businesses subsequently failed, with a total of 
90% of businesses in Doncaster de-registering over the course of the 1980's (Barnsley and 
Doncaster TEC, 1992). This trend continued into the 1990's. Table 4:37 shows for example 
that survival rates between 1993-1994 for new businesses were consistently lower for 
Doncaster (and Barnsley) than for Rotherham or Sheffield. This would continue into the new 
century. 
Table 4:36 - Net growth of VAT registered businesses 1981-1991 
1981 1991 % Change 
Doncaster 4,115 5,510 33.9 
Yorkshire and Humberside 105,157 127,495 21.2 
UK 1,336,700 1,716,299 28.4 
Source: NOM/S m GOYH (1999) 
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Table 4:37 - Business survival periods in South Yorkshire 1993-1994 
Survival Registration UK Barnsley/Ooncaster Rotherham Sheffield 
Period Year 
12 months 1993 84.3 81.3 85.8 87.0 
1994 85.3 81.5 84.5 85.2 
24 months 1993 68.5 64.5 67.9 70.5 
1994 69.8 65.6 71.9 69.4 
36 months 1993 57.0 51.4 54.5 58.1 
1994 59.2 54.4 60.0 58.2 
.. Source: Regional CompetitIVeness Indicators In GOYH (1999) 
Understanding the impact that mining had on the town's ability to succeed in the enterprise 
economy has been a key contribution of this study. Coal as discussed above has been 
associated with a number of unique legacies which make re-integration into a modern 
economy difficult, one of which was that coal areas lacked an entrepreneurial spirit with 
lower than average levels of indigenous SMEs (Fothergill, 1992). Doncaster has become 
one of the most 'business deprived' districts in England performing poorly in comparison to 
other areas across all traditional indicators of enterprise (IPPR, 2006). Was this due to a 
particular legacy of mining? The answer is yes and no. Yes where coalmining remained an 
undiversified industry which offered few opportunities to develop new internal capabilities 
and experiences. But no-where the assumption is that mining uniquely predisposed its 
employees to lack the confidence and drive often associated with starting a business. 
New firm formation across regions can be explained by differences in the regional 
composition of industries and by the differences in one particular industry in specific regions 
(Stam, 2010, p. 145). The latter would suggest that there are context-specific differences 
affecting entrepreneurship rates, while the former would indicate that the explanation should 
largely be sought in the specific industry structure of a region. Mining was one of a number 
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of dominant industries in Doncaster yet tends to be more regularly associated with limited 
spin off businesses and new firm formation rates. Industries differ in their degree of 
contestability (entry barriers) and the extent to which entrepreneurial opportunities emerge. 
The evidence shows that there were only isolated examples of local heroes spinning off 
enterprises from the local mining industry.132 Where business directories are accurate 
representations of the nature and structure of local economies, then there is evidence that 
there were few spin out opportunities available in the local mining industry. Appendix 12 
shows the number of coalmining related businesses registered in the local trade directories 
over the course of the century. It shows that the number of businesses in the power 
classification across the 20th century to be low compared with all classifications other than 
agriculture. This broad conclusion is supported by census data which in 1961 for example 
records fifty-five men registered as self employed in the mining industry. In 1981 this figure 
was twenty-three self employed in an industry which at the time employed over 28,000. 
However whilst few opportunities existed while the pits were open, even less were available 
once they were closed. 
Whereas the narrow economic trajectory pursued by British Coal ensured that the industry 
and its employees lacked many of skills, experiences and networks crucial to business 
formation, the resultant low new firm formation rates were not indicative of a lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit. There was some enthusiasm for entering self employment shown by a 
significant number of displaced Doncaster mineworkers. Of those made redundant from 
Markham Main colliery for example, 32% said that they intended to take steps to enter self 
employment (Turner 1993). A more recent local study found that more miners than had been 
predicted had considered self employment at one time (51%) (in Murray et ai, 2005). 
However, the majority of ex-mineworkers who did choose to start up in business were often 
132 One rare entry in the 1970 Annual Guide's was Mineral Wealth and Co. Ltd. which had been established in 1966 by Mr 
Derek Palm er. an ex-faceworker. and which specialised in the design. manufacture and repair of underground cutting 
equipment (DG. 30/11/67). Other examples ~ere Ciroreel Lt~ and Hydra Tools International. both of which prospered during 
the 1980's but like Mineral Wealth both had Bnltsh Coal as their key customer. 132 
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previously employed as electricians and fitters while at the pit (Murray et ai, 2005).133 For 
those without trades or newer skills the opportunities were less obvious. Here self 
employment was crowded into service and retail sectors which offered little sustainability. 
So whilst coal mining is clearly associated with strong cultures and legacies, the experience 
of Doncaster suggests that this does not extend to the lack of an entrepreneurial spirit. The 
inability of the town to regenerate through a small business led set of policy measures at this 
time is better understood as determined by declining levels of local affluence which reduced 
purchasing power. This has been shown to have been contingent on the manner with which 
the pit closure programme was managed and the subsequent regeneration measures 
introduced. Both of which were determined at a national level, but in the case of 
regeneration, implemented at a local level through a self sustaining coalition led by BCE but 
including the local authority and agencies such as Donbac. However the extent to which 
both local agencies were able to affect the nature of policy measures was limited by the 
need to compete for government funding. In the case of Donbac much of its funding came 
through BCE. In the case of the local authority, the fact that the town had been awarded 
Intermediate Area Status in the early 1970's meant that it could not attract automatic 
Regional Development Grants. It is possible therefore that potential inward investors 
screened Doncaster out as a result. This was certainly the impression amongst local 
authority at the time. This sense of powerless is also evident a decade later when the town 
failed to win Enterprise Zone status where neighbouring areas including Rotherham, 
Wakefield and Scunthorpe had been successful. These areas subsequently attracted firms 
which competed with Doncaster firms but on a subsidised basis.l34 This is not say that that 
the local authority and other agencies had no responsibility for the economic plight facing the 
133 One Local ex pit engineer, Russ Light. received national coverage after setting up a business building fold away aeroplanes 
(Daily Mail, 2/11/95) . . A~ with former steel workers, thes~ transferable skills offered opportunities outside of the mining industry, 
although not all ex mining craftsmen set up bUSinesses In related trades. Ken Savage, a former pit electrician, for example, set 
up China Vision, a china plates business (DEP 6/5193). 
134 In a letter dated 1113/1983 from Councillor Redmond Chief Executive of DMBC in response to Wakefield's proposed 
application of Enterprise Zone status he outlined the potential negative impact it would have on Carcroft Industrial Estate and 
on the retail areas of the north east of the town. Doncaster Archives. Ref. MB/LEAD/1/25. 
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town at the end of the century. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) had described the 
towns local authority as "being positive even though it is Labour controlled" (in Pieda, 1988, 
p.15) with a flexible attitude towards development, although its actions according to the 
Doncaster Chamber of Commerce came too late and then in "an opportunistic rather than 
strategic manner.· The Chamber of Commerce levelled similar criticisms at agencies such 
as BCE which they argued appeared "to take a fairly short term view" (in Pieda, 1988, p.31). 
4.4.6Conclusion 
During the period 1971-2000 Doncaster's economic vulnerability was exposed as being 
dependent upon a small number of large firms narrowly concentrated in declining sectors, 
which included coalmining. Whilst the local mining industry continued to decline, the town 
continued to remain heavily dependent upon employment in this sector. However, what had 
previously been a relative decline in mining employment, offering a window of opportunity to 
develop alternative employment, became rapid between 1981 and 1990, which offered 
none. This combined with an equally dramatic decline in the town's other major industrial 
employers provided a 'perfect storm' challenge for local policy- makers. Decline and the 
town's subsequent economic trajectory however was not inexorable nor determined by 
mining, as alternative paths were available, but these were not taken. It was therefore the 
timing and speed of decline which most clearly reveals the contingent nature of Doncaster's 
trajectory during the last two decades of the 20th century. 
The town's ability to deal with the challenges of a declining industrial base during this period 
is evident in the growing frustration and resignation of the town's Development Officer. The 
limit of his and local agency in general is evident in the town's powerlessness to compete 
with regional policy measures and to dispel the increasingly negative image associated with 
the local mining industry. The town's image problem remained significant throughout the 
period and remains the single most negative determinant of coalfield competitiveness. Whilst 
stubborn, the militant image was to a degree contingent on the way that public memory was 
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reinforced, and as was shown above largely associated with the national miner's strike 
rather than the experience of local employers, which was largely positive. Local agency was 
dealt a further blow by the election of the Conservative government in 1979. The election of 
the Thatcher government represents a critical juncture in both the history of the mining 
industry and the nature of Doncaster's economy from this time. It heralded a definitive shift in 
policy style of government, which has been described as marking a conscious attempt to 
move from a consensual to an impositional style of governing (Dudley & Richardson, 2000). 
In the case of mining this is evident in the manner in which the government prepared the 
industry for privatisation. Ignoring the merits of the economic case for pit closure, the shift in 
style is also evident in the manner with which closure was managed. The comparison with 
the German experience highlights the fact that the onus was on government to determine 
the pace of closure. The impact of closure was therefore largely contingent upon these 
policy choices. 
The contingent nature of decline is also evident in the policy response to the consequences 
of decline. The shift from the recommendations in the Hunt report to those policy measures 
encouraged as part of the Conservative governments 'enterprise crusade', represent a 
cognitive shift as increasingly market forces came to determine regional economic 
development paths. For local authorities the shift to the enterprise economy came as a 
shock. However engagement with this agenda at local level (whilst often tactical) is clear, 
and is a conclusion which challenges one of the key assumptions underpinning current 
explanations of spatial distribution of new firms, namely, that Labour-led local authorities 
would be less likely to support such a policy agenda (Keeble & Walker, 1994). In their efforts 
to shift the town's economic trajectory towards an enterprise economy they were supported 
by various enterprise agencies who offered what Macdonald and Coffield (1991, p. 80) have 
termed '''implied regional policy written small." At the centre of this self-sustaining coalition 
was British Coal who having previously supported the development of a narrow economic 
trajectory around large employers and narrow skill sets, and despite the decline in its 
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significance as an employer, remained a key local agent in determining Doncaster's post-
coal trajectory. 
However at a more fundamental level, regional policy during this period remained typified by 
continuity rather than change. By initially enforcing capacity cuts in preparation for 
privatisation which contributed to the decline in private sector business, and then opting to 
close pits so quickly rather than as part of a staged decline as had been the policy choice in 
Germany, the UK government effectively locked the area back into a narrow and ultimately 
unsustainable trajectory. In previous eras regional policy had focused on attracting inward 
investment and more latterly through the spatial distribution of public sector employment. 
Both of these approaches have subsequently been identified as reinforcing regional lock-in. 
Whilst the shift to a small business led regional development appears on the surface to mark 
a cognitive shift, it is better understood as further evidence of a cognitive lock at a policy 
level as it seeks to impose a national measure, whilst failing to consider sufficiently the wider 
impact on regions. A wide range of studies have challenged the view underpinning 
enterprise policy that entrepreneurship can play a significant role in reVitalising de-
industrialised regions (Benneworth, 2004; Troni & Kornblatt, 2006). They show consistently 
that sustainable small business economies are associated with areas with high levels of 
affluence, and a high proportion of skilled and professional workers. The timing and speed of 
decline ensured that Doncaster during the 1980's and 1990's experienced high levels of 
unemployment, and what skills had been developed over the course of the century were 
either inappropriate, or were gradually lost as the town shifted towards a service-based 
economy, which in turn ensured comparable wage levels were lower. The lack of job 
opportunities in the town's traditional sectors may well have served to 'push' unemployed 
workers eventually into self-employment. Even where this led to an increase in the number 
of businesses as had been the case nationally at this time, it was not indicative of an 
emergent enterprise culture. The section concluded by addressing the question does mining 
bequeath negative entrepreneurial legacy. Whilst the number of spin outs and level of self 
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employment within the local industry was low it should not be seen as an indication of a lack 
of entrepreneurial spirit amongst the town's miners, more a reflection of the skills, 
experience, and subsequently the opportunities, all of which have been shown to have been 
contingent on a failure of entrepreneurship at a corporate and government level. 
The decline of Doncaster's economy between 1970 and 2000 was therefore not associated 
with processes inexorably linked to mining but more the result of poor decisions across 
multiple levels of decision making. At a local level despite the rhetoric there was no 
concerted attempt to prioritise manufacturing, and despite the town's strong communications 
base there was little effort to capitalise on this advantage at this stage. However local efforts 
did not happen in a vacuum and must be understood as part of a reaction to the structural 
collapse brought about by a government which having rejected opportunities to diversify the 
industry into new sub markets in emerging sectors, also rejected the option to manage 
closure in a staged manner. The perfect storm that resulted therefore not only explains the 
nature of decline between these years but also the continuing local regeneration challenges. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The overall objective of this study was to explore the impact of coalmining on the town of 
Doncaster with a view to understanding the extent to which the legacy of the mining industry 
has inhibited the town's economic competitiveness in what is today called an enterprise 
economy. In this regard the study contributes to a wider understanding of the nature of 
change in old industrial regions. The study has placed the analysis within a conceptual 
framework which sought to determine the extent to which path contingency captures the 
transition from growth to decline in former industrial regions, more adequately than does that 
of path dependency (Hudson. 2005). It has made contributions to knowledge in two specific 
but related domains, these are: local history and regional policy. In order to meet the study's 
objectives an historical approach has been adopted which explored the impact of coal 
212 
across a range of socio-economic and political variables spanning the course of the 20th 
century. 
Given that coalmining is an extractive industry it has been argued, the decline and closure of 
particular collieries and the communities dependent upon them is an inevitable, if regrettable 
fact of life (Bennett et ai, 2000). Multiple generations over time it is argued are locked in to 
narrow patterns of production, leading to both an institutional and cognitive lock, and results 
in inappropriate attitudes, skills, networks and expectations, which make moving a regional 
economy onto a new and more promising developmental trajectory difficult. This is an 
accurate depiction of the experiences of most former coal areas. However, this study 
concludes that whilst the decline of coal as an energy source was in some ways determined 
by technological advances in new energy sources and more latterly environmental concerns, 
this did not need to signal the decline of the areas that had come to depend upon it. Even 
old industries such as coal mining provided the basis for diversification into new products 
and markets. Such cases of 'resurgent innovation' have been described as evidence of a 
phase of 'dematurity' (Storper, 1985). Processes of this sort would seem to fit a less 
deterministic development model in which an industry (and that part of a local or regional 
economy dependent upon it) undergoes radical adaption, in effect renewing (or extending) 
the industry's (regions) development path (Martin & Sunley, 2010). However, diversification 
is contingent on investment decisions through for example a continued commitment to both 
research and development, and the development and exploitation of internal competencies, 
and equally importantly a willingness to identify and grasp opportunities. Both of these 
particularly from the nationalised era were contingent on political will which was not 
forthcoming. It has been shown that possible new trajectories were available to the coal 
industry and a number of piecemeal initiatives were developed, but no political party was 
prepared to support diversification in any systematic way. Where this leadership was evident 
industrial cumulative innovation was possible, as was demonstrated in the case of Dutch 
State Mining. In the UK opportunities existed for example to diversify towards energy 
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conservation and renewable energy sources, but these opportunities were not pursued. That 
today British Coal tends to use former colliery sites for property development purposes is 
therefore both indicative and representative of the legacy of this institutional inertia. The 
study therefore also places this study within the wider context of British economic decline. In 
particular it supports but also updates the view that a lack of entrepreneurial leadership was 
endemic in the management of the UK mining industry. A central conclusion of the study 
therefore is that the nature of the UK coal industry's decline, and therefore any regional 
instituted legacies was contingent on human agency and not determined by the nature of its 
principal product. 
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5 Impact of mining on Doncaster 
The decline of coal mining has been considered within the context of the experiences of the 
town of Doncaster. Specifically this thesis has sought to contribute to a greater 
understanding of the role that coal mining played in determining the town's economic 
trajectory and subsequently its ability to compete in today's enterprise economy. The 
manner in which local economies develop lies somewhere on a continuum between 
accidental and random emergence and deliberate intended consequences (Meyer & 
Schubert, 2007), and therefore isolating and assessing the contribution of a single factor is 
not easy. For example Doncaster's economic development path over the course of the 20th 
century provided examples which span the entire breadth of this continuum. It has been 
shown that the town's development path over the course of the 20th century was contingent 
on a wide range of factors which ranged from acts of God, to the impact of globalisation, and 
the increasing levels of supranational decision making, and that decisions led to unintended 
as well as intended consequences. For example, the town became increasingly reliant upon 
a small number of dominant manufacturing firms, many of which were subsequently taken 
over by international firms increasing the town's vulnerability to global pressures. Similarly 
the town initially benefited from wartime dispersal of industry but became a regional policy 
'loser' when government provided incentives for Ford to move production to Liverpool. Whilst 
the above (both of which can be related to branch plant syndrome), were clearly contributory 
factors in Doncaster's subsequent economic decline, coalmining remains central to 
explanations of the nature of decline, and in particular its continued challenge to regenerate 
within the enterprise economy. 
The study has shown that a 'coal effect' can be identified across a number of local economic 
and socio-political indicators. It shows that like other coal areas, Doncaster over time 
suffered from a narrowing skills and employment base and high levels of migration, although 
this was more evident within the surrounding pit villages. The nature of the town - village 
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divide was not analysed in any depth, and is an area which needs further analysis, but the 
study has demonstrated clear differences were evident particularly in local politics which in 
Doncaster would remain representative of the wider interests in the town. The extent to 
which coal came to dominate the culture of the town is therefore moot, with most miners and 
their families preferring to live within the surrounding pit communities, only using the town for 
retail and leisure purposes. Nevertheless despite this the lasting legacy of coalmining on 
Doncaster has been its influence on the town's external image. The town's publicity 
materials managed over many years to hide the surrounding coalfield, but the town today 
remains strongly associated with mining. That this image is largely based on a misperception 
does not detract from the stubborn nature of this image which continues to inhibit economic 
development. It also tells us something about how regional brands are constructed around a 
historically based narrative but one which changes more slowly than the region itself. 
The study shows that Doncaster at no stage could be described as a typical coal town 
displaying some but not all of the characteristics associated with mining areas. The town for 
example maintained a relatively diverse economic infrastructure throughout the century with 
manufacturing remaining Doncaster's largest industrial sector. In fact Doncaster could better 
be described as it had been as early as 1912 as a railway town surrounded by a coalfield. If 
anything the coal industry enhanced the town's status as a transport nodal pOint in particular 
boosting the local railway industry. This factor alone distinguishes Doncaster from many 
other coal mining areas and provided the basis for economic competitive advantage which 
continues to this date. 
The study has shown nevertheless that over time the town's economic prosperity became 
over-reliant upon mining employment and related economic multipliers. One economic 
impact study found that by 1988, one fifth of all jobs in the Doncaster area were still in 
mining or quarrying - over ten times the national average. In the same year miners' spending 
in the town was estimated to be £35 million (Pieda, 1988). Whilst the town's overall 
economiC vulnerability was based on its dependence on a small number of large employers 
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in what would become shrinking economic sectors, one of which was the coal industry, it 
was however the dangers associated with mining's dominance which tended to be reported 
in the local newspapers. This concern was evident from the earliest days of the Doncaster 
coalfield. The Doncaster Gazette in particular maintained a consistent editorial line 
throughout the century which sought to impress upon local political and business leaders the 
need to use coal mining as a catalyst to attract new industry and to build a modern and 
diverse industrial infrastructure. Whilst coal attracted new business to the area it was never 
sufficient to address the concerns of the Gazette, nor was it comparable with the scale or 
type of business that had been attracted by the railways which had also been responsible for 
attracting additional investment, and provided the hub for subsequent engineering clustering, 
and developing engineering and draughtsman skills. Evidence from actual numbers of 
businesses started in the town suggest also that mining provided comparatively few spin-off 
or start-up opportunities, a factor which could be indicative of resilient local economies in the 
enterprise economy. 
5.1 Understanding the process of regional lock in 
Regional lock-in is a multi-scaled process, and one which also has a high degree of place-
dependence, but is in fact influenced and affected by both intra-regional and extra-regional 
factors. It is argued in this study that human agency within and between these levels is the 
key determining factor in understanding the nature of regional decline. Institutional inertia at 
both me so and macro level in particular was highlighted as a key factor in the coal industry's 
failure to diversify in to new or different markets. It has also shown through the case study of 
Doncaster that decisions at a micro level through local agency can also affect a town's 
development path. The town's engagement with the coal industry spanned the entire 20th 
century and during that time numerous impact indicators were evident. It is clear from the 
pages of the Doncaster Gazette that the town's decision makers were well aware of what the 
paper described as the 'peculiar problems' afforded by the growing dominance of the local 
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coal industry. They were also aware of the 'gathering storm' as the town became 
increasingly dependent upon a small number of large employers in what over the course of 
the century became declining sectors. Numerous opportunities existed to address these 
challenges and reduce if not break the town's dependency levels, suggesting therefore both 
forseeability and opportunity, supporting the overall conclusion that the nature of the town's 
decline was contingent on human agency. 
Understanding what factors drive policy decision-making needs further development, 
although there is a broad cross disciplinary consensus that policy makers are always likely to 
focus on their own career progression, which often results in short term popular decisions. 
These decisions mayor may not be in the best interests of a given area's future 
development path. Examples were highlighted at all levels of decision making. For example 
at a micro level the Doncaster Progressive Party's prioritisation of cheap rates during the 
Edwardian period was shown to be at the expense of necessary investment in the town's 
infrastructure, and came at a time when coal provided key locational advantages to new 
industry. A more industrialist policy was evident from the inter and post war years as local 
politics became dominated by the Labour Party. This did not however lead to a fundamental 
shift in the town's subsequent development path. The decision of Doncaster's labour 
controlled council to build council houses in the early post Second World War period for 
example, was shown to have resulted in a housing mix which subsequently acted as a 
deterrent to professional workers and inward investment. These two examples highlight how 
decisions can have both intended and unintended consequences, but also serve to illustrate 
how the processes of economic lock-in manifest themselves at a local level. Both had 
negative consequences for the town's subsequent development. 
The study has also shown however that local autonomy declined over time and in this regard 
it challenges the centrality of place in understanding the nature of regional trajectories. Two 
critical junctures can be identified in this study both of which resulted in an increasing role for 
the State in the subsequent determination of the town's developmental trajectory. The first 
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came with the emergence of regional policy from the 1930's, and the second with the 
nationalisation programme in the immediate post Second World War period. Local labour 
markets were often constituted to be dominated by a single industry, with government 
actively colluding in this process to ensure there was little by way of alternative employment. 
This was apparent during the inter-war years, with industry steered into the depressed 
regions, which perpetuated local economic vulnerability through branch plant syndrome, but 
was particularly evident after nationalisation when alternative male jobs were intentionally 
kept out of the coalfields. Hudson's (2005) assessment of industrial decline in the North East 
concluded that the State had a central role in determining a particular economic trajectory by 
creating and reinforcing lock-in to ensure path dependent development. This study builds on 
and extends this conclusion beyond a single region, highlighting ways in which government 
management of the coal industry and regional policy affected the development trajectory of 
Doncaster. It has shown that windows of opportunity were available when entrepreneurial 
action at both meso and macro levels could have enabled the town to develop new paths, for 
example at the time of the publication of the White Paper on energy in 1967, but shows that 
this and other opportunities were not taken. Conversely the Coal Board as a dominant actor 
in the local self-sustaining coalition actively constrained the town's ability to develop new 
opportunities. The disproportionate influence of the Coal Board in Doncaster ensured that as 
long as coal remained profitable the longer term interests of the town would be of secondary 
concern. Given that the Coal Board had social as well as economic obligations this 
represents a significant failure, and any resultant local instituted legacies should therefore be 
understood as contingent on a legacy of institutional or political lock-in. Hudson also argued 
that having locked the North East in to a narrow industrial trajectory the State subsequently 
sought to erode such lock-in to facilitate new developmental trajectories. This study extends 
this conclusion by highlighting how the manner by which the State chose to erode 
Doncaster's dependence on coal merely perpetuated the problem, limiting both the range of 
possibilities that may have lead to newer and more sustainable trajectories. In doing so it 
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shifts the focus of cognitive lock in from a place based phenomenon to an institutional 
phenomenon operating at national regional policy making level. 
Whilst pit closure on any scale did not occur in the Doncaster coalfield until the 1980's, the 
resultant speed of decline placed tremendous pressure on a local labour market which was 
also suffering similar levels of retrenchment amongst its main manufacturing employers. The 
timing and scale of unemployment caused by the closure programme rather than any 
particular dependence upon the coal industry therefore explains the nature of the problem 
facing the town during the 1980's and 1990's. It also explains the extent to which the town 
could realign its economic trajectory during these years. 
Government response to closure was to create new organisations to support regeneration, in 
itself an admission of the scale of the problems. One of these was British Coal Enterprise 
(BCE) whose influence in the town grew as local pits closed. Whilst not the sole regeneration 
measure, the local enterprise strategy focused on the encouragement of local people to start 
up businesses as regional policy shifted in the direction of market-based, indigenous 
solutions for regional problems. Evidence based on new firm formation rates in the town 
suggests that the town was making a successful transition onto an enterprise trajectory, but 
deeper analysis shows that this trajectory was based on low-value adding businesses within 
sectors typified by high failure rates. This is typical in regions suffering high levels of 
unemployment and declining levels of local affluence, but in Doncaster this did not have to 
be the case. Whilst local directories showed few mining-related businesses registered (a 
factor associated with sectoral inertia caused by institutional inertia rather than a cultural 
flaw), they also showed that Doncaster maintained a strong engineering and manufacturing 
tradition, which along with sectors which built on the town's connectivity such as logistics 
and distribution, provided the basis for more concerted and sustainable regeneration 
strategies. There was some recognition of this fact with BCE and other business support 
agencies having a strategic objective to maintain the town's manufacturing skills base whilst 
realigning the sector towards emergent technologies. However the scale of unemployment 
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caused by the pit closure programme and its wider multiplier effect placed greater pressure 
on what was already an inadequate resource and supported an untargeted approach to 
business support. This is not to say that the local decision makers were not complicit in this 
regard, as there is evidence that the town saw opportunities in enabling the development of 
a service-orientated economy. However faced by a perfect economic storm, which resulted 
in mass unemployment, speed was bound to become the key motivation behind action, as 
too was access to funding. The subsequent misalignment of the allocation of an admittedly 
scarce resource nevertheless provides an example of a short term fix where a more 
considered longer term strategy was required. If towns are going to shift onto to new, but 
sustainable development paths then early interventions which provide time are crucial. 
Doncaster's experiences during the 1980's and 1990's highlight the fundamental paradox of 
the enterprise strategy at this time. That is, it ignored the clear relationship that had existed 
between the local collieries (and manufacturing plant) and local business success, whether 
through the supply chain or customer base. Structural change cannot come through 
structural collapse. The lessons to be drawn from this conclusion are as relevant today as 
they were thirty years ago and provides a better explanation for the levels, and also type of 
new business activity in the town than does any industry-based cultural legacy. Given the 
wider local economic context with declining levels of affluence and increasing deprivation 
this finding also supports the broader conclusion that government understanding of the 
causal flows within the relationship is incorrect. Rather than low start up rates explaining 
deprivation, high levels of deprivation explain low start-up rates. This conclusion has 
implications for current regional policy particularly where localities have high concentrations 
of public sector employment, which today also includes Doncaster. Evidence from the most 
recent business analysis of the town conducted by the local Chamber of Commerce 
suggests that the town continues to be dominated by micro businesses in low value adding 
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service sectors, with the result that the economy still suffers from disproportionately high 
business failure rates. 135 
In considering the nature of decline the study draws the broad conclusion that despite the 
political shift from social democratic politics to neoliberal politics started during the 1980's, 
regional policy fundamentally remained locked into solutions which were based on national 
blueprints not applicable to all regions, and which merely reinforced the problems the policy 
rhetoric claimed to be addressing. Whereas 50 years earlier government was labelling 
regions 'depressed' or 'derelict', hardly, as Aneurin Bevin pointed out at the time of South 
Wales, 'a great inducement to anybody to open a business when you tell him that he is going 
to a place where there is a depression' (in Parsons, 1988, p. 8), during the time of the pit 
closure programme, government, including many local authorities were describing regions 
as lacking an 'entrepreneurial spirit' or an 'enterprise culture'. There is an important 
connection between the ways the regional problem is defined and the perception of 
appropriate forms of regional policies to tackle it, and each of the above were designed to 
effect a change in what we might term the 'meta' policy, each definition adopting what was 
then the prevailing discourse of the day. Murray Edelman, a political scientist who wrote on 
the linguistic and symbolic dimensions of public policy, expressed this as an 'impression that 
induces acquiescence of the public in the face of ... tactics that might otherwise be expected 
to produce resentment, protest and resistance' (in Parsons, 1988, p. 8) whilst at the same 
time seeking to help reinforce or to change forms of instituted behaviour, and to secure or 
alter the existing developmental trajectory. 
The study has highlighted how self-sustaining coalitions often determine regional 
trajectories. One particular limitation of this study is that in describing the various 
stakeholders and actors within these coalitions it has done so under the broad categories: 
macro; meso; and micro. Whilst not questioning the central conclusion that local autonomy 
135 See also the latest Doncaster labour market profile (2012) accessed at www.Nomisweb.co.uk on 28/5/2013 
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was eroded over time there is merit however in extending understanding of how local 
influence is represented and develops within these coalitions. The study has made reference 
at various times to the influence of business networks and trade unions in addition to elected 
local officials. It has also shown how these coalitions comprise networks often held together 
by expediency based on the need to compete for regional funds. These provide the basis for 
further analysis. However it is recommended that any subsequent analysis of self-sustaining 
coalitions should also include the role played by the academic community and specifically 
their role in relation to the publication of research. Despite extensive reference to the 
weaknesses inherent in one-size fits all solutions to regional problems, policy making 
remains locked in to standardised measures often derived from the experience of super-star 
regions. This tradition represents not just a political consensus but is also indicative of a 
dominant research tradition which seeks generalisation, but which often comes at the 
expense of understanding. Regions are different, and policy measures should be based on 
both the needs and the desires of the regions. To this end, recent work on the re-
conceptualisation of regions presents a possible critical juncture in not just how we think 
about regions, but also how we develop and implement regional policy. This is not 
particularly a comment in support of regional Mayors, but more a recognition that within any 
re-conceptualisation both quantitative and qualitative regional development is possible (Pike 
et ai, 2007). Quantitative growth might lead to rapid but short-lived growth, based on low 
quality jobs, dis-embedded inward investors and/or failing start up firms. Qualitative 
'development' on the other hand, can be based on low level, weak (but perhaps more 
sustainable) growth, insufficient (although potentially good) quality jobs. Or regional 
development could be based on a mixture of the two. This area clearly needs more thought, 
but asking the question what is a region for, provides the correct starting point rather than 
top down solutions based on the experiences of certain successful regions. This study has 
looked at the experiences of Doncaster over the course of the 20th century and it should be 
remembered that whilst today it continues to face numerous economic challenges, it had 
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previously been at the centre of a successful region. A key conclusion therefore is that a 
prerequisite for any re-conceptualisation would be a greater understanding of regions and 
their histories, many of which, particularly within old industrial regions, may be underpinned 
by cultures currently judged to be inhibitors to economic growth, but as demonstrated by the 
example of the Ruhr may provide a valuable anchor point around which change can be 
developed. 
Towns and regions often become victims of their own history. If they are to escape it they 
first must understand it. To paraphrase a recent NESTA document,136 economic 
performance varies substantially across the UK and the different history of each town/region 
has a substantial bearing on its economic position today. However, until recently regional 
policy has not taken sufficient notice of regional histories. This is a major oversight. History 
shows that old industrial regions find it harder to adapt to new ideas than those starting from 
a new industrial slate. This has been illustrated by the case of Doncaster. Policy-makers 
therefore need to develop an historical awareness in developing regional policy. However 
this study concludes that even where related to industries such as the coal industry, 
processes of lock-in are not inevitable or inexorable. It has been shown that opportunities 
exist to break industrial trajectories and the development paths of regions associated with 
them. It is not correct therefore to say that regions sow the seeds of their own decline. 
Industries especially the coal industry clearly have an impact on the subsequent trajectory of 
related regions, but this, and any related instituted legacies (including any particular attitude 
to starting a business) is contingent on wider factors which are not necessarily place 
dependent. In this study it has been argued that understanding the nature of Doncaster's 
decline cannot be limited to any specific industry legacy as all industrial legacies are largely 
contingent on agency. Any coal legacy affecting Doncaster is therefore an effect and not a 
cause. 
136 History matters. Unlocking innovation in British cities and regions. Policy briefing, HM/26/July 2008, National Endowment for 
Science Technology and the Arts, London, 
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Appendix 1: The 24 Regional Factors of Competitiveness as used by IFO (1990) 
Economic Infrastructure Social Educational Politicallinfrastructural I 
1. Proximity to customers 7. Connection to the traffic 12. Availability and quality 16. Availability and quality 21. Regional policy I 
2. Proximity to suppliers network of municipal cultural and of school-education and incentives social facilities training facilities 
3. Business culture 8. Availability and costs of 22. Co-operation of regional energy supply 13. Availability of leisure 17. Availability of qualified authorities. 
4. Availability and quality 9. Modern time facilities labour 23. Flexibility of planning 
of banks, insurance communications system 14. Social climate (e.g. 18. Availability of less or not decisions by local 
companies, and lawyers labour relations) qualified labour authorities 
5. Availability and quality 10. Availability and costs of waste disposal facilities 15. Availability and cost of 19. Proximity of vocational! 24. Local! regional taxes 
of advertising and housing managerial training and public fees 
consultancy agencies 11. Industrial sites facilities 
6. Availability and quality 20. Proximity to colleges, 
of servicing for universities and 
machinery research facilities 
I 
-
- .-
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Appendix 2: The 41 Regional Competitiveness Factors as used by Bowes (2000) 
Infrastructure Quality of life factors Institutional factors Labour force factors Business environment 
factors 
1. Transport network 8. Society values 15. Local authority co- 20. Direct labour costs 31. Proximity to customers 
2. Road network 9. External reputation operation 21. Supply of qualified 32. Proximity to suppliers 
3. Rail network and/or notoriety 16. Local political culture labour 33. Supply and cost of energy 
4. Air network 10. Crime levels 17. Business rates 22. Supply of qualified 34. Supply and cost of waste 
make labour 
5. Water network 11. Cost and availability 18. Regional policy disposal 
of housing incentives 23. Supply of qualified 35. Banks, insurance 6. Communications 12. School facilities 19. Support structures female labour companies and lawyers 
system (e.g. TECs, Business 24. Supply of unqualified 
7. Industrial sites 13. Leisure facilities Links) labour 36. Advertising and consulting 
14. Cultural and social companies 
facilities 25. Supply of unqualified 37. Machinery servicing male labour 
companies 
26. Supply of unqualified 38. Proximity of female labour 
vocationaVmanagerial 
27. Flexibility/adaptability training facilities 
of workforce 39. Proximity of third level 
28. Worker motivation education 
29. Brain drain 40. Regional and local 
30. Industrial relations industrial legacy 
41. Business culture 
-
-- _._-
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Appendix 3: Occupational category list 
1. Managerial staff: includes working directors and managers. 
2. Professional engineers, scientists and technologists 
3. Technicians and technical engineers 
4. Administrative and professional staff 
5. Clerks, office machine operators, secretaries and typists 
6. Surveyors 
7. Craftsmen 
8. Operators and other employees 
266 
Appendix 4: The Doncaster Area 
~~!~E~~~;1~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2 Bentley 
3 Brodsworth 
4 Bullcroft 
5 Cadeby 
6Denaby 
7 Hatfield 
8 Markham Main 
9 Rossineton 
10 Thorne 
11 Yorkshire Main 
The above map shows the town of Doncaster within the Doncaster Area with the (former) pit 
villages in red and is based on the Doncaster Coal Mining Referral Area 2010 
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Appendix 5: Doncaster wards 1910 
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Appendix 6: Doncaster ward map 1914 
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Appendix 7: Doncaster Borough ward map 2004 
2 Armthorpe 
4 Balby 
5 Bentley 
6 Bessacarr & Cantley 
7 Central 
9 Edenthorpe, Kirk Sandal! & Barnby Dunn 
20 Town moor 
21 Wheatley 
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Appendix 8: Doncaster industrial estates showing motoway 
development 
1. Kirk Sandall Estate 
2. Wheatley Hall Estate 
3. Marshgate Estate 
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Appendix 9: The eight Divisions of the National Coal Board 1 
January 1947 
o 
IRISH SEA 
Th. eighl Divisions oftlae Naliol1al Coal Board, IJal1uary 1947. 
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Appendix 10: Yorkshire coalfield showing Doncaster area 
1967 
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Reorganisation cif Yorkshire Coalfield into North, South, Barnsley '& Doncaster Areas, 27 Marc11 1967" 
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Appendix 11: Doncaster coalfield statistics 1972-73 & 1983-
84 
Tables of saleable output ('000 Tonnes) 
At the end of March 1973 there were 70 NCB collieries in the Yorkshire coalfield (North 
Yorkshire Area 20; Doncaster Area 10; Barnsley Area 21; South Yorkshire Area 19) 
52 weeks ended 
Area 24.3.73 25.3.22 
North Yorkshire 9,921 8,438 
Doncaster 8,675 6,809 
Barnsley 8,083 6,727 
South Yorkshire 9,416 7,624 
Total 36,095 29,598 
Source: NCB Annual Press Statement 1972-73 
At the end of March 1984 there were 53 NCB producing collieries in the Yorkshire Coalfield 
(North Yorkshire Area 12; Doncaster Area 10; Barnsley Area 16; South Yorkshire Area 15) 
52 weeks ended 
Area 31.3.84 26.3.83 
North Yorkshire 7,548 8,391 
Doncaster 5,816 6,780 
Barnsley 6,195 8,132 
South Yorkshire 6,574 7,328 
Total 26,133 30,631 
Source: NCB Yorkshire Coalfield Annual Review 1983-84 
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Appendix 12: Businesses registered in local business 
directories (all periods) 
Standard Classification Codes 1900 1936 1967 
o. Farming and horticulture 27 13 31 
1. Power: coal, oil. electricity, gas 4 12 89 
2. Manufacture of Metals, Mineral products and 46 28 83 
Chemicals 
3. Metal Goods EngineeringNehicles 5 52 169 
4.Manufacturing Industries (other) 113 188 261 
5. General Construction and Demolition 19 59 487 
6.Distribution 467 1055 2357 
7. Transport and Communication 46 105 110 
8. Banking and Business Services 86 217 378 
9. Other Services 127 327 334 
Totals 936 2056 4,299 
Source: Local Trade Directories based on 1980 Standard Classification Codes . 
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Appendix 13: Change in estimated unemployment rate 
from 1981 census base to 1991 census base by Ward for 
DMBC at April 1991 
Ward 1981 based 1981 1991 1991 Difference 
rate economic based economic In % rates 
activity rate activity 
Adwick * 13.07 7,094 13.71 6,792 +0.64 
Armthorpe ** 8.85 7,683 8.42 8,074 -0.43 
Askern * 13.06 4,792 12.31 5,085 - 0.75 
Balby 13.42 6,101 13.45 6,088 +0.03 
Bentley Central * 16.36 5,287 17.17 5,038 +0.81 
Bentley North Road 9.58 5,816 10.83 5,145 + 1.25 
Bessacarr 6.60 6,680 7.51 5,875 +0.91 
Central 16.34 5,691 17.35 5,359 +1.01 
Conisbrough * 13.45 6,491 14.81 5,895 +1.36 
Edlington & Warmsworth * 11.45 6,025 12.83 5,377 +1.38 
Hatfield * 9.73 6,237 8.64 7,029 -1.09 
Intake 11.51 5,315 13.72 4,460 +2.21 
Mexborough * 13.61 6,890 14.15 6,627 +0.54 
Richmond 6.57 6,559 6.36 6,774 -0.21 
Rossington * 11.61 5,661 12.07 5,443 +0.46 
South East 5.12 7,533 4.50 8,579 -0.62 
Southern Parks 6.17 6,027 5.25 7,079 -0.92 
Stainforth 10.85 6,679 10.27 7,061 -0.58 
Thorne * 12.52 7,478 13.07 7,161 +0.55 
Town Field 18.41 5,599 19.50 5,288 +1.09 
Wheatley 11.53 5,656 12.82 5,085 +1.29 
Doncaster Borough 11.24 131,298 11.41 129,275 +0.17 
.. 
*denotes mining wards 
** Armthorpe was drawn into Doncaster Central in 1983 
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Appendix 14: Doncaster Local Council Election Results 
1973-92 
Ward 1973 1975 1976 1978 1979 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Armthorpe Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lib Dem Lib Dem Lab 
Balby Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Con 
Bessacarr Con Con Con Con Lab Lab Lab Lib Dem Lab Con 
Con Con Lab 
Central Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Con Lib Dem 
Intake Con Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lib Dem Lib Dem Lib Dem 
Town Field Con Con Con Con Lab Lab Lab Con Con Con 
(& St Georges 
pre 1980) 
Wheatley Con Con Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lib Dem Lab Lab 
Sources: Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Election Results 1979-92, (DMBC), British Local 
Election Database, 1889-2003 
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